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ABSTRACT
This dissertation reports 4 Experiments that are concerned with the evaluation of eyewitness
identification testimony. In Experiment 1, three target description groups were assessed in
order to test different theoretical accounts regarding the relationship between identification
performance and target description (verbal overshadowing): non-describers, describers, and
rereaders (describers with rereading of the description before the identification task). Reread-
ers less frequently chose somebody from the lineup than the other two groups, lending sup-
port to the decision criterion shift approach (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004). In Experiment 2,
post-decision confidence, decision time, and self-reported decision processes were used as
postdictors of identification accuracy. Using a decision rule including highly confident and
fast choosers led to more correct classifications than either variable alone. Unexpectedly, self-
reported decision processes were neither associated with identification accuracy for choosers
nor for nonchoosers. In Experiment 3, combinations of post-decision confidence, decision
time, and Remember-Know-Familiar (RKF) judgments were evaluated as postdictors of iden-
tification accuracy in a field experiment with ten targets and a very large sample. Fast and
confident choosers were highly accurate. Including the RKF judgment did not lead to higher
correct classification rates. Participants' self-reported (estimated) decision times also proved
to be a postdictor of identification accuracy. Postdicting nonchoosers' identification perform-
ance by forming three homogeneous groups of nonchoosers failed, although there were differ-
ences with regard to confidence measures and decision times. Experiment 4 tested the useful-
ness of multiple lineup decisions (portrait face, body, bag, and profile face) for the assess-
ment of identification testimony for nine different targets. Performance in the four different
lineup types was not associated with each other, lending support to the idea that multiple
lineups can serve as independent sources of evidence. Compared to foil choices and lineup
rejections, target/suspect choices were most diagnostic of guilt. The portrait face lineup alone
and its combination with the body lineup were most diagnostic for target/suspect choices.
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To conclude, the present studies suggest that both decision times and post-decision
confidence should be collected at the time of identification and be combined in order to assess
identification accuracy. Investigators need to be aware though, that there is no postdictive
value of nonchooser's estimates. Furthermore, there seem to be no negative effects of target
descriptions on identification accuracy when there is a sufficient interval between description
and identification, as there is in real cases. Finally, the data speak for the application of mul-
tiple lineups with regard to suspect/target choices as a procedure to avoid false identifications,
whereas the benefit of multiple lineups for lineup rejections and foil choices seems to be lim-
ited. Future studies should address how many and which specific lineup types should be
used. In real cases, the results for the assessment (decision times, confidence, decision proc-
esses) and control variables (target description, multiple lineups) examined in the present dis-
sertation may vary from those that we obtain in laboratory or field studies. Reasons could be,
for example, awareness of the severe consequences of false identifications and false rejections
or the stress level at encoding or recognition. It would be interesting to collect data on these
issues in real cases so they can be compared to the data obtained in laboratory/field studies.
Undoubtedly, it would be a great contribution to the field of identification if data were col-
lected even where DNA samples exist, so that identification accuracy could actually be as-
sessed in real cases.
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INTRODUCTION
When a person witnesses a crime or becomes the victim of a crime, he or she will be
asked to give a description of the perpetrator and later will be presented with a live lineup or
a photospread. On the one side, eyewitnesses are capable of giving valuable testimony, on the
other hand, history has taught us that eyewitness identification evidence is not always reli-
able. A famous case of misidentification is the one of Jennifer Thompson. In 1984, the 22-
year old college student was assaulted and raped by a man who had broken into her apart-
ment. In order to get a better view of him, she lured him into the illuminated parts of the
apartment. She was determined to do everything that would enable her to later give a good
description of the man and to identify him so he could be convicted and pay for what he had
done to her. In the identification procedure she identified a man named Cotton as the offender.
Only little later, police was given a hint by a prison inmate who reported that a person named
Poole had confessed the offence while he had served time with him. Consequently, Jennifer
Thompson was presented with the lineup one more time but she declared that she had never
seen Poole before and that she was absolutely confident that Cotton was the man. The police
believed Jennifer and it was not until 1995 that Cotton was exonerated by DNA analysis. The
analyses also provided evidence that Poole committed the offence. Even though Jennifer had
been very confident about her decision and in spite of the fact that she had been presented
with the actual offender, she erred (for coverage on the case, see
www.truthinjustice.org/positive_id.htm; www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna). The
case of Jennifer Thompson is by far no exception. An investigation of cases in which biologi-
cal evidence was kept and analyzed when DNA analysis became available demonstrated that
eyewitness testimony was involved in most cases of wrong conviction (Scheck, Neufeld, &
Dwyer, 2000; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe, 1998). Nevertheless,
DNA samples do not always exist and then eyewitness identification testimony may be the
only evidence available. The importance of eyewitness identifications for investigating and
prosecuting crimes is still undoubted. Research on the psychology of eyewitness identifica-
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tion began in the late 1970s and has since identified numerous estimator and system variables
(Wells, 1978) that can have an influence on the accuracy of identification decisions. System or
control variables are those over which the criminal justice system normally has control, such
as instruction to witnesses or lineup composition. Estimator variables can be further broken
down into situational variables which can only be explored post hoc (e.g., lighting conditions)
and assessment variables (Sporer, 1993) that may be used to assess individual witnesses’ de-
cision making processes.
One well-studied system variable is the description of the target. Any eyewitness
identification task such as a live lineup or a photospread is usually preceded by a description
of the perpetrator provided by an eyewitness. Although this seems to be straightforward,
some research has challenged the idea that this process is unproblematic: Numerous studies
have shown that the very process of describing a target face can have negative effects on iden-
tification performance, that is, a verbal overshadowing effect (VOE) can occur (see the meta-
analysis by Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Meissner, Sporer, & Schooler, 2007). Different theo-
retical explanations have been developed to account for this phenomenon. Experiment 1 fur-
ther examined the mental processes involved. In particular, I investigated the influence that
describing a target freely and with open-ended questions has on identification performance,
and also how rereading of this description prior to the identification task affects identification
performance. To ensure high ecological validity, a 1-week delay was inserted between wit-
nessing the crime and target description on the one side and the identification task on the
other side.
Assessment or postdiction variables are those that may be used to retroactively assess
individual witnesses’ decision making accuracy. The most widely used assessment variables
are post-decision confidence (e.g., Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995) and decision times
(e.g., Sporer, 1992, 1993, 1994; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004). As the case
of Jennifer Thompson showed, eyewitness confidence is not resilient against mistakes and
research demonstrated that confidence can be influenced by feedback given by the investigator
(Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004; Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003).
On the other hand, post-decision confidence has shown to be useful when assessed right after
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the identification and when only the decisions of witnesses who made a positive identification
decision (choosers) were considered (Sporer et al., 1995). Other methods which further ex-
plore the decision processes (Dunning & Stern, 1994) have also been explored lately (Brewer,
Palmer, McKinnon, & Weber, 2005; Caputo & Dunning, 2005; Kneller, Memon, & Steve-
nage, 2001). Although decision time and post-decision confidence have been combined suc-
cessfully in the past (Sporer, 1992; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004), most
research on assessment variables, or postdictors, focused on one or another of these variables
in isolation. It was the aim of Experiment 2 to determine the usefulness of combinations of
post-decision confidence, decision time, and self-reported decision processes for distinguish-
ing between accurate and inaccurate identification decisions. Additionally, I intended to ex-
plore the usefulness of a judgment of the state of awareness and the existence of recollective
experience via a Remember-Know-Familiar (RKF) judgment. However, the operationalization
of that measure failed such that there was not a satisfactory number of Know answers, thus
not allowing any meaningful comparisons. Consequently, the wording of the corresponding
items was revised for Experiment 3, an extensive field study with 10 target persons and 720
participants. In this study, post-decision confidence, decision time, and RKF judgments were
combined. By the inclusion of 10 targets in Experiment 3, greater stimulus generalizability
was ensured and allowed for internal replication (Wells & Windschitl, 1999).
Associations of identification accuracy with post-decision confidence (e.g., Sporer et
al., 1995; Weber & Brewer, 2003) and decision time (e.g., Dunning & Stern, 1994; Sporer,
1992, 1993; Weber & Brewer, 2006; Weber et al., 2004) exist for positive identification deci-
sions (choosers), but not for negative identification decisions (nonchoosers). Until now, no
assessment variable that is capable of making valid postdictions about nonchoosers’ decisions
has been identified. Therefore, another aim of Experiments 2 and 3 was to test the usefulness
of nonchoosers’ self-reports about their decision processes as a postdictor of lineup rejection
accuracy with two different methodologies.
Even though higher correct classification rates are obtained when postdictors are com-
bined (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sporer, 1992; Weber et al., 2004), the question of how to pro-
ceed with those witnesses who do not meet the set criteria with regard to, for example, deci-
Introduction 12
sion time and post-decision confidence remains unanswered. Obviously, their evidence cannot
be discarded per se. A method applied by Lindsay and colleagues (Lindsay, Wallbridge, &
Drennan, 1987; Pryke, Lindsay, Dysart, & Dupuis, 2004) may be useful for all witnesses.
Rather than presenting witnesses with one lineup, Lindsay et al. (1987) carried out two inde-
pendent lineups, one in which the face of the target was presented, a second one in which a
piece of clothing that the target wore during the crime was to be identified. The authors then
estimated the diagnosticity ratios (Wells & Lindsay, 1980; Wells & Turtle, 1986). The diag-
nosticity ratio (DR) is defined as the ratio of correct and incorrect decisions. When the term
equals 1, the lineup is neither diagnostic of the guilt nor of the innocence of the suspect.
These results so far speak in favor of multiple lineups (Lindsay et al., 1987; Pryke et al.,
2004). Nevertheless, altogether, the effect has been shown for only three targets (Lindsay et
al., 1987; Pryke et al., 2004) and hence its generalizability remains unclear. Experiment 4,
which reports different data of the field study (see Experiment 3), aimed at replicating the
previous finding with nine targets and a large sample. Furthermore we wanted to contrast the
view that multiple lineups are independent of one another with the notion that performance in
blank (TA) lineups has predictive value for TP lineups (Wells, 1984).
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EXPERIMENT 1
Person Descriptions and Person Identifications: Verbal Over-
shadowing or Recognition Criterion Shift?
Any eyewitness identification task such as a live lineup or a photospread is usually
preceded by a description of the perpetrator provided by an eyewitness. However, numerous
studies have shown that the very process of describing a target face can have negative effects
on identification performance, that is, a verbal overshadowing effect (VOE) can occur (see the
meta-analysis by Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Meissner, Sporer, & Schooler, 2007). Different
theoretical explanations have been proposed to account for this phenomenon. The present
study examines the mental processes involved. In particular, we investigated the influence
that describing a target freely and with open-ended questions can have on identification per-
formance, and also how a witness's rereading of his or her own description prior to the identi-
fication task affects identification performance.
Verbal Overshadowing
The VOE, that is, decreased recognition performance in persons describing a face
compared to non-describers was investigated in a series of six experiments by Schooler and
Engstler-Schooler (1990). Since this initial set of experiments the body of research on the
VOE has grown vastly (see Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Meissner, Sporer, & Susa, in press).
While some researchers succeeded in replicating the VOE in face recognition experiments (e.g.,
Dodson, Johnson, & Schooler, 1997; Fallshore & Schooler, 1995; Ryan & Schooler, 1998;
Schooler, Ryan, & Reder, 1996), others failed to replicate the VOE (e.g., Clifford, 2003;
Meissner, Brigham, & Kelly, 2001; Memon & Bartlett, 2002; Tunnicliff & Clark, 1999; Yu &
Geiselman, 1993) or even reported verbal facilitation effects (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens,
1987; Krafka & Penrod, 1985). In these studies, however, verbal and visual context reinstate-
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ment variables were manipulated together so that it remained unclear, which manipulation the
positive effects have to be ascribed to. In a meta-analysis across 15 research articles with a
total of 29 effect size comparisons (N = 2018), Meissner and Brigham (2001) found a small,
yet significant, verbal overshadowing effect (Z
   r = -0.12), demonstrating that participants who
described a target face were 1.27 times more likely to later make an identification error when
compared to non-describers. Furthermore, post-description delay and type of description in-
struction were found to moderate this relationship (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Specifically,
overshadowing effects were more likely to occur when the identification task immediately
followed the description task, and when participants were given an elaborative description
instruction, as opposed to a standard (free recall) description instruction. A comparison of
studies using immediate or short delays (< 10 min) with those using long delays (> 30 min)
revealed that the long delay influenced only participants in the no-description control condi-
tion. These participants showed a significant degree of forgetting compared to a short delay,
whereas participants who had previously described the target face showed no change in per-
formance across the delay conditions. As an explanation for these findings the authors suggest
that a preservation of the memory trace across the extended post-description delay occurs
due to verbalization.
However, an exception to these findings are those of Finger and Pezdek (1999, Ex-
periment 3), where the description condition showed better identification performance after a
retention interval of 24 minutes compared to an immediate testing description group. When
compared to an immediate testing control group, there was no difference. As an explanation
for release from verbal overshadowing, Meissner and Brigham (2001) suggested that differ-
ences in performance resulted from memory decay across the delay for the control condition.
Unfortunately, as Finger and Pezdek (1999) did not include a post-description delay for the
control group, this hypothesis cannot be investigated with their data (Meissner & Brigham,
2001). Another exception to the effect of post-description delay, as postulated by Meissner
and Brigham (2001), are the findings by Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990, Experiment 5)
where a significant VOE was observed even after a retention interval of two days.
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There are three major theoretical explanations of the VOE. The first approach, origi-
nally termed transfer-inappropriate retrieval (Schooler, Fiore, & Brandimonte, 1997), but
subsequently renamed transfer-inappropriate processing shift (TIPS; Schooler, 2002), sug-
gests that the activation of verbal processes, involved in providing a face description inhibits
subsequent non-verbal processes considered primarily responsible for face recognition. How-
ever, these verbal processes are not assumed to alter the original memory of the face. Schooler
et al. (1997) hypothesized that in verbal processing of faces the emphasis lies on the featural
information whereas in visual processing configural information is crucial. Hence, after de-
scribing a face participants are involved in a verbal (featural) mode of processing faces, and
attempt to recognize a face by referring to the verbal instead of the visual memory trace. Ac-
cording to TIPS, VOE is not attributed to excessive reliance on a memory representation cor-
responding to verbalization. Rather, verbal recall is hypothesized to disrupt the successful
application of nonreportable processes omitted in the initial verbal retrieval. Further support
for the TIPS was provided by Dodson, Johnson, and Schooler (1997) and Brown and Lloyd-
Jones (2002, 2003).
Another assumption made by the TIPS account is that the original memory only tem-
porarily becomes inaccessible instead of being permanently altered by verbalization. Support
for this assumption was found in several studies reporting release from verbal overshadowing.
For example, Finger and Pezdek (1999, Experiment 3) found even an increase in identification
accuracy after a retention interval between description and identification task of only 24 min-
utes (see also Finger, 2002).
Whether the VOE constitutes a temporal or a permanent interference with an eyewit-
ness's memory of a face is of utmost practical importance in criminal investigations. While it
is a standard procedure for police officials to interview eyewitnesses after a crime was com-
mitted and ask for a description of the perpetrator the probability of an immediately follow-
ing identification task with a photospread or live lineup is highly unlikely. Even a time inter-
val of two days between the witness's statement and an identification task as in Schooler and
Engstler-Schooler (1990, Experiment 5) appears to be the exception rather than everyday
practice (see Behrman & Richards, 2005; Valentine, Pickering, & Darling, 2003). Thus, a non-
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permanent effect of verbalizing visual memories would have little practical relevance for iden-
tification procedures in police investigations in real cases.
Another theoretical explanation of the VOE, known as retrieval-based interference
(RBI), suggests that the VOE arises from an alteration of the original memory trace caused by
verbalization. The RBI was first introduced by Meissner, Brigham, and Kelley (2001) fol-
lowing a study in which they manipulated the amount and elaboration of people's verbaliza-
tion. In an earlier study, Finger and Pezdek (1999, Experiment 1) had already compared the
VOE after an elaborate verbalization (using the cognitive interview) and a standard verbaliza-
tion of a previously seen photograph. In the elaborate interview participants recalled signifi-
cantly more correct, incorrect and subjective details and also performed significantly less ac-
curate in the identification task than participants in the standard interview condition. Meiss-
ner et al. (2001) partly replicated these results. By using three different instruction types
they altered people's response criterion for descriptions. Specifically, when participants were
explicitly instructed to provide a detailed and extensive description of the perpetrator and
were even encouraged to guess (forced recall), subsequent identification accuracy significantly
decreased both immediately and 30 min after the verbalization. Thus, unlike Finger and
Pezdek (1999, Experiment 3), no release from verbal overshadowing was found after a similar
retention interval. However, note that Meissner et al. (2001) used forced recall instructions in
this condition. In contrast, when participants were discouraged from guessing and asked to
only tell what they were sure they remembered correctly (warning condition) no VOE oc-
curred. In this condition, identification performance improved in both immediate and delay
conditions, relative to the control and forced recall conditions (Meissner et al., 2001). In an-
other condition in which participants were given standard description instructions (free re-
call), identification accuracy did not differ significantly from the control condition, that is, no
VOE occurred. This instructional bias effect was replicated in several studies (Meissner,
2002; MacLin, Tapscott, & Malpass, 2002) and has been found to be persistent after delays
of 30 min or 1 week. As guessing also evokes more inaccurate details, Meissner et al. (2001)
argued that these inaccuracies interfere with the original memory of the face, thus causing a
higher error rate in the identification task. These results obviously challenge the TIPS account
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and strongly suggest that the visual memory trace is permanently altered by erroneous ver-
balization.
A novel account of the VOE, first introduced by Clare and Lewandowsky (2004),
could possibly explain the results of those studies in which no apparent negative effect of
verbalization was found. Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) pointed out that previous research
has left open two major issues involving (a) the types of responses witnesses can make dur-
ing identification and (b) the nature of the lineup. Obviously it should make a difference if
participants merely have the option to choose from a lineup (forced-choice procedure) or can
also reject a lineup (optional-choice procedure). Furthermore, only presenting target-present
(TP) lineups in an experiment does not create a realistic scenario of the situation in a crime
investigation because it does not allow to adequately assess the rate of false identifications.
Therefore, for the sake of ecological validity any experiment should also include tar-
get-absent (TA) lineups, along with optional-choice instructions. Consequently, participants
need to decide not only who the perpetrator is but also whether the lineup must be rejected
entirely (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004). This decision requires a response criterion, such that
witnesses say "not present" when no lineup member matches their memory or make an iden-
tification if a particular face in the lineup meets the response criterion. The placement of that
response criterion is likely to influence identification performance: With a conservative crite-
rion, people might rather not choose anyone from the lineup, whereas with a liberal criterion,
identification attempts might increase (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004). Criterion effects are
pervasive and have frequently been observed in other memory paradigms that permit optional
choice, especially when there is a trade-off between quantity and accuracy (Koriat & Gold-
smith, 1994; Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000).1 Therefore, criterion shifts may also be a
contributing factor to the VOE if verbalization raises people's response criterion. As one pos-
sible explanation for a criterion shift following verbalization Clare and Lewandowsky (2004)
proposed that people monitor their descriptive ability the same way they monitor their per-
                     
1Note, however, that identification decisions are binary and therefore no such trade-off is
possible.
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formance during other memory tasks (Brigham & Pressley, 1988; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996;
Schraw, 1998).
In the identification context with a previous description task, people's inexperience
with providing descriptions of faces implies that they might find the task rather difficult and
that they are unlikely to have an appropriate reference against which they can compare their
own description (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004). Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) hypothe-
sized that those two factors combined may make people unsure about the quality of their
provided description, which in turn might lower their tendency to choose someone from a
lineup. According to this assumption, the criterion shift to be expected after verbalization is a
cautious shift as people become more cautious in their actions after experiencing their lacking
ability to satisfyingly describe the perpetrator. Thus, Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) rea-
soned that in an experimental design including both TA and TP lineups the rate of correct
identification decisions for describers should decrease in TP lineups (increase of false rejec-
tions) but increase in TA lineups (decrease of false alarms). Accordingly, no VOE should oc-
cur in forced-choice methodologies in which the decision of choosing or not choosing is re-
duced to one of choosing among alternatives (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004). These assump-
tions clearly differentiate the criterion shift account from the competing TIPS and RBI ac-
counts, as it focuses on choosing rates rather than considering only accuracy rates (TIPS) or
suggesting that most errors should consist of false identifications (RBI).
As the distinction between optional-choice and forced-choice, and in consequence the
use of TA lineups, has largely been ignored in previous research on the VOE (note that all
studies included in the meta-analysis by Meissner & Brigham [2001] used TP lineups only),
Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) assumed that people's response criterion may have contrib-
uted in unknown ways to existing experimental outcomes. However, it should be noted that in
the initial set of experiments by Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) the optional-choice
methodology (yet, no TA lineups) was used and no criterion effect was found. Furthermore,
Meissner (2002, Experiment 1) used TA and TP lineups but did not find a criterion shift in
any of the description conditions.
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In a series of experiments accounting for the factors of optional-choice and TA line-
ups, Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) reexamined the possibility of criterion effects in verbal
overshadowing. The results of Experiment 1 clearly supported the criterion shift account: In
an optional-choice identification task participants who had previously described the target
significantly less often chose someone from a lineup, which in turn lead to a decrease of deci-
sion accuracy in the TP condition, but also to increased identification accuracy in the TA
condition (i.e., correct rejections), relative to non-describers.
In order to further test their response criterion shift interpretation of Experiment 1,
Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) applied the forced-choice methodology with TP lineups only
in Experiment 2. They argued that, with the option of lineup rejection no longer available,
participants in the verbalization condition should no longer make more errors than the control
group if a response criterion shift was actually taking place. Supporting the criterion shift ac-
count, it turned out that describers did not perform less accurately than non-describers in the
identification task when they were forced to choose someone from a lineup. Based on the
findings in their study, the authors argued, that unlike the TIPS and RBI accounts, the crite-
rion shift explanation can simultaneously account for (a) the results of those experiments in
which standard description instructions and forced-choice identifications were used and no
VOE occurred, (b) a large VOE in optional-choice TP lineups, and (c) the beneficial effect of
verbalization with optional-choice TA lineups.
In summary, the results of both the meta-analysis (Meissner & Brigham, 2001) and
the more recent study by Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) suggest that more than one process
may be responsible for the observed variations in the VOE. The effect observed after standard
verbalization may be based on a response criterion shift, while the impact of an elaborative
description on identification performance appears to be due to either a change in processing
style or an alteration of the original memory trace.
In the present study, three description groups were assessed: non-describers, describ-
ers only (describers without rereading the description prior to the identification task), and re-
readers (describers with rereading of the description immediately before the identification
task). A rereading group was included in order to put some participants back into a verbal
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mode. If this leads to inappropriate processing, then the VOE should be particularly high in
this group.2 In any realistic case where a witness describes the target, it is very unlikely that
a suspect is found and that a lineup is constructed within less than 24 hours (see Behrman &
Richards, 2005; Valentine et al., 2003). To ensure ecological validity, we therefore allowed for
a 1-week delay between the description of the target and the identification task. In order to
analyze the data with regard to the discussed decision criterion shift due to target descriptions
(Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004), we included both TA and TP lineups. As standard descrip-
tion instructions (see Meissner & Brigham, 2001) were used, no VOE as caused by a change
in processing style (TIPS) or an alteration of the original memory trace (RBI) was expected.
Instead, we expected a response criterion shift (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004). Specifically,
we expected that describers shift their criterion towards a more conservative direction leading
to a higher rate of lineup rejections in the identification task relative to the control group. As
no results or theories regarding the duration of this cautious shift existed to date, there were
two possible outcomes: (1) If the response criterion shift is permanent, all describers should
reject the lineup equally often; (2) however, if the criterion shift is temporary, the description
only group should choose equally often as non-describers and only rereaders should show a
larger degree of lineup rejections. Furthermore, as both TA and TP lineups were included, the
tendency of rereaders (respectively describers in general) to not choose a person from a lineup
(as expected in the hypothesis above) should lead to less correct identifications (hits) in TP
lineups but also to an increase of correct rejections in TA lineups.
                     
2Note, however, describing and rereading are not the same; describing a person is the
effort to verbally retrieve a visually encoded stimulus, whereas rereading the description
merely reactivates the previously encoded verbal memory trace. One assumption is that both
processes have a similar effect due to the VOE. Yet, the possibility that rereading has an as-
sociative effect in terms of context reinstatement should not be ignored.
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Context Reinstatement
Verbalization apparently can have negative implications for identification accuracy by
"overshadowing" the original memory trace, altering it, or producing a cautious shift in peo-
ple's response criterion. However, contrary to the verbal overshadowing accounts, the use of
person descriptions as a means of context reinstatement prior to the identification task may
also lead to memory facilitation (e.g., Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Cutler, Penrod,
O'Rourke, & Martens, 1986). Cutler et al. (1987) provided context reinstatement cues by
conducting an interview using the mnemonic instructions of the cognitive interview (see
Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985), providing snapshots of the crime scene,
the victim, and another person involved, and by having the participants reread their written
description of the incident and the perpetrator. Additionally, the target's disguise and pres-
ence of a weapon were manipulated. A significant interaction between disguise and context
reinstatement was observed. That is, only when the target's face was difficult to see in the
encoding situation was subsequent identification performance improved by the context rein-
statement cues.
Cutler et al. (1986) conducted an extensive study in order to determine which of dif-
ferent context reinstatement methods was the most effective and under which circumstances.
They found that only the rereading of a description about the incident had a significant effect
on the identification decision, however, only in interaction with other factors. The first inter-
action found was between rereading and the retention interval: Those participants who did
not reread their descriptions showed impairment of identification performance after a reten-
tion interval of one month compared to a retention interval of one week, whereas those par-
ticipants who reread their own description performed almost equally well after both retention
intervals. The second interaction was found between rereading and target presence in the
lineup. In the TA condition, rereading was associated with better identification performance,
while in the TP condition, rereading was associated with decreased identification performance.
However, this effect only occurred when the offender was disguised and thus the encoding
situation was non-optimal for the observer. While these results have been interpreted primar-
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ily on the basis of a possibly facilitative effect of context reinstatement it should be noted
that they can also be explained with Clare and Lewandowsky's (2004) criterion shift account:
While the memory preserving effect due to rereading across the one month retention interval
only occurred in the target-disguise condition also a general tendency of rereaders to not
choose (55%) when compared to non-rereaders (40%) was observed. Sporer (in press) com-
pared describers only to describers with rereading and found a nonsignificant tendency toward
a facilitative effect of rereading (51.7% vs. 36.0% accuracy in the description only condition)
in the expected direction. However, Sporer's (in press) experiment may have lacked statistical
power to detect a context reinstatement effect.
Thus, while several lines of research have tried to produce a memory facilitating effect
by including the rereading of the target description, the results suggest the effect to be unsta-
ble. Possibly, other effects of describing the to be identified person and rereading the descrip-
tion prior the identification task, such as verbal overshadowing or response criterion shifts
may counteract the impact context reinstatement may have under the given circumstances.
Therefore, in the present study we included the rereading of one's own target description
prior to the identification task to examine these rival views. According to the principle of con-
text reinstatement, rereaders were expected to experience memory facilitation due to context
reinstatement cues provided in their own person descriptions relative to the control group and
the description only group. Therefore, rereaders should perform better in the identification
task than the other groups.
Relationship between Quantity and Quality of Descriptions
and Identification Accuracy
The significance of person descriptions for assessing eyewitness identification accu-
racy became apparent when the U.S. Supreme Court specified the accuracy of a witness' de-
scription of the criminal as one of five factors to be considered in the evaluation of identifica-
tion evidence (Neil v. Biggers, 1972). The practical importance of person descriptions is evi-
dent from the discussion on their utility to assess ("postdict") the accuracy of a given identi-
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fication (Sporer, 1992b, 1996; Wells, 1985; for a recent meta-analytic review, see Meissner,
Sporer, & Susa, in press). Two aspects of person descriptions can be distinguished: descrip-
tion accuracy (usually defined as the number of correct descriptors divided by the number of
correct plus incorrect descriptors), and description quantity (the total number of descriptors,
irrespective of accuracy). In actual criminal cases, the accuracy of person descriptions cannot
be established as this requires knowledge of the true perpetrator. Description quantity, how-
ever, can be ascertained by the number of descriptors or features mentioned which may or
may not be related to identification accuracy (see Sporer, 1996). Quantity, and indirectly also
accuracy of descriptions, is likely to be influenced by the type of instruction given, viz. stan-
dard instructions vs. elaborative description instructions, which have been an important mod-
erator of the VOE (Meissner & Brigham, 2001).
Correlations between Description Accuracy and Identification Accuracy
While some studies observed positive correlations between description accuracy and
identification accuracy (e.g., Meissner et al., 2001; Wogalter, 1996), other studies did not find
an association between the two variables (Goldstein, Johnson, & Chance, 1979; Pigott &
Brigham, 1985; Pigott, Brigham, & Bothwell, 1990; Grass & Sporer, 1991; see Sporer, 1996).
In a recent meta-analysis, Meissner, Sporer, and Susa (in press) synthesized the reported
point-biserial correlations between various aspects of description quality and quantity and
identification accuracy. Across k = 32 hypothesis tests of the relationship between descrip-
tion accuracy and identification accuracy with N = 2973 participants, the weighted mean ef-
fect size was r = .14 (p < .001), with CIs of .11 and .18.
Sporer (in press) found a significant interaction between identification accuracy and
choosing with accurate nonchoosers (M = 5.5) reporting more correct descriptors than inaccu-
rate nonchoosers (M = 3.3). No effect was found for choosers (M = 4.2 vs. 4.6). Addition-
ally, a series of experiments conducted by Meissner and colleagues (Meissner et al., 2001;
Meissner, 2002) consistently demonstrated a significant negative association between the
number of incorrect descriptors provided and identification accuracy while no such associa-
tion was found for the number of correct descriptors given. Finger and Pezdek (1999) found
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that inaccurate identifiers reported more incorrect description details (M = 4.0) than accurate
identifiers (M = 2.1) when only a 10-minute delay between description and identification task
was inserted (Experiment 1). However, no such differences were found when longer delays
between description and identification were used (Experiment 2: 1-hour; Experiment 3: 24
minutes).
Number of Features Mentioned and Identification Accuracy
Among other studies, Sporer (1992b) observed a positive correlation between the
number of descriptors and identification accuracy (r = .28). However, other studies failed to
find such an association (Franzen & Sporer, 1994b; Pigott et al., 1990; Wells, 1985; see
Sporer, 1996). The meta-analysis by Meissner, Sporer, and Susa (in press) analyzed 33
studies with N = 2578 participants that examined the relationship between the number of
features mentioned (description quantity) and identification accuracy. A weighted mean r = -
.04, ns, with CIs of -.08 and .00, was found. Thus, the number of features mentioned seems
to be unrelated to identification accuracy.
As Meissner, Sporer, and Susa (in press) noted, the results of studies on description
accuracy and quantity are difficult to compare as the various authors used different opera-
tionalizations of description accuracy (e.g., some analyzed only facial descriptors while oth-
ers included bodily descriptors or estimates of height and weight). Also, studies varied con-
siderably with respect to the methodological rigor with which descriptions were assessed. For
example, some analyses were carried out by establishing clear criteria for scoring and reporting
high interrater agreement using Pearson's r, while others used single raters or established
agreement simply by consensus of raters. Finally, some studies reported only few descriptive
elements with little variation across participants while others contained lengthy descriptions
that varied considerably. Of course, to the extent that description quantity and accuracy are
not precisely measured or show very little variation across participants we cannot expect
substantial correlations between these measures and identification accuracy.
The relationship between description quantity and identification accuracy will again
be tested in the present study, using an elaborate coding scheme for description accuracy and
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quantity. Participants who gave more elaborate person descriptions in terms of quantity of
details could be expected to experience a VOE in form of a change in processing style (TIPS;
Schooler, 2002) or an alteration of the original memory trace (RBI; Meissner et al., 2001). If
an alteration of the original memory trace (RBI) takes place, then both description groups
should be equally affected by description elaborateness and accuracy. Specifically, elaborate
describers of both description groups would be expected to show lower identification accu-
racy due to a form of VOE. Furthermore, a negative relation between description accuracy and
identification accuracy would be expected for both groups.
On the other hand, if a change in processing style (TIPS) takes place, one would ex-
pect no effect of description accuracy or elaborateness on identification accuracy for describ-
ers only, as it would not be expected to last over an interval of 1 week. However, a change in
processing style might be reactivated by rereading. Therefore, according to TIPS, elaborately
describing rereaders would be expected to show lower identification accuracy rates than less
elaborately describing rereaders. Additionally, rereaders who make an incorrect identification
decision should have reported more incorrect descriptors. Consequently, description accuracy
was expected to be positively correlated with identification accuracy for rereaders.
Method
Participants
One hundred and forty four individuals (72 males and 72 females; age 16 to 53,
Mdn = 23 years) completed this experiment. Most participants were psychology majors
(59%) who received course credit for their participation. Other participants were students
with other areas of study (26%) and persons of various occupations (15%). They were ran-
domly assigned to the conditions and tested individually. Half of the participants were tested
at the Free University Berlin and half at the Justus Liebig University Giessen, Germany.
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Design
A 3 (description: no description vs. description only vs. description with rereading) x
2 (target presence: TP vs. TA) between-subjects design was used. Dependent variables were
identification accuracy and choosing rate. For the two description groups we measured de-
scription quantity and quality and their association with identification accuracy.
Stimulus Film
The stimulus film was taken from an earlier study by Sporer and Franzen (1994a).
The film showed the theft of an expensive pair of sunglasses in an optometrist’s store. Alto-
gether, five amateur actors (one woman and four men) participated in the film, which lasted 6
minutes and 30 seconds. The target person could be seen for 18 seconds. A close-up showing
the target's head and shoulders in half-profile lasted for about 2 seconds. For the remaining
time the target was filmed from a distance of several meters, where his head and whole torso
could be seen. The actual theft took about 30 seconds (looking at the sunglasses on the rack,
taking a pair and putting it in the pocket). The content of the film can be described as follows:
A young female (optician) is standing behind the counter, polishing glasses. One after
another, three male customers enter the store. When a fourth customer comes in, the
optician asks him to wait for a moment until she has served the other customers.
While she is taking care of the other customers, the fourth customer walks up to a
rack, takes a pair of sunglasses from the shelve and puts it in his pocket. At that time
he can be seen in the background while the third customer stands in the foreground at
the counter waiting for the optician. He then leaves the store with the words: "This is
taking too long, I'll come back later." After the third customer has paid and is about to
leave the shop, the optician discovers the theft.
Photo Lineup
Each lineup consisted of six frontal 6 x 9 cm photographs simultaneously displayed
on the computer screen at a color depth of 16.7 million colors, that is, 32 bit and a resolution
of 1024 x 768 pixels, depicting six male individuals who all fit the general description of the
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target person as determined by a pilot study (effective size = 4.7). The men all wore the same
sweater (different from clothing in the film) and each picture had been taken in the same win-
dowless room with the same illumination and in front of the same wall.
The photos were arranged in two rows of three pictures each. For half of the partici-
pants, the target photograph was present (TP), for the other half it was replaced with an in-
nocent foil (TA). Target position as well as distractor position were completely balanced to
appear at any of the six positions an equal number of times.
Procedure
In the present experiment, an effort was made to achieve a high ecological validity by
(a) inserting a retention interval of one week between description and identification task, and
(b) including TA lineups equally often as TP lineups as well as a "not present" option fol-
lowing unbiased lineup instructions. In line with common police practice, we collected person
descriptions first via free report followed by open-ended questions.
Before and in-between the separate parts of the experiment the participants were
given thorough instructions on the computer screen how to respond to the questions and
which keys to use. All instructions and lineup presentation were programmed with SuperLab
1.75 (www.cedrus.com).
Participants were informed that they were taking part in an experiment concerned
with witness statements. The advertisement for the experiment displayed the question "Are
You A Good Witness?", in order to appeal to peoples' ambition and curiosity but did not ex-
plicitly mention the topic of person identification. Participants were tested individually. Be-
fore viewing the video they were asked to watch the film closely and pay attention to every
detail. Afterwards, participants completed a 30-minute filler task consisting of 40 general
knowledge questions. In the following, participants of the experimental groups were in-
structed to give a detailed written description of the crime they had witnessed earlier in the
film. Participants were asked to imagine they were making a witness statement for a real po-
lice investigation. This description was to be a free report consisting only of the information
the participants remembered by themselves. Subsequently, participants were asked to answer
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eight open-ended questions concerning the crime on another sheet. The same procedure was
followed for the description of the culprit. First, participants were asked to describe the tar-
get with their own words, emphasizing precision ("the description should be precise enough
for another person to be able to recognize the culprit in a crowd"). Then, twelve open ques-
tions concerning the target's appearance followed (see Appendix). The description instruc-
tions were in line with the standard description instructions as used in previous studies (e.g.,
Finger & Pezdek, 1999; Meissner & Brigham, 2001).
The identification task was scheduled exactly one week later. Half of those partici-
pants who had provided a target description a week earlier were given the opportunity to re-
read their free description of the perpetrator as well as their answers to the specific questions
concerning the physical appearance of the thief which they had provided. Before the identifi-
cation task, participants indicated their pre-decision confidence regarding the accuracy of their
identification decision on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0% to 100% (with intervals
marked in 10% steps: 0%, 10%, ..., 100%). Subsequently, participants were asked to identify
the culprit on the computer screen. Participants were advised that the culprit might or might
not be present in the lineup. Decision time was measured automatically via SuperLab. After
giving a rating of recollective experience, post-decision confidence ratings concerning the iden-
tification decision were assessed on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0% to 100% for all
participants.
Coding of the Person Description Details
Two raters received training in which they individually rated all details named in ten
cases and discussed the discrepancies with each other and the trainer. Subsequently, all de-
scriptions were coded for correct, incorrect or subjective details (cf. Finger & Pezdek, 1999).
Subjective details contained descriptors of personality traits or impressions the three raters
could not objectively agree on as correct or incorrect (e.g., “looked tired”, “unfriendly face”)
and were excluded from further analyses. Interrater correlations were computed for clothing,
body, facial and other (e.g., posture, nationality) details separately for free report and the
open questions. Due to the non-ambiguity of the coding system the mean interrater correla-
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tions after Fisher’s Z-transformation of free descriptions and specific questions was equally
high for body, facial, and other details, rs = .99. The mean interrater correlation after Fisher’s
Z-transformation for clothing details was r = .86 for free reports and r = .99 for open-ended
questions. Estimates of age, height and weight of the target were excluded from analysis due
to a lack of standard for coding “accuracy” (e.g., is a response of “20-25 years” to be consid-
ered accurate when a person is 25 years old?).
For data analysis, description scores combining free descriptions and specific ques-
tions were formed in addition to the four categories listed above. When a participant named
the same detail in the free report and the following questions, this repetition was excluded
from calculations. The subsequent analyses were carried out with the total number of details
(correct + incorrect details = description quantity). Additionally, description accuracy
scores3 were computed (description accuracy = correct details /[correct + incorrect details]).
We chose this rather time-consuming method to evaluate description accuracy and quantity
because this allowed us to analyze data differently than in most other VOE studies. Specifi-
cally, we wanted to analyze data not only according to the description condition participants
were allocated to but also with regard to the actual descriptive features of the descriptions.
Although participants in the description conditions all received the same instructions, indi-
vidual differences may lead to differences in description elaborateness (quantity) and descrip-
tion accuracy which in turn may have an influence on the processes believed to underlie the
VOE.
                     
3Using description accuracy as a predictor for identification accuracy has been criti-
cized in previous research (Sporer, 1996; Wells, 1985) because the accuracy coefficient does
not differentiate between more and less detailed descriptions. A description consisting of only
one correct detail will obviously have a higher accuracy score (100%) than a description con-
sisting of 10 details with 2 of them wrong (80%). However, the minimum of total descriptors
provided by participants in our experiment was 7 (M = 16.8; SD = 4.1), which made analyses
with description accuracy appropriate and justifiable.
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Results
An alpha level of alpha = .05 was used for all inferential analyses. Cohen’s (1988) d
and f are reported as measures of effect size for ANOVAs, and Cramer’s V and phi are re-
ported for nonparametric analyses of 3 x 2 and 2 x 2 contingency tables, respectively.
In the following, we first report descriptive results for the whole sample. Subse-
quently, we look at the influence of the description conditions on identification accuracy and
choosing behavior, followed by analyses of the relationship between description accuracy and
quantity and identification outcomes.
Identification Accuracy
Table 1 displays the distribution of identification decisions for TA and TP lineups in
the three experimental conditions. Altogether, 47.2% of the 144 participants made a correct
decision. Identification accuracy differed significantly for the 60 choosers (33.3%) from the
84 nonchoosers (57.1%), chi2(1, N = 144) = 7.96, p = .007, phi = -.24. Identification accu-
racy for TA lineups (66.7%) was higher than for TP lineups (27.8%),
chi2(1, N = 144) = 21.85, p < .001, phi = -.39.
Target Descriptions
Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations of accuracy rates and the number
of descriptors separately for free reports, and for free reports and open-ended questions
combined. The mean number of descriptors in the free report was M = 10.40 (SD = 3.75,
Min = 4, Max = 20) and M = 14.05 for the open-ended questions (SD = 3.49, Min = 6,
Max = 23). On average, open-ended questions increased the number of details reported by
M = 6.38 (SD = 2.33), after eliminating descriptors mentioned in both. There were no differ-
ences in description accuracy for free report (M = 70.12%, SD = 17.51) and open-ended
questions (M = 69.28%, SD = 11.75), t(95) = .66, p = .512, d = -0.07. The mean description
accuracy for free report and open-ended questions together, after eliminating duplicates, was
M = 69.68% (SD = 11.64).
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Table 1
Distribution of Identification Decisions (in %) in Target-Absent and Target-Present Lineups
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Target-absent (n = 72) Target-present (n = 72) Total sample (N = 144)
                                                                                                             
Choosers Nonchoosers Choosers Nonchoosers
                                                                                                           
Condition False Correct Hit Foil False Mean Mean
alarm rejection identification rejection accuracy choosing rates
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
No description 33.3 66.7 29.2 25.0 45.8 47.9 43.8
(n = 48) (8) (16) (7) (6) (11) (23) (21)
Description only 37.5 62.5 33.3 33.3 33.3 47.9 52.1
(n = 48) (9) (15) (8) (8) (8) (23) (25)
Rereading 29.2 70.8 20.8 8.3 70.8 45.8 29.2
(n = 48) (7) (17) (5) (2) (17) (22) (14)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total sample 33.3 66.7 27.8 22.2 50.0 47.2 41.7
(N = 144) (24) (48) (20) (16) (36) (68) (60)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note. Figures enclosed in parentheses represent absolute frequencies.
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Total Descriptors and Proportion Correct in Free Reports
and in Free Reports and Open-Ended Questions Combined (N = 96).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Free report Free report and open-ended  questions
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total number Proportion Total number Proportion
descriptors correct descriptors correct
------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------
M SD M SD M SD M SD
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Face total 4.52 2.05 .72 .23 7.01 2.01 .67 .17
Hair 2.77 1.10 .69 .25 4.18 1.15 .67 .17
Face holistic .35 .58 .55 .47 1.11 .69 .55 .44
Eyes .56 .68 .80 .38 .58 .69 .77 .39
Nose .15 .48 .87 .32 .19 .53 .78 .38
Skin .25 .44 .92 .28 .28 .45 .89 .32
Face other .44 .69 .86 .33 .66 .86 .84 .33
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Body .59 .61 .35 .47 1.54 .91 .39 .40
Clothes 5.28 2.97 .74 .24 8.23 2.95 .78 .15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 10.40 3.75 .70 .18 16.78 4.06 .70 .12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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For descriptors concerning the face only (holistic facial descriptors, hair, eyes, nose,
skin, and other features) the mean number descriptors named across both free report and
open-ended questions was M = 7.01 (SD = 2.01). Of these, a mean of M = 4.52 (SD = 2.05)
descriptors had already been named in the free report. Thus, on average, 41.78% of the de-
scriptors referred to the face of the perpetrator, most of which concerned hair style and color
(59.63%).
Additionally, descriptors of age, weight, and height occurred with a mean of M = 2.25
(SD = 0.52), and subjective details with a mean of M = 1.27 (SD = 1.16), across both free re-
port and open-ended questions. However, for the reasons explained earlier these latter details
were not included in any of the following analyses.
Effects of Describing and Rereading
Effects on Identification Accuracy
Our main hypotheses were based on the question of whether identification perform-
ance was affected by the different description conditions. Identification accuracy did not dif-
fer as a function of the three conditions (no description: 47.9%; description only: 47.9%; re-
reading: 45.8%), chi2(2, N = 144) = .06, p = .973, Cramer’s V = .02, that is, no VOE in the
traditional sense was found, nor did the results confirm our expectations concerning a context
reinstatement effect, or an effect of memory preservation due to describing the target (see Ta-
ble 1).
Effects on Choosing Rates
Table 1 above also displays the distribution of choosers and non-choosers in the three
conditions. First, comparing describers (describers only and rereaders; 39.6%) to non-
describers (43.8%), showed no effect on choosing rates, chi2(1, N = 144) = .13, p = .724,
phi = -.03. Secondly, comparing rereaders to non-rereaders showed that rereaders significantly
less often chose a person from the lineup (29.2%) than non-rereaders (47.9%),
chi2(1, N = 144) = 4.63, p = .033, phi = -.18. Choosing rates in the rereading condition
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(29.2%) also differed from those in the description only condition (52.1%),
chi2(1, N = 96) = 5.23, p = .037, phi = -.23. These results indicate a cautious shift in the re-
reading condition.
Quality and Quantity of Descriptions and their Relationships to Identification
Accuracy
Analyses of variance and correlational analyses were conducted to examine the asso-
ciations between different aspects of person descriptions with identification accuracy and
choosing behavior.
Three 2 x 2 x 2 unweighted means ANOVAs with choice (choosers vs. nonchoosers),
description condition (description only vs. rereading), and decision outcome (correct vs. in-
correct) as classification variables and description accuracy, total number of descriptors and
number of false descriptors as dependent variables were computed. The main effect for
choosing  became significant for description accuracy, F(1, 88) = 4.60, p = .035, d = 0.11, and
number of false descriptors, F(1, 88) = 5.08, p = .027, d = 0.12, but not for total number of
descriptors, F(1, 88) = .88, p = .352, d = 0.05. Specifically, choosers gave more accurate de-
scriptions (M = 70.06%) and less false descriptors (M = 4.81) than nonchoosers
(M = 65.27%; M = 6.08). The main effects of decision outcome and description condition
were nonsignificant for the three ANOVAs, Fs ≤ 2.62, ds ≤ .09. All three ANOVAs revealed
significant interactions of Decision Outcome and Description Condition (description accu-
racy:  F(1, 88) = 5.29, p = .024, f = .25; total number of descriptors: F(1, 88) = 3.99,
p = .049, f = .21; number of false descriptors: F(1, 88) = 9.14, p = .003, f = .32).
Figures 1 and 2 display the interactions of Description Condition with Identification
Accuracy for description accuracy and number of false descriptors. There was a simple main
effect of identification accuracy within describers only for description accuracy,
F(1, 88) = 7.56, p = .007, d = 0.14, and for number of false descriptors, F(1, 88) = 8.33,
p = .005, d = 0.15. That is, within describers only, inaccurate identifiers gave less accurate
descriptions (M = 65.86%) than correct identifiers (M = 74.89%). Likewise, within describ-
ers only, inaccurate identifiers reported more incorrect descriptors (M = 5.76) than accurate
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identifiers (M = 3.91). Within rereaders, no significant differences were found for description
accuracy, F(1, 88) = .03, p = .855, d = 0.00, or number of false details reported, F(1, 88) =
.38, p = .541, d = 0.03. The simple main effects of identification accuracy for total number of
descriptors were nonsignificant for describers only, F(1, 88) = 1.38, p = .244, d = 0.06, and
rereaders, F(1, 88) = 1.15, p = .286, d = 0.06.
Analogous ANOVAs with description accuracy of facial descriptions, total number of
facial descriptors and number of false facial descriptors as classification variables were carried
out. No significant main effects for choice, decision outcome, and description condition were
found, Fs ≤ .2.06, |d|s ≤ .08. The only significant interaction was between Decision Outcome
and Description Condition for number of incorrect facial descriptors, F(1, 88) = 6.25,
p = .014, f = .27. That is, within describers only, incorrect identifiers (M = 2.48) reported
more incorrect facial descriptors than correct identifiers (M = 1.74), F(1, 88) = 4.33, p = .040,
d = 0.11. No significant difference was found within rereaders, F(1, 88) = .55, p = .461,
d = 0.04.
Figure 1. Description accuracy (%) of correct and incorrect lineup decisions with or without
rereading.
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Figure 2. Number of false descriptors in correct and incorrect lineup decisions with or without
rereading.
These interactions between Decision Outcome and Description Condition were nonsignificant
for accuracy of facial descriptors, F(1, 88) = 2.74, p = .101, f = .18, and total number of facial
descriptors, F(1, 88) = 2.44, p = .122, f = .17.
Correlational Analyses of Description Accuracy and Identification Accuracy
Overall description accuracy (i.e., referring to all descriptors, not just facial descrip-
tors) and description quantity did not correlate significantly, r(94) = -.16, p = .877. Table 3
displays the correlations of description accuracy, description quantity as well as number of
correct and incorrect details with identification accuracy for all describers and separately for
describers only and rereaders. Additionally, associations are reported not only for all descrip-
tors but also for facial descriptors. In the following, we will concentrate on the different result
patterns of describers only and rereaders with regard to all descriptors named. Results for fa-
cial descriptors and the whole sample can be obtained from the Table.
Positive associations between description accuracy and identification accuracy were
found for the description only group for open-ended questions, r(46) = .41, p = .004, and the
combination of free report and open-ended questions, r(46) = .39, p = .006. No significant
results emerged for the rereading group, all |r|s ≤ .04, ns.
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Correlational Analyses of Description Quantity, Correct and Incorrect Details and Identifica-
tion Accuracy
No significant associations between identification accuracy and description quantity
were found, |r|s ≤ .28, ns, with correlations for describers only tending to be negative, correla-
tions for rereaders tending to be positive. Likewise, no significant associations between identi-
fication accuracy and number of correct details were found, |r|s ≤ .26, ns. However, for de-
scribers only, significant negative associations between number of incorrect details named and
identification accuracy emerged for free report, r(46) = -.30, p = .038, open-ended questions,
r(46) = -.49, p < .001, as well as the combination of both, r(46) = -.46, p = .001. No such as-
sociations were found for rereaders, |r|s ≤ .12, ns.
Correlational Analyses of Description Accuracy and Choosing
Table 4 displays the correlations of description accuracy, description quantity as well
as number of correct and incorrect details named with choosing for all describers and sepa-
rately for describers only and rereaders. Additionally, associations are reported not only for
all descriptors but also for facial descriptors. As for identification accuracy, we will concen-
trate on the different result patterns of describers only and rereaders with regard to all de-
scriptors named. Results for facial descriptors and the whole sample can be obtained from the
Table.
For rereaders, choosing and description accuracy were positively associated for free report,
r(46) = .41, p = .004, open-ended questions, r(46) = .29, p = .047, and the combination of
both, r(46) = .37, p = .011. That is, witnesses who reread their low accuracy descriptions
tended to not choose, while accurately describing rereaders tended to choose. No associations
between choosing and description accuracy were found for describers only, |r|s ≤ .07, ns, with
all the correlations tending to be negative.
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Table 3
Correlations of Identification Accuracy with Description Accuracy, Description Quantity,
Number of Correct Details, and Number of Incorrect Details
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All describers Description Rereading
(N = 96) only (n = 48) (n = 48)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description accuracy
Free report
All descriptors .14 .25° .04
Facial descriptors .14 .23 .08
Open questions
All descriptors .22* .41** .02
Facial descriptors .19° .30* .07
Free report and open questionsa
All descriptors .18° .39** -.03
Facial descriptors .12 .29* -.06
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description quantity (correct and incorrect details)
Free report
All descriptors .11 -.08 .28°
Facial descriptors .08 -.08 .22
Open questions
All descriptors -.08 -.20 .04
Facial descriptors .00 -.00 .00
Free report and open questionsa
All descriptors -.01 -.18 .16
Facial descriptors -.01 -.12 .10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 3 (continued)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All describers Description Rereading
(N = 96) only (n = 48) (n = 48)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number correct details
Free report
All descriptors .17 .07 .26°
Facial descriptors .12 .04 .19
Open questions
All descriptors .06 .06 .05
Facial descriptors .13 .21 .04
Free report and open questionsa
All descriptors .10 .07 .14
Facial descriptors .06 .08 .03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number incorrect details
Free report
All descriptors -.07 -.30* .12
Facial descriptors -.05 -.26° .10
Open questions
All descriptors -.23* -.49** -.01
Facial descriptors -.18° -.30* -.05
Free report and open questionsa
All descriptors -.16 -.46** .09
Facial descriptors -.10 -.35* .11
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
°p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01.
aFeatures mentioned in both free report and open-ended questions were only coded once.
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Correlational Analyses of Description Quantity, Correct and Incorrect Details and Choosing
No significant associations between choosing and description quantity with regard to
all descriptors were found, |r|s ≤ .24, ns. Likewise, no significant associations between identi-
fication accuracy and number of correct details were found, |r|s ≤ .22, ns. However, for reread-
ers, significant negative associations between number of incorrect details and choosing
emerged for free report, r(46) = -.31, p = .032, open-ended questions, r(46) = -.35, p = .016,
and the combination of both for rereaders, r(46) = -.31, p = .035. No significant results were
obtained for describers only, |r|s ≤ .09, ns.
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Table 4
Correlations of Choosing with Description Accuracy, Description Quantity, Number of Cor-
rect Details, and Number of Incorrect Details
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All describers Description Rereading
(N = 96) only (n = 48) (n = 48)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description accuracy
Free report
All descriptors .22* -.01 .41**
Facial descriptors .11 -.17 .28°
Open questions
All descriptors .09 -.07 .29*
Facial descriptors .10 -.06 .21
Free report and open questionsa
All descriptors .16 -.05 .37*
Facial descriptors .11 -.03 .25°
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description quantity (correct and incorrect details)
Free report
All descriptors -.11 -.20 .02
Facial descriptors -.00 -.10 .00
Open questions
All descriptors -.19° -.15 -.24°
Facial descriptors -.20° -.35* -.03
Free report and open questionsa
All descriptors -.10 -.13 -.05
Facial descriptors -.05 -.19 .14
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 4 (continued)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All describers Description Rereading
(N = 96) only (n = 48) (n = 48)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number correct details
Free report
All descriptors .02 -.17 .22
Facial Descriptors .07 -.12 .24°
Open questions
All descriptors -.12 -.18 -.05
Facial descriptors -.10 -.30* .09
Free report and open questionsa
All descriptors .00 -.14 .17
Facial descriptors .04 -.14 .26°
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number incorrect details
Free report
All descriptors -.23* -.09 -.31*
Facial descriptors -.12 .02 -.18
Open questions
All descriptors -.17 .02 -.35*
Facial descriptors -.16 -.12 -.15
Free report and open questionsa
All descriptors -.19 -.02 -.31*
Facial descriptors -.14 -.08 -.13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
°p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01.
aFeatures mentioned in both free reports and open-ended questions were only coded once.
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Discussion
The major aim of this study was to investigate the influence of describing a target-thief
seen in a film and the influence of rereading one’s description prior to a lineup on identifica-
tion performance and choosing rates. We considered a number of possible theoretical ap-
proaches with partly opposing predictions. Extensive care was taken to ensure ecological va-
lidity. First, the identification task was postponed until a week after both seeing the film and
providing a written description of the target. Second, both TP and TA lineups were used.
Third, the description instructions used were similar to the ones used in real criminal pro-
ceedings (free recall followed by a few open-ended questions to elicit additional details). The
results of our experiment emphasize the need to reconsider the effect that person descriptions
can have on eyewitness identification performance.
We found no impact of person descriptions and rereading on identification perform-
ance but only on choosing rates under certain conditions. No VOE as postulated by a change
in processing style (TIPS, Schooler et al., 1997; Schooler, 2002) or by an alteration of the
original memory trace (RBI; Meissner et al., 2001) was found. This was in line with previous
research that used standard description instructions (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Appar-
ently, only the inclusion of a forced recall condition allows for a more direct test of RBI and
TIPS (Meissner et al., 2001).
Also, our results yielded no support for a memory facilitation effect through context
reinstatement by rereading of one’s target description as found in some earlier studies (Cutler
et al., 1986; Cutler et al., 1987). Instead, consistent with our hypothesis, our results support
the recognition criterion shift approach as suggested by Clare and Lewandowsky (2004). The
fact that control and experimental conditions did not differ in identification accuracy supports
the assumption that the standard description instruction (or free recall) is a reasonably "safe"
way to obtain a person description with regard to the VOE (cf., Meissner & Brigham, 2001),
without reducing the description quantity to a minimum as observed with warning recall in-
structions (e.g., Meissner, 2002).
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Our results are in line with other studies that also did not find a VOE after post-
description delays of 24 hours or longer (e.g., Clifford, 2003; Memon & Rose, 2002; Yu &
Geiselman, 1993) and the meta-analysis by Meissner and Brigham (2001) which detected a
VOE only for elaborate description instructions. To our knowledge, there is only the excep-
tion of Schooler and Engstler-Schooler’s study (1990, Experiment 5) who did use a retention
interval of 48 hours and found a VOE. Yet, most studies examining the VOE used only short
post-description delays of less than 24 hours (cf., Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Therefore,
there is a clear need of studies with longer post-description delays in order to address the
questions of the durability and permanence that target descriptions can have on identification
performance. Also, we need to pay closer attention to the type of description instructions
and the way description quantity and accuracy are measured. After all, the probability that a
lineup is carried out immediately after the description is very low as documented in archival
analyses of real criminal cases (Behrman & Richards, 2005; Sporer, 1992a; Valentine et al.,
2003; van Koppen & Lochun, 1997). Hence, the ecological validity of previously reported
findings is arguable.
With regard to the criterion shift, our results differed for rereaders and non-rereaders.
Specifically, there were more nonchoosers within rereaders than within non-rereaders (de-
scription only and control conditions). As no such effect was found for describers in general,
we have to assume that the recognition criterion shift only occurs if (a) the identification task
immediately follows the description task, as assessed in the study by Clare and Lewan-
dowsky (2004), or (b) the description is reactivated before the identification task, for example
by rereading it, as it was the case in the present study. Our results in this regard are in line
with the underlying processes proposed by Clare and Lewandowsky (2004). According to
Clare and Lewandowsky, a criterion shift occurs due to the perceived difficulty of the de-
scription task combined with the presumed inadequacy of the description itself. Especially
the latter of these factors is not confined to the situation immediately after the description
task but can also be applied to the situation when participants reread their own descriptions.
Concerning the duration of the criterion shift, our results indicate the effect to only prevail
temporarily, for less than a week, as it appeared for rereaders only.
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Similar to the present study, Sporer (in press) had applied a 1-week delay and used
the same stimulus materials. He found a nonsignificant tendency of rereaders to be more accu-
rate in their identification on TA and TP lineups than describers only but no effect of the ex-
perimental manipulations on choosing. Note, however, that Sporer (in press) did not include a
no description control group, against which identification accuracy usually is contrasted in
VOE studies.
The second aim of our study concerned the relationship of different aspects of person
descriptions with identification accuracy and choosing behavior. The lack of a relationship
between description accuracy and quantity suggests that these two aspects need to be consid-
ered separately. Differences in description quantity can also be interpreted as differences in
elaboration, not evoked by varying instructions but most likely by the participants' individual
differences in their description criterion or ability. Participants in the present study provided
rather detailed target descriptions (descriptive details: M = 16.8; SD = 4.1) when compared to
the findings in archival analyses (Sporer, 1992a, M = 9.7; van Koppen & Lochun, Mdn = 8)
or staged event studies (e.g., Lindsay et al., 1994, M = 7.6; Sporer, 1992b, M = 5.5). Also,
the rate of descriptors referring to the perpetrator’s face was higher (42%) than the rate found
in the archival analysis by Sporer (1992a; 30%). Different from the findings by van Koppen
and Lochun (1997), the majority of the facial descriptors in our study were correct (67%).
Yet, again in concordance with the findings of the archival analysis by Sporer (1992a), most
of the facial descriptors referred to hair style and color (60%). Although description accuracy
coefficients have been criticized in the past (Sporer, 1996; Wells, 1985) because they do not
differentiate between more and less complete descriptions, we believe that the minimum
number of total descriptors provided by our participants was sufficiently large (Min = 7) to
make analyses with description accuracy appropriate.
Even though the accuracy of a person description cannot be assessed in actual cases
(see Wells, 1985) it has been listed as one of the criteria to be considered in the evaluation of
identification evidence by the U.S. Supreme Court (Neil v. Biggers, 1972). Yet, analyses of
description accuracy can be useful in order to find out more about the decision processes un-
derlying identification decisions with regard to target descriptions. In line with previous
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studies (e.g., Meissner et al., 2001; Meissner 2002; see also the meta-analysis by Meissner,
Sporer, & Susa, in press), we found a positive association between description accuracy and
identification accuracy along with a negative association between the number of false details
and identification accuracy. However, here this effect was limited to the description only
condition. These results are neither in line with the RBI approach nor with the TIPS ap-
proach. According to the RBI approach, associations for both description groups, not just for
one, would have been expected. According to the TIPS approach, one would expect the ob-
served relationships for rereaders but not describers only. At first sight it seems puzzling,
that descriptions that are reread prior to the identification task should have less impact on
identification performance than descriptions that are not reread. However, within rereaders,
description accuracy was positively associated with choosing, supporting the idea that lineup
rejections might be due to the perceived inadequacy of the description (Clare & Lewan-
dowsky, 2004). Apparently, rereaders somehow became aware of the accuracy or inaccuracy
of their descriptions. Comparing the observed associations with rereaders and with describers
only, it seems that the positive association between description accuracy and identification
accuracy within describers only changed to an association with choosing behavior for reread-
ers. Possibly, the inclusion of two repeated descriptions--once shortly after observing the tar-
get, and again before the identification after the 1-week delay--may have resulted in a correla-
tion between identification accuracy and number of descriptors as reported by Meissner
(2002, Experiment 2).
When we consider the description-only group by itself, the present study showed
higher correlations between various measures of description accuracy and identification accu-
racy than previous studies, thus questioning findings that have reported null-findings. We at-
tribute these higher correlations to our careful attempts to operationalize and measure face
and person descriptions. In Meissner, Sporer, and Susa's (in press) meta-analysis, higher cor-
relations were also observed when substantial effort was invested into measuring description
quality more rigorously. Correlations were also found to be higher when there were longer de-
scription-identification delays than when the recognition test was conducted shortly after the
description phase.
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Although much care was taken to ensure ecological validity in the present study in
form of a complex filmed scenario of 6 min length, a 1-week delay, the use of TP and TA
lineups, and the description procedure, generalizability of the findings may be limited as we
used only a single target. Stimulus sampling through the use of multiple targets is desirable for
two reasons: First, to ensure stimulus generalizability and to allow for internal replication
(Wells & Windschitl, 1999). Second, previous research discussed the role of facial distinctive-
ness/typicality not only regarding face recognition performance (e.g., Shapiro & Penrod,
1986) but also concerning the relationship between target descriptions and identification
(Wells, 1985). This issue should be addressed in future research.
In summary, our results help to understand the decision processes underlying eyewit-
ness identifications in connection with person descriptions. First, a retention interval of one
week between description and identification appears to be sufficient to eliminate the negative
effects of person descriptions on identification accuracy as observed in other studies (Dodson
et al., 1997; Fallshore & Schooler, 1995; Ryan & Schooler, 1998; Schooler et al., 1996;
Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). For police practice, this means that no change in pro-
ceedings is necessary in most cases as the presentation of a lineup rarely happens within less
than one week after the description (Behrman & Richards, 2005; Valentine et al., 2003). Sec-
ond, a rereading task did not lead to a VOE, but to a criterion shift (Clare & Lewandowsky,
2004), however without affecting identification accuracy. Furthermore, an association be-
tween description accuracy and choosing emerged for rereaders. Interestingly, rereaders
seemed to be aware of the quality of their descriptions and this affected their choosing be-
havior. In contrast, an association between description accuracy and identification accuracy
materialized for describers only. Apparently, when describers reread their own descriptions,
the memory effect of the description which lead bad describers to be bad identifiers shifts to a
decision criterion effect which lead bad describers to become nonchoosers. Whether one or
which of these two effects is (more) desirable is left for further studies to investigate. Specifi-
cally, the (non-)existence of an effect of rereading on identification (in-)accuracy needs to be
reexamined before further conclusions can be drawn.
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Appendix
Open-ended questions asked after free report was given
1. How old do you think the culprit was?
2. How tall was the culprit in cm?
3. Describe the culprit's build!
4. Describe the culprit's clothing!
5. Describe the culprit's hair color!
6. Describe the culprit's hairdo!
7. Describe the culprit's face shape!
8. Which of the culprit's special features caught your eye?
9. Did the culprit wear headgear? If yes, what kind?
10. Did the culprit wear glasses? If yes, what did they look like?
11. Did the culprit have a beard? If yes, what did it look like?
12. Did the culprit speak in a dialect or did he have an accent? If yes, which?
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EXPERIMENT 2
Post-Decision Confidence, Decision Time, and Self-
Reported Decision Processes as Postdictors of Identification
Accuracy
Eyewitness identifications are of immense importance for investigating and prose-
cuting crimes. Research on the psychology of eyewitness identification began in the late
1970s and has since identified numerous estimator and system variables (Wells, 1978) that
can have an influence on the accuracy of identification decisions. Estimator variables can be
further broken down into situational variables which can only be explored post hoc (e.g.,
lighting conditions) and assessment variables (Sporer, 1993) that may be used to assess
individual witnesses’ decision making processes (e.g., confidence and decision time). In
contrast, system or control variables are those over which the criminal justice system nor-
mally has control. These include lineup test factors such as instruction to witnesses as well
as lineup composition.
Although decision time and post-decision confidence have been combined success-
fully in the past (Sporer, 1992; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004), most re-
search on assessment variables, or postdictors, focused on one or another of these variables
in isolation. It is our aim to determine the usefulness of combinations of post-decision con-
fidence, decision time, and self-reported decision processes for distinguishing between ac-
curate and inaccurate identification decisions. Hereby, we also hope to learn more about
the underlying decision processes. A particular strength of the present study is that special
care was taken to ensure ecological validity by using a long, complex stimulus film and a
retention interval of one week.
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Response Latencies as Markers of Accuracy
A series of studies have consistently demonstrated a negative relationship between
response time and identification accuracy for positive identifications (choosers) but not for
lineup rejections (nonchoosers; Dunning & Stern, 1994; Dunning & Perretta, 2002; Kneller,
Memon, & Stevenage, 2001; Smith, R. C. L. Lindsay, & Pryke, 2000; Sporer, 1992, 1993,
1994; Weber et al., 2004). Dunning and Perretta (2002) attempted to establish an empiri-
cal, absolute time boundary that best discriminates between correct and false choices.
Across four studies, they found that this time boundary was located between 10
and 12 s. Witnesses who made their identification within 10 s were largely accurate, with
an average accuracy rate across the four studies of 87%. Slower choosers were accurate in
about 50% of the cases. Dunning and Perretta (2002) concluded that time boundaries are
invariant across experimental conditions.
However, other studies failed to replicate the 10-12 s "rule" (Weber et al., 2004;
Brewer, Caon, Todd, and Weber, 2006). Weber et al.’s (2004) peaks varied from 5 s to 29
s, and for only two of six samples did the identified peaks include the 10-12 s window
postulated by Dunning and Perretta (2002). Additionally, the high accuracy rates obtained
previously for fast choosers (Dunning & Perretta, 2002) could not be replicated but stayed
as low as 67%. When confidence was taken into account in addition to response time,
higher classification rates were obtained within the 10 s window (88%) for rather confident
witnesses (confidence estimates of 90% or 100%) than for less confident witnesses (confi-
dence estimates of 0%-80%; 54%). Similar results were found for the empirically estab-
lished time boundary in this study (84% vs. 63%). These data suggest that response laten-
cies should not be considered in isolation but jointly with other assessment variables, in
particular, confidence.
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Brewer et al. (2006) provided another test of the 10-12 s rule. In two experiments
retention interval (0 vs. 15 vs. 30 minutes) and nominal lineup size (4 vs. 8 vs. 12 persons)
were manipulated separately. The experiments replicated the finding that correct choosers
made their decisions faster than incorrect choosers and no differences were found for non-
choosers. The manipulation of retention interval and lineup size both influenced response
times and time boundaries, with short retention intervals and small lineup size leading to
faster decisions and earlier optimum time boundaries than longer retention intervals and
larger nominal lineup size. None of the identified time boundaries was within the 10-12 s
interval postulated by Dunning and Perretta (2002). The different retention interval condi-
tions of Experiment 1 produced relatively low pre-time boundary accuracy of no more
than 55%. In contrast, Experiment 2 produced high pre-time boundary accuracy rates in a
number of conditions. Thus, Dunning and Perretta’s (2002) claim for an invariant time
boundary was contradicted by the results of Weber et al. (2004) and Brewer et al. (2006)
who failed to find a consistent time boundary across conditions. Brewer et al. (2006) ex-
plained their results with reference to cognitive research on recognition memory (Ratcliff,
1978; Vickers & Packer, 1982) which showed that similarity, that is, discriminability be-
tween distractors and a target, is an important predictor of recognition performance where
low discriminability leads to an increase of latencies. This account calls into question the
idea of an absolute optimum time boundary and points to the possible influence that esti-
mator and control variables have on response times.
To sum up, past research established a negative relationship between identification
accuracy and response time for choosers, but not nonchoosers. We expected to replicate
these findings in the present study. Additionally, we determined the empirical time bound-
ary for our data in order to contribute to the current discussion on absolute time bounda-
ries (Dunning & Peretta, 2002; Weber et al., 2004).
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Confidence-Accuracy Relationship
Meta-analyses reported small to moderate correlations between post-decision con-
fidence and accuracy of r = .25, (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987) and r = .28
(Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). However, practically relevant conditions were
identified under which die CA relationship is more reliable. In line with Deffenbacher’s
(1980) optimality hypothesis, Bothwell et al. (1987) found that longer target exposure du-
ration (longer than approximately 75 s) lead to a higher CA relation. Sporer et al. (1995)
conducted separate analyses for choosers and nonchoosers and found that the CA relation-
ship was considerably higher for choosers (r = .37) than for nonchoosers (r = .12).
Furthermore, work by D. S. Lindsay and Read (D. S. Lindsay, Nilsen, & Read,
2000; D. S. Lindsay, Read, & Sharma, 1998; Read, D. S. Lindsay, & Nicholls, 1998) pro-
vided evidence that the CA relationship (following immediately after the identification, not
in the courtroom) can be more substantial when tested across heterogeneous conditions
rather than in the homogenous conditions commonly used in previous studies. For exam-
ple, D. S. Lindsay et al. (2000) obtained highly significant CA correlations of r = .55
(whole sample) and r = .68 (choosers) when tested under heterogeneous conditions (i.e.,
combining good and poor viewing conditions) whereas homogeneous (i.e., computing data
for good and poor viewing conditions separately) conditions lead to lower correlations
comparable to those observed in other studies. The rationale behind this approach is that
under homogeneous conditions differences in witnesses’ ability to identify the target are
only attributable to individual differences in attention, motivation, etc. as well as unin-
tended procedural variations. Hence, in a given condition, participants who make a correct
decision in the identification task are likely to have only a slightly better ability to identify
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the target than do participants who respond incorrectly, thus producing a weak CA corre-
lation.
We expected to replicate the positive relationship between identification accuracy
and post-decision confidence for choosers in the present study. No such relation was ex-
pected for nonchoosers. Additionally, rather than setting an arbitrary decision rule for
more or less confident witnesses, we attempted to establish an empirical confidence
boundary that best discriminates between correct and false choices analogous to Dunning
and Perretta’s (2002) time boundary. To our knowledge, this procedure has not been ap-
plied to post-decision confidence in any previous study.
Self-Reported Decision Processes
Across four studies, Dunning and Stern (1994) asked their witnesses to provide in-
formation about their decision processes. They found that eyewitnesses reporting auto-
matic recognition (e.g., “the face just popped out at me”) were more likely to be accurate in
identification performance than those reporting eliminative decision processes (e.g., “I
compared the photos to each other to narrow the choices”). These results are in line with
Wells’ (1984) distinction between relative and absolute judgment strategies, with erroneous
witnesses tending to make use of relative decision strategies and accurate witnesses tending
to rely on absolute decision strategies.
Some studies supported Dunning and Stern’s findings (Caputo & Dunning, 2005;
Kneller et al., 2001), whereas another study failed to find differences between accurate and
inaccurate decisions via self-reported decision processes (Brewer, Gordon, & Bond, 2000).
Furthermore, Kneller et al. (2001) did show the effect when analyzing simultaneous and
sequential lineups together, but not when analyzing them separately. Some studies used
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target-present lineups only (Brewer et al., 2000; Dunning & Stern, 1994, Experiments 1 to
3), which does not allow for an appropriate test of the chooser vs. nonchooser distinction.
Clearly, further research is needed in order to clarify the findings.  
In the current study, we explored self-reported decision processes of choosers,
combining the procedures that differed across previous studies (Dunning & Stern, 1994;
Kneller et al., 2001; see Table 1). We expected identification accuracy to be positively as-
sociated with automatic recognition and to be negatively associated with eliminative deci-
sion strategies. As automatic recognition is described as a fast process, we expected it to be
negatively associated with decision time. Eliminative decision strategies, on the other hand,
are considered as time consuming and deliberate, and were therefore expected to be posi-
tively associated with decision time. Furthermore, if eyewitnesses derive their post-
decision confidence ratings from metacognitive processes regarding the identification proc-
ess, then post-decision confidence should be negatively associated with eliminative deci-
sion strategies, and positively associated with automatic recognition processes. Addition-
ally, witnesses might use the time taken for an identification decision as a cue for the ease
of the decision. Therefore, decision time and post-decision confidence were expected to be
negatively associated.
Previous research has consistently failed to show associations of postdictors and identifi-
cation accuracy for nonchoosers. Nevertheless, the assessment of nonchoosers’ decisions
is valuable for exonerating innocent suspects. We addressed this issue by developing a dif-
ferent set of decision process items for nonchoosers in order to explore their usefulness for
postdicting identification accuracy of nonchoosers. The items belonged to one of two
groups that we termed memory match strategy and comparative judgment strategy (see
Table 2). Memory match strategy items were designed to describe the failure to find a
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Table 1
Choosers’ Decision Process Items with Factor Loadings for Principal Components Analysis
(N = 70)
Items
Eliminative deci-
sion strategy
Automatic recog-
nition
I just recognized him, I cannot explain whyab .25 .48
His face just popped out at mea -.14 .82
When I first saw the person I identified in the
lineup, I instantly knew that it was him
-.52 .70
I compared the photos to each other in order to nar-
row the choicesa
.76 -.02
I first eliminated the ones definitely not him, then
chose among the resta
.68 -.06
He was the closest person to what I remember, but
not exacta
.66 -.03
Note. Loadings of |.59| or larger were significant (see Stevens, 2002). The Item that fell be-
low this cut-off was deleted. aFrom Dunning & Stern (1994). bModified from Kneller et al.
(2001).
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Table 2
Nonchoosers’ Decision Process Items with Factor Loadings for Principal Components
Analysis (N = 122)
Items
Memory
match strat-
egy
Comparative
judgment
strategy
I couldn't identify anyone, as the target was not in the lineup. .87 -.14
Had the target been present in the lineup, I probably would
have recognized him.
.85 -.18
I tried to match each photograph to my memory of the target
person’s face, but none of the faces matched this image. a
.62 .15
I compared each face shown with the others to narrow down
the selection.a
.14 .70
I first eliminated those pictures that definitely weren’t him
but could eventually not decide on one of the other pictures.
-.04 .84
One of the faces resembled the target closest, but I could not
decide on him.
-.15 .68
Because the faces were quite similar to each other, I could not
make a decision.
-.41 .49
Note. Loadings of |.46| or larger were significant (see Stevens, 2002). aModified from
Kneller et al. (2001). All other items were new items.
match between the members of the lineup and the memory for the target. Comparative
judgment strategy items describe the process of comparing the foils to each other, rather
than with the memory of the target. We predicted that the memory match strategy would
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be positively associated with identification accuracy whereas the comparative judgment
strategy would be negatively associated with identification accuracy.  Furthermore, we ex-
pected memory match to be negatively associated with decision time and positively asso-
ciated with post-decision confidence. The associations were expected to be opposite in
sign for comparative judgment strategies.
To sum up, the major aim of the present research was to combine three postdictors
of identification accuracy, namely decision time, post-decision confidence, and self-
reported decision processes. We expected that the combination of the postdictors would
lead to a higher number of correct classifications than each of them by itself. Additionally
we wished to test the usefulness of self-reported decision process strategies again for
choosers, but particularly also for nonchoosers. Finally, we wanted to gain more insight
into the differing processes underlying choices and nonchoices by scrutinizing the interrela-
tionships between confidence, decision time, and self-reported decision strategies.
Method
Participants
One-hundred-and-ninety-two (96 male, 96 females; age 19 to 52, Mdn = 24 years)
individuals completed this experiment. Most participants were psychology majors (62%)
who received course credit for their participation. Other participants were students with
other areas of study and persons of various occupations. They were randomly assigned to
the experimental conditions and tested individually. Participants were tested at the Free
University of Berlin and at the Justus Liebig University of Giessen, Germany.
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Materials
Stimulus Film
The stimulus film was taken from an earlier study by Franzen and Sporer (1994).
The film showed the theft of an expensive pair of sunglasses in an optometrist’s store. Al-
together five amateur actors (one woman and four men) participated in the film, which
lasted 6 minutes and 30 seconds. The target person could be seen for 18 seconds. A close-
up showing the target's head and shoulders in half-profile lasted for about 2 seconds. For
the remaining time the target was filmed from a distance of several meters, where his head
and whole torso could be seen. The actual theft took about 30 seconds (looking at the sun-
glasses on the rack, taking a pair and putting it in the pocket).
Photo Lineup
Each lineup consisted of six frontal 6 x 9 cm photographs simultaneously displayed
on the computer screen at a color depth of 16.7 million colors, that is, 32 bit and a resolu-
tion of 1024 x 768 pixels, depicting six male individuals who all fit the general description
of the target person as determined by a pilot study (effective size = 4.7). The men all wore
the same sweater (different from clothing in the film) and each picture had been taken in
the same windowless room with the same illumination and in front of the same wall.
The photos were arranged in two rows of three pictures each. For half of the par-
ticipants, the target photograph was present (TP), for the other half it was replaced with
an innocent foil (target absent, TA). Target position as well as distractor position were
completely balanced to appear at any of the six positions an equal number of times.
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Procedure
The experiment was conducted on two different days. For all parts of the experi-
ment the participants were given thorough instructions on the computer screen how to re-
spond to the questions and which keys to use. All instructions and the lineup presentation
were programmed with SuperLab 1.75 (www.cedrus.com). Participants were informed that
the experiment dealt with witness statements, but the topic of person identification was
not mentioned on the first day of the experiment. Each participant was tested individually.
Participants were told that they would be shown a short video and then were asked to
watch the film closely and pay attention to every detail. After viewing the film partici-
pants completed a 30-minutes filler task consisting of 40 general knowledge questions. Par-
ticipants were then asked to give a description of the witnessed crime and of the culprit.
The lineup procedure was scheduled one week later. Prior to lineup presentation,
participants indicated their pre-decision confidence regarding the accuracy of their identifi-
cation decision on an 11-point scale ranging from 0% to 100% (with intervals marked in
10% steps: 0%, 10%, ..., 100%). Subsequently, participants were asked to identify the
culprit from the lineup. Participants were advised that the culprit might or might not be
present. Decision time was measured automatically via SuperLab.1 Subsequently, post-
decision confidence ratings concerning the identification decision were again assessed on an
11-point scale. Hereafter, the decision process items were rated on 7-point Likert scales
                     
1After the identification task, choosers were asked to make a Remember-Know (-
Familiar) judgment (Tulving, 1985). However, the operationalization of the variable failed
to elicit a satisfactory number of Know answers, thus not allowing any meaningful com-
parisons. Therefore, the results will not be discussed.
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ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (absolutely so). Depending on a participant's response to
the lineup (choice vs. no choice), they received different questions regarding their decision
process (see Tables 1 and 2).
Results
An alpha level of .05 was used for all inferential analyses. Effect sizes, that is,
Cohen’s (1988) f, are reported for ANOVAs for interactions and for tests with more than
1 df in the numerator; d is reported for comparisons of two means, and phi is reported for
nonparametric analyses of 2 x 2 contingency tables.
We first present results for identification accuracy. Subsequently, we look at the
relationships between identification accuracy and the postdictors, first for each of them
individually, then their combination.
Identification Accuracy
Altogether, 44.8% of the identification decisions were correct. Identification accu-
racy differed significantly for choosers (n = 70) and nonchoosers (n = 122), chi2(1, N =
192) = 9.75, p = .001, phi = 0.23. Nonchoosers were accurate in their decision more often
(53.3%) than choosers (30.0%). Thus, not surprisingly, identification accuracy for target-
absent lineups was higher (67.7%) than for target-present lineups (21.9%), chi2(1, N =
192) = 40.78, p < .001, phi = 0.46.
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Decision Time
Due to a significantly positively skewed response latency distribution, one extreme
value was winsorized on either side of the distribution (Winer, 1971) and inferential analy-
ses were conducted on log-transformed data. Means and standard deviations are reported
as backtransformed values.
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with choice (choosers vs. nonchoosers) and decision outcome
(correct vs. incorrect) as classification variables and decision times as dependent variable
revealed a significant main effect for decision outcome, F(1, 188) = 9.25, p = .003, d = -
0.44. Accurate witnesses made their decision faster (M = 16.5 s) than inaccurate witnesses
(M = 22.7 s). Neither the main effect for choice, F(1, 188) = 0.24, p = .623, d = 0.07, nor
the interaction, F(1, 188) = 0.56, p = .455, f = .05, were significant. Means and standard
deviations for identification accuracy and all postdictor variables and their intercorrelations
are shown in Tables 3 to 5 for choosers, nonchoosers, and the total sample, respectively.
The correlation between decision time and identification accuracy was significantly
negative for choosers, r(68) = -.29, p = .017, and marginally significant for nonchoosers,
r(120) = -.18, p = .054. Therefore, time boundary analyses were performed for choosers
only. As previously done by Dunning and Perretta (2002) and Weber et al. (2004), we
computed a series of chi2 statistics on the 2 (accuracy: correct vs. incorrect) x 2 (time
boundary: faster or equal vs. slower) contingency tables with the time boundaries set at
each integer value from 1 s (i.e., 1 s, 2 s, 3 s, etc.). The decision time that produced the
greatest chi2 value was identified as the time boundary that optimally discriminated be-
tween correct and incorrect decisions.
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The plot of chi2 values by time boundaries is presented in Figure 1. The optimum
time boundary for choosers was at 18 s, chi2(1, N = 70) = 8.96, p = .006, phi = 0.36, with
another peak at 20-21 s, chi2(1, N = 70) = 8.96, p = .004, phi = 0.36. The proportion of
correct decisions made within the 18 s time boundary was 52.0%. The proportion of
wrong decisions made after 18 s was 82.2%. The proportion of correct decisions made be-
low the 20-21 s time boundary was 48.4%. The proportion of wrong decisions made after
21 s was 86.6%.
Following Dunning and Perretta (2002), we additionally worked backward from
long time windows in order to find a boundary beyond which most (i.e., at least 85%) wit-
nesses were inaccurate. We found that 91.7% (11 out of 12) of the decisions were inaccu-
rate when they were made after 35 s had passed.
Confidence
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with choice (choosers vs. nonchoosers) and decision outcome
(correct vs. incorrect) as classification variables and pre-decision confidence as dependent
variable revealed a significant main effect for choice, F(1, 188) = 7.47, p = .007, d = -0.41,
but not for accuracy, F(1, 188) = 0.08, p = .772, d = 0.04. Nonchoosers showed higher
pre-decision confidence ratings (66.0%) than choosers (57.6%). The interaction did not
reach significance, F(1, 188) = 3.54, p = .061, f = .11.
The correlation between pre-decision confidence and identification accuracy was
significantly negative for nonchoosers, r(120) = -.18, p = .047, but non-significant for
choosers, r(68) = .11, p = .375, and the whole sample, r(190) = -.02, p = .794.
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Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Postdictors of Identification Accuracy for Choosers (N = 70)
M SD
Pre-decision
confidence
Post-
decision
Decision
time
Automatic
recognition
Eliminative
strategy
Accuracy 30.0% 46.2 .11 .28* -.29* .17 -.06
Pre-decision confidence 56.6% 21.0 .41** .24* .48** .08
Post-decision confidence 50.7% 24.3 -.21 .73** -.25*
Decision timea 21.5 s 1.9 -.15 .43**
Automatic recognitionb   5.7 1.1 -.33**
Eliminative decision strategyb   5.1 1.4
*p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed.
aAll analyses were conducted with log-transformed values. The mean and standard deviations of decision times were backtransformed from log.
b
 Means of items on 7-point Likert scales from Table 1.
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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Postdictors of Identification Accuracy for Nonchoosers (N = 122)
M SD
Pre-decision
confidence
Post-
decision
Decision
time
Memory
match
Comparative
judgment
Accuracy 53.3% 50.1 -.18* .09 -.18 .04 -.11
Pre-decision confidence 65.7% 18.6 .42** .12 .43** -.12
Post-decision confidence 65.1% 25.9 -.52** .75** -.33**
Decision timea 18.7 s 2.0 -.44**    .42**
Memory match strategyb 5.4 1.2 -.19*
Comparative judgment strategyb 4.0 1.5
*p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed.
aAll analyses were conducted with log-transformed values. The mean and standard deviations of decision times were backtransformed from log.
b
 Means of items on 7-point Likert scales from Table 2.
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Table 5  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Postdictors of Identification Accuracy for the Whole Sample (N = 192)
M SD
Pre-decision
confidence
Post-decision
confidence
Decision time
Accuracy 44.8% 49.9 -.02 .20* -.23*
Pre-decision confidence 62.4% 19.9 .45**   .01
Post-decision confidence 59.8% 26.2 -.43**
Decision timea 19.7 s 2.0
*p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed.
aAll analyses were conducted with log-transformed values. The mean and standard deviations of decision times were backtransformed from log.
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Figure 1. Plot of chi2 values (and 95% CI) by time boundaries.
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with choice (choosers vs. nonchoosers) and decision outcome (cor-
rect vs. incorrect) as classification variables and post-decision confidence as dependent vari-
able revealed significant main effects for decision outcome, F(1, 188) = 5.83, p = .017, d =
0.35, and choosing, F(1, 188) = 8.04, p = .005, d = -0.41. Accurate participants made higher
confidence ratings (M = 64.1%) than inaccurate participants (M = 54.5%). Choosers were
significantly less confident about their decision (M = 53.6%) than nonchoosers (M = 64.9%).
The interaction did not reach significance, F(1, 188) = 1.58, p = .210, f = .09.
As expected, the correlation between post-decision confidence and identification accu-
racy was significant for choosers, r(68) = .28, p = .020, but not for nonchoosers, r(120) = .09,
p = .329.
Analogous to the time boundary analyses performed by Dunning and Perretta (2002),
chi2 analyses on 2 (accuracy: correct vs. incorrect) x 2 (post-decision confidence boundary:
more vs. less or equally) contingency tables were computed. The plot of chi2 values by post-
decision confidence boundaries is presented in Figure 2. Curiously, the optimum post-
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decision confidence boundary here is at 50%, chi2(1, N = 70) = 8.27, p = .007, phi = .34. Of
the 42 participants who were 50% or more confident about their choice, 18 (42.9%) were cor-
rect. Participants indicating lower post-decision confidence were wrong in 25 out of 28 cases
(89.3%).
When we adapted Weber et al.’s (2004) cut off point of 90% post-decision confi-
dence, 3 out of the 7 choosers (42.9%) who were 90-100% confident were correct. Partici-
pants indicating lower post-decision confidence were wrong in 45 out of 63 cases (71.4%).
Figure 2. Plot of chi2 values (and 95% CI) by post-decision confidence boundaries.
Contrary to our hypotheses, the association between decision time and post-decision
confidence of choosers failed to reach significance, r(68) = -.21, p = .075, although the direc-
tion of the correlation was as expected. For nonchoosers, the association was highly reliable,
r(120) = -.52, p < .001.
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Self-Reported Decision Processes of Choosers
Following Dunning and Stern (1994) decision process items were combined based on
factor analyses conducted separately for choosers and nonchoosers. For choosers, automatic
recognition items loaded on one factor (Cronbach’s alpha = .55), eliminative decision strategy
items loaded on another factor (alpha = .68). Automatic recognition accounted for 41.92% of
variance (eigen value = 2.1), eliminative decision strategy for 22.17% of variance (eigen value
= 1.1). Loadings of the items are shown in Table 1. The two scales were computed by aver-
aging the corresponding items into one score. Unexpectedly, correlational analyses showed no
significant associations between identification accuracy and self-reports of automatic recogni-
tion, or eliminative decision strategy. When looking at target-present lineups only, the ex-
pected association was found for automatic recognition, r(37) = .37, p = .021, but not elimina-
tive decision strategy, r(37) = -.18, p = .255, although the correlation was in the expected di-
rection.1
Table 3 displays means and standard deviations of postdictors as well as their inter-
correlations. As expected, post-decision confidence was positively associated with automatic
recognition, r(68) = .73, p < .001, and negatively associated with eliminative decision strate-
gies, r(68) = -.25, p = .035. Also as predicted, decision time and eliminative decision strategy
were positively associated, r(68) = .43, p < .001. Contrary to our hypotheses, the association
between decision time and automatic recognition failed to reach significance, although the di-
rection of the correlation was as expected, r(68) = -.15, p = .230.
                     
1No separate analyses for target-absent lineups are possible as choosers are always
incorrect in target-absent lineups.
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Self-Reported Decision Processes of Nonchoosers
The factor analysis of nonchoosers’ self-reported decision process items revealed that
the corresponding items loaded on two factors (see Table 2). Three items loaded on memory
match strategy (alpha = .73), and four items loaded on comparative judgment strategy (alpha
= .64). Memory match strategy accounted for 34.94% of variance (eigen value = 2.4), com-
parative judgment strategy for 22.96% of variance (eigen value = 1.6). Unexpectedly, correla-
tional analyses of nonchoosers’ self-reported decision processes showed no significant asso-
ciations of identification accuracy with memory match strategies or comparative judgment
strategies (see Table 4).2
Yet, as expected, memory match strategy was positively associated with post-
decision confidence, r(120) = .75, p < .001, and negatively associated with decision time,
r(120) = -.44, p < .001. Comparative judgment strategies were negatively associated with
post-decision confidence, r(120) = -.33, p < .001, and positively associated with decision
time, r(120) = .42, p < .001.3
Combination of Identification Postdictors
Due to the lack of associations between self-reported decision processes and identifi-
cation accuracy, these assessment variables were not combined with the other two. Thus, de-
cision time and post-decision confidence remained for combination. Table 6 shows identifica-
                     
2No separate analyses for target-present and target-absent lineups were carried out, as
nonchoosers are always correct in target-absent, and always incorrect in target-present line-
ups.
3As displayed in Table 2, the last item loaded relatively high on both factors, although
the loading on memory match strategy was non-significant.
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tion accuracy for combinations of fast vs. slow decisions and high vs. low post-decision con-
fidence. Higher correct classification rates were obtained when confidence and decision time
were combined than when decision time or confidence were looked at individually. As afore-
mentioned, choosers who decided within the first 18 s were correct in 52.0% of the cases and
choosers who were 50% or more confident about their choice were correct in 42.9% of the
cases. Combining both measures, that is, fast (≤ 18 s) and confident choosers (≥ 50%), were
correct in 64.7% of their decisions. Choosers who made their decisions slower than within 18
s and with less confidence erred in 95.0% of the cases.
Table 6
Identification Accuracy for Postdictor Combinations
Decision time
Post-decision Fast Slow
Total
Confidence n % correct n % correct n % correct
  0 -  40%    8 25.0 20 5.0 28 10.7
50 -100% 17 64.7 25 28.0 42 42.9
Total 25 52.0 45 17.8 70 30.0
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Discussion
This study investigated the usefulness of post-decision confidence, decision time, and
decision processes for postdicting identification accuracy. Relatively low accuracy rates were
obtained for the total sample and particularly for choosers. Additionally, surprisingly few
participants (36.5%) chose someone from the lineup although in 50% of our lineups the target
was present. Thus, the identification task in the present study proved to be a difficult one.
One possible, though speculative, explanation is that the one-week interval between witness-
ing the event and the identification task might have resulted in the low choosing rate, which
resulted in the low hit rate in target-present lineups. Another potential explanation concerns
the stimulus film, which was rather long compared to those used in most other studies, and
the course of action which did not draw much attention to the culprit. Additionally, the cul-
prit was seen for a relatively short time, and the lineup photo was shot on a different day
(which is typical for real criminal cases), with the target looking different from the film with
respect to his hairstyle and not as clean shaven.
As expected, eyewitness identification accuracy was positively associated with post-
decision confidence and negatively associated with decision time for choosers, thus replicating
the findings of Sporer et al.'s (1995) meta-analysis as well as Sporer's studies with decision
times (Sporer, 1992, 1993, 1994). No such associations were found for nonchoosers (although
the Choice by Outcome interaction was not significant). Nevertheless, there was a reliable
negative association between pre-decision confidence and identification accuracy, indicating
that nonchoosers low in pre-decision confidence were more likely to be accurate in the identi-
fication task. That is, those participants who rated their capability of recognizing the target as
low and therefore made no choice, turned out to be more accurate than those who had more
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confidence in their capability of recognizing the target and made no choice. No association be-
tween pre-decision confidence and identification accuracy was found for choosers.
The time boundary analyses revealed a cut-off point at 18 s. Therefore, as was the
case for Weber et al. (2004), the notion of an absolute time boundary at 10-12 s (Dunning &
Perretta, 2002) was not supported by our data. Speculatively, the elevated difficulty of the
identification task in the present study may have lead to longer decision times and therefore
caused the relatively long optimum time boundary. At any rate, these data also question the
invariance claim of the 10 to 12 s rule.
For the first time, we also established an optimum boundary for post-decision confi-
dence ratings. At 50%, the optimum post-decision confidence boundary was surprisingly
low. For example, Weber et al. (2004) previously adopted an arbitrary cut-off point of 90%
post-decision confidence, indicating that the cut-off point for post-decision confidence would
be expected to be much higher.
Contrary to our hypotheses, self-reported decision processes were not associated
with identification accuracy for choosers or nonchoosers. For target-present lineups only, ac-
curate choices were associated with automatic recognition whereas inaccurate choices tended
to be associated with eliminative decision strategies. These findings are in line with other
studies that demonstrated the postulated effects for target-present lineups (Caputo & Dun-
ning, 2005, Experiment 1; Dunning & Stern, 1994, Experiments 1 to 3) although the negative
association between identification accuracy and eliminative decision strategies failed to reach
significance here. However, there is also one study that did not find the postulated associa-
tions for target-present lineups (Brewer et al., 2000). Nevertheless, others demonstrated the
expected relationships for both target-present and target-absent lineups (Dunning & Stern,
1994, Experiment 4; Caputo & Dunning, 2005; Kneller et al., 2001). So far, the research re-
sults remain contradictory and further research is needed to shed more light on this issue.
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Our finding, that automatic recognition is associated with identification accuracy for
target-present lineups but not for the combination of target-present and target-absent lineups
demonstrates once again that not including target-absent lineups in an identification study se-
riously questions the generalizability of the obtained findings. If a postdictor, specifically,
self-reported decision processes, has postdictive value for target-present lineups only, its
practical applicability is at best limited.
Some interesting intercorrelations between the postdictors were found. As hypothe-
sized, choosers responded as if they were deriving their post-decision confidence from their
decision process and to a limited degree from the time they took for the decision. Choosers
who perceived the decision process as primarily automatic, indicated high post-decision con-
fidence. Unexpectedly, automatic recognition was not significantly associated with faster de-
cision making. As predicted, those choosers who described their decision process as mainly
eliminative, indicated lower post-decision confidence and took longer for their decision.
Shorter decision times tended to be associated with higher post-decision confidence for
choosers.
Our attempt to identify a postdictor that is capable of postdicting identification accu-
racy of nonchoosers failed. Contrary to the hypothesis, neither the memory match strategy
nor the comparative judgment strategy were postdictive of identification accuracy. The only
other study that examined self-reported decision processes of nonchoosers (Kneller et al.,
2001) did not separately analyze the data for choosers and nonchoosers. Thus, it seems that
self-reported decision process, like post-decision confidence and decision time, is not a valid
postdictor of identification accuracy. However, conclusions must not be made prematurely,
as the present study is one of very few that assessed self-reported decision processes of non-
choosers.
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Since the expected associations of self-reported decision processes and identification
accuracy were not found, the intended combination of all three postdictors was not carried
out. Combining only post-decision confidence and decision time (i.e., looking at fast and con-
fident participants) led to 64.7% correct classifications, whereas considering decision time or
post-decision confidence by themselves only led to 52.0% and 42.9% correct classifications,
respectively. Although these numbers do not seem to be too impressive, the low overall accu-
racy of choosers in our sample (30.0%) must be considered. Furthermore, applying these
postdictors showed a strong capability in marking inaccurate identification decisions. For ex-
ample, how likely was it, that a slow and not so confident witness was correct? Choosers
who decided slowly and with little confidence, that is, outside the established boundaries,
erred in 95.0% of the cases.
In spite of the lack of an association between decision process and identification accu-
racy for nonchoosers, all hypotheses with regard to the associations between postdictors
were supported by the data. Those nonchoosers, who employed primarily memory match
strategies, showed high post-decision confidence and were fast decision makers. On the con-
trary, comparative judgment strategies were associated with low post-decision confidence and
slower decision times. In addition, nonchoosers also responded as if they strongly relied on
decision time when making their post-decision confidence ratings.
It is notable that the associations within the individual postdictors were not only ob-
tained for choosers but also for nonchoosers. These results speak in favor of the idea that all
witnesses, choosers and nonchoosers, derive their confidence and decision process reports
from each other and from their decision time. This highlights that it is important to bring the
different research areas and processes together. In combination they may be more useful in
assessing eyewitness identification decisions.
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Yet, postdictors failed to be associated with identification accuracy for nonchoosers.
As Sporer et al. (1995) pointed out, the heterogeneity within the group of nonchoosers might
be responsible for the lack of association. There may be different types of nonchoosers who
reject a lineup for different reasons (e.g., because their memory is poor, or because they are
very cautious not to indict somebody erroneously). Dividing nonchoosers into more homoge-
neous subgroups might be one way to address this issue.
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Fast and Confident: Postdicting Eyewitness Identifica-
tion Accuracy in a Field Study
The importance of eyewitness identifications for investigating and prosecuting crimes
is undoubted. However, cases of miscarriage of justice in which eyewitness identifications
played a key role (Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero,
& Brimacombe, 1998) call for procedures that allow the assessment of identification deci-
sions. The focus of the present study therefore is on assessment variables which may be used
to retroactively assess individual witnesses’ decision making accuracy. The most widely used
assessment variables are post-decision confidence (e.g., Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995)
and decision time (e.g., Sporer, 1992a, 1993, 1994; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast,
2004). Other methods which further explore different types of decision processes (Dunning
& Stern, 1994) have also been explored lately (Brewer, Palmer, McKinnon, & Weber, 2005;
Caputo & Dunning, 2005; Kneller, Memon, & Stevenage, 2001; Sauerland & Sporer, in
press).
It is the first aim of the present research to examine the combined utility of three as-
sessment variables for postdicting identification accuracy in a field study. Specifically, we
study the relationship between response time and identification accuracy, focusing on the
time boundary that best discriminates correct from incorrect decisions. We also analyze the
confidence-accuracy (CA) relationship via correlation and calibration measures. Additionally,
we examine the relationship between confidence and identification accuracy, analogous to the
time boundary analysis, focusing on the confidence boundary that best discriminates correct
from incorrect decisions. Finally, the usefulness of a judgment of the state of awareness and
the existence of recollective experience is explored via Remember-Know-Familiar (RKF)
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judgments (e.g., Tulving, 1985; Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, & Cohen, 1997;
Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2002). Post-decision confidence and decision
time each by themselves have been researched extensively in the past, but have only rarely
been combined (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sauerland & Sporer, in press; Sporer, 1992a; Weber et
al., 2004). There is now some, albeit unpublished research reporting RKF data for identifica-
tions (Brewer, Palmer et al. 2005; Davids, 2006; Penrod, 2006), but combinations with other
postdictors are the exception (Davids, 2006). We expected combinations of postdictors to
lead to more correct classifications than each postdictor by itself.
Until now, no assessment variable that is capable of making valid postdictions about
decisions made by nonchoosers has been identified. A postdictor for nonchoosers' identifica-
tion accuracy could be a valuable instrument to exonerate innocent suspects. The second aim
of the study was therefore to test the usefulness of nonchoosers’ self-reports about their de-
cision processes as a postdictor of lineup rejection accuracy.
Furthermore, the present study addresses one shortcoming that affects most identifi-
cation studies. Although the need for a sufficient participant sample sizes seems obvious to
most, the need to sample stimuli appears to be far less straightforward (Wells & Windschitl,
1999). Whereas some studies have reported results for two targets (Brewer, Caon, Todd, &
Weber, 2006, Experiment 2; Brewer & Wells, 2006; D. S. Lindsay, Read, & Sharma, 1998),
very few studies have used more (Brigham, 1990). Studies that did use two targets found that
the results differed with regard to identification accuracy, choosing rates in target-present
(TP) and target-absent (TA) lineups (Brewer, Caon et al., 2006, Experiment 2; Brewer &
Wells, 2006), optimum time boundaries (Brewer, Caon et al., 2006, Experiment 2), the CA
correlations (D. S. Lindsay et al., 1998), and the CA calibrations (Brewer & Wells, 2006).
These results show, that general conclusions based on one target could be misleading. There-
fore, we included ten targets in the present study.
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Even though a wealth of research on identification accuracy exists using laboratory
staged events or filmed scenarios, only a small number of field experiments have been con-
ducted to date (e.g., Brigham, van Verst, & Bothwell, 1986; Krafka & Penrod, 1985; Yarmey,
2004). Nevertheless, field experiments have some potential to provide a more differentiated
understanding of processes underlying eyewitness identification (Cutler & Penrod, 1995),
compared to laboratory research. In order to enhance the ecological validity and generalizabil-
ity of postdiction research, data were collected in a natural setting, in the pedestrian zone of a
small university town.
Decision Time-Accuracy Relationship
The negative relationships between response time and identification accuracy for
choosers (people who make a positive identification) but not for nonchoosers (people who
reject the lineup) are well established (Dunning & Stern, 1994; Dunning & Perretta, 2002;
Kneller et al., 2001; Sauerland & Sporer, in press; S. M. Smith, R. C. L. Lindsay, & Pryke,
2000; Sporer, 1992a, 1993, 1994; Weber et al., 2004; Weber & Brewer, 2006). Recently, re-
searchers have tried to establish a decision time boundary within which correct decisions are
highly likely, and therefore incorrect decisions highly unlikely. When splitting the time to de-
cision into three groups (1-15 s, 16-30 s, > 30 s), S. M. Smith et al. (2000) found that eye-
witnesses making their choice within the first 15 s were correct in 70% of the cases, whereas
accuracy rates in the other intervals dropped to 43% and 18%, respectively. Dunning and
Perretta (2002) postulated that witnesses making a positive identification within 10 to 12 s
were highly likely to be correct and that these time boundaries were invariant across experi-
mental conditions. The authors based their conclusion on four studies, all of which showed
that the best discrimination between correct and incorrect choosers was roughly at 10 to 12 s
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and termed this cut-off point optimum time boundary. Witnesses who made their identifica-
tion within 10 s were largely accurate, with an average accuracy rate across the four studies of
87%. Slower choosers were accurate in about 50% of the cases. Response times of correct and
incorrect nonchoosers did not differ. In an attempt to explain their results, the authors argued
that correct identifications tended to be made via an automatic cognitive process whereas in-
correct identification decisions were made via a process of elimination (see also Dunning &
Stern, 1994). In contrast to deliberate decisions, which are known to be conscious and effort-
ful, automatic decisions are described as fast and unconscious. Therefore, Dunning and Per-
retta (2002) claimed that automatic processes should not be influenced by external circum-
stances, that is, changes in the context of the identification procedure. The invariability of the
optimum time boundary found in their experiments was therefore taken as evidence for the
automaticity of accurate positive identifications.
Contrary to the findings of Dunning and Perretta (2002), Weber et al. (2004) found
optimum time boundaries varying between 5 s to 29 s across four studies using six targets.
Only for two of the six samples did the identified optimum time boundaries include the 10-
12 s window postulated by Dunning and Perretta (2002). Furthermore, the accuracy rates
were considerably lower (67%). When confidence was taken into account in addition to re-
sponse time, much higher classification rates were obtained within the 10 s window (88%) for
rather confident witnesses (90% or 100% confident) than for less confident ones (0% to 80%
confident; 54%). These data suggest that response latencies should not be considered in isola-
tion but jointly with other assessment variables, in particular, confidence.
Also contrary to Dunning and Perretta’s conclusions, Brewer, Caon et al. (2006)
found that manipulations of retention interval (0 vs. 15 vs. 30 minutes) and lineup size (4 vs.
8 vs. 12 persons) both influenced response times and time boundaries. Short retention inter-
vals and smaller lineup size lead to faster decisions and earlier optimum time boundaries than
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longer retention intervals and larger nominal lineup size. None of the identified time bounda-
ries were within the 10-12 s interval postulated by Dunning and Perretta (2002). Thus, it
seems that the claim of an invariant time boundary (Dunning & Perretta, 2002) cannot be up-
held. However, the critical results were exclusively obtained by using one stimulus film from
Weber et al. (2004). In the present study, we aimed at analyzing empirical time boundaries
using a different research paradigm, a field experiment. Whereas we cannot rule out the possi-
bility that the optimum time boundary here is at 10-12 s, we did not expect this. Further-
more, we expected to replicate the negative correlation between decision times and identifica-
tion accuracy for choosers but not nonchoosers.
Even though the measurement of decision times is highly desirable, practitioners are
often confronted with the lack of such measures. As a possible resort in cases where the ac-
tual decision times are not available, we asked our participants to give an estimation of their
decision time. First results on this were obtained by Davids (2006), who combined estimated
decision times with "easiness of identification" and "willingness to swear an oath on the tes-
timony made" in a factor analysis. The factor was negatively correlated with measured deci-
sion times and positively correlated with identification accuracy for two targets. In order to
test the usefulness of estimated decision times as a substitute of measured decision times, we
reran all analyses that were carried out for measured decision times for estimated decision
times. We expected a positive correlation between the two measures. Furthermore, we ex-
pected both measures to elicit similar result patterns with regard to their postdictive value.
Confidence-Accuracy Relationship
Meta-analyses reported small to medium point-biserial correlations between post-
decision confidence and accuracy of r = .25, (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987) and r
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= .28 (Sporer et al., 1995). Importantly, Sporer et al.'s (1995) separate analyses for choosers
and nonchoosers revealed that the CA relationship was considerably higher for choosers (r =
.37) than for nonchoosers (r = .12).
However, assessing the CA relationship via point-biserial correlations has been criti-
cized in recent research (Brewer, 2006; Brewer & Wells, 2006; Juslin, Olsson, & Winman,
1996; Weber & Brewer, 2006) as reliance on point-biserial correlations can result in dis-
counting of informative CA relations (Brewer, 2006), for example due to a lack of variation in
confidence or accuracy. Moreover, the correlation coefficient does not give guidance on how
to interpret a single confidence rating. Consequently, some researchers have chosen a different
approach to determine the CA relationship, namely by computing the calibration between
confidence and accuracy. Whereas at first there were primarily face recognition studies using
calibration measures (Cutler & Penrod, 1989; Olsson, Juslin, & Winman, 1998; Weber &
Brewer, 2003, 2004, 2006) the body of research using eyewitness identification paradigms is
now growing (e.g., Brewer, Keast, & Rishworth, 2002; Brewer & Wells, 2006; Juslin et al.,
1996; Olsson & Juslin, 1999). In line with results on CA correlations, the general result pat-
tern shows a better calibration for choosers than for nonchoosers (Brewer & Wells, 2006;
Brewer, Keast et al., 2002; Weber & Brewer, 2003, 2006).
The present field experiment examined the CA relation, using both correlation and
calibration for the identification task. We expected the CA relation to be stronger for choosers
than for nonchoosers. For the combination with decision times and Remember-Know-familiar
judgments, we sought to establish an empirical confidence boundary that best discriminates
between correct and false choices analogous to Dunning and Perretta’s (2002) time boundary.
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Remember-Know(-Familiar) Judgments
The third assessment variable included in the present study was a judgment of recol-
lective experience, that is, Tulving’s (1985) Remember-Know (RK) distinction proposed in
the context of dual-process theories of recognition memory. The RK paradigm has been used
primarily in the cognitive literature on word recognition (e.g., Conway & Dewhurst, 1995;
Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java, 1990, 1991; Perfect, Mayes, Downes, & Van Eijk, 1996;
Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). Typically, at study participants were exposed to a list of words.
At test, participants indicated whether a particular word had been presented before (i.e.,
"old") or not (i.e., "new"). After positive ("old") responses, participants made a Remember or
Know judgment. Remembering was defined as “the ability to become consciously aware again
of some aspect of what happened or what was experienced at the time the word was pre-
sented” (Gardiner, 1988, p. 311) whereas Knowing was defined as “recognition that the word
was in the booklet but the inability to collect consciously anything about its actual occurrence
or what happened or what was experienced at the time of its occurrence” (Gardiner, 1988, p.
311). Later, these two categories were supplemented with a Guess option (RKG), the reason
being that the two judgments could not be considered statistically independent because par-
ticipants had to make a Know judgment when they failed to give a Remember judgment (Ra-
jaram, 1996). In the RKG paradigm, participants were asked to give a Guess response when
they have some other reason than Remembering or Knowing to believe, or suspect, that a test
item was encountered in the study list. Some studies additionally used a Familiar option,
which lies between Know and Guess responses (e.g., Conway et al., 1997; Wright & Sladden,
2003). Conway et al. (1997) explained the Familiar option as follows: “It may be however,
that you did not remember a specific instance, nor do you know the answer. Nevertheless the
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alternative you have selected may seem or feel more familiar than any of the other alterna-
tives.” (p. 398).
Tulving (1985) postulated Remember responses to be associated with autonoetic con-
sciousness and episodic memory, that is, recollective memories. In contrast, Know responses
were supposed to involve noetic consciousness and semantic memory, that is, nonrecollective
memories. A wealth of studies has led to the conclusion that there are some experimental ma-
nipulations that influence Remember responses whereas others only have an impact on Know
responses (Gardiner, 2001).
Since Tulving's original proposal, other models have been developed in an effort to ac-
count for RK data. Dual-process theories of recognition memory assume recollection to be an
all-or-none retrieval process (high-threshold process; e.g., Yonelinas, 1994). Specifically, rec-
ollection is defined as a threshold process which is accompanied by retrieval of qualitative
information about a studied event (Yonelinas, 2001). In contrast to dual-process theories of
recognition memory, one-dimensional signal detection models (Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman &
Master, 1997) propose that RK judgments are simply equivalent to confidence statements
(Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004). Nevertheless, many studies showed that the patterns of re-
sults were different for RK versus confidence statements (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1990; Män-
tylä, 1997; Parkin & Walter, 1992; Rajaram, 1993; but see Perfect et al., 1996, for an excep-
tion, and Dunn, 2004, for a discussion).
Finally, Rotello, Macmillan, and Reeder (2004) proposed a two-dimensional model of
RK judgments. They combined Tulving’s idea that Remembering and Knowing reflected two
distinct forms of memory (global familiarity and specific recollection) with the signal detec-
tion approach. This approach differentiates between accuracy and response bias and accounts
for the confidence level with which responses are made. According to the model, stimuli vary
in global memory strength (familiarity) and in the strength of their more specific features or
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characteristics. "Old" items are more familiar (i.e., show stronger global memory strength) and
activate more contextual and semantic information (i.e., showing more specific memory
strength) than "new" items. When deciding whether an item is "new" or "old", both memory
strengths are summed. Remember-Know judgments divide "old" responses into those for
which specific memory strength is relatively strong (Remember responses) and those for
which specific memory strength is relatively weak (Know responses), in comparison to global
memory strength. Accordingly, Remember and Know judgments are both based on an as-
sessment of global and specific memory strength. The authors concluded that Remember re-
sponses neither were simply high confidence old decisions nor did they result from a high-
threshold process, as assumed by the dual-process model. According to Rotello et al. (2004),
those people who make a Remember judgment perceive greater specific memory strength
compared to global memory strength. The opposite is assumed for Know responses. Trans-
lated to eyewitness identification, choosers who give a Remember response after making their
identification decision should accordingly be more accurate than those giving Know re-
sponses.
Another way of looking at the decision processes concerns the distinction between
automatic and deliberate decision processes proposed by Dunning and Stern (1994). They
hypothesized witnesses reporting automatic decision processes (i.e., “just knowing”) to be
more likely to make a correct decision than those making a deliberate decision. Comparing this
approach to the Remember-Know paradigm, we would expect Know answers to be associ-
ated with automatic processes and higher accuracy than the more deliberate Remember an-
swers. Dunning and Stern's account has gained support in some studies (Caputo & Dunning,
2005; Dunning & Stern, 1994; Kneller et al., 2001), but in another study self-reported deci-
sion processes were unable to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate decisions (Brewer,
Gordon, & Bond, 2000).
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With regard to Remember-Know judgments in the context of identification accuracy,
people have hypothesized about the superiority of one or the other, but until now, not a sin-
gle study has been published. The results of the few unpublished studies on the topic show
mixed results: Supporting the assumptions made in the Remember-Know literature, Brewer,
Palmer et al. (2005) found significantly higher accuracy for Remember than for Know an-
swers. On the contrary, supporting Dunning and Stern's (1994) notion, Davids (2006) who
used Remember, Know, and Familiar options, found a tendency of Know, not Remember an-
swers to be associated with identification accuracy.
To summarize, rival hypotheses exist about the superiority of Remember and Know
judgments for postdicting identification accuracy and the data are inconclusive. Only few
studies exist on the issue to date and in the present study we sought to provide more data on
these rival hypotheses. Specifically, we used Remember, Know, and Familiar options. A
Guess option was not included, because we hold the view that this option would undermine
the ecological validity in the context of person identifications. Courts certainly would have
reservations to prosecute a person on the basis of a witness who justified his or her lineup
decision on nothing more than a good “guess”. Both, Remember and Know responders were
expected to show better identification performance than participants giving a Familiar re-
sponse.
Nonchoosers’ Decision Processes
Previous research has consistently shown that associations of identification accuracy
with post-decision confidence (e.g., Sporer et al., 1995; Weber & Brewer, 2003) and decision
time (e.g., Dunning & Stern, 1994; Sporer, 1992a, 1993; Weber et al., 2004, Weber & Brewer,
2006) are statistically reliable for positive identification decisions, but not for negative identi-
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fication decisions. In an attempt to explain this observation Sporer et al. (1995) argued that
the group of nonchoosers was too heterogeneous. Specifically, they proposed that rejecting a
lineup can indicate, first, that the witness was absolutely sure that the target was absent, sec-
ond that the witness believed that one person in the lineup was the target but that he/she was
not confident enough to choose this person. Thirdly, the witness may have had no memory
for the event. In the present study, we asked nonchoosers to indicate one of three reasons
why they rejected the lineup after their decision. The options included that (a) the target had
not been among them ("absent”), (b) they thought the target had been among them, but that
he/she had not been confident enough to choose him/her ("low confidence”), or (c) he/she did
not know whether the target had been among them or not ("no memory”). In doing so, we
hoped to create three subgroups of nonchoosers who differ in their accuracy. Specifically, we
expected participants in the "absent" group to show higher identification accuracy than those
in the two other groups. The "low confidence" group was expected to be less accurate than
the "no memory" group for the following reasons: The "no memory" group should be accurate
in their decisions in about 50% of the cases (the base rate for target absence/presence). Lower
accuracy than chance was expected for participants who reported that they believed the target
may have been present but that they had not been confident enough to make a choice. Analo-
gous, we expected confidence to be highest and decision times to be shortest for the absent
group, followed by the "no memory" and "low confidence" groups. Table 1 gives a summary
of all our hypotheses.
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Table 1
Summary of Hypotheses
Variable Hypothesis
Decision times Negative correlation with identification accuracy for choosers but not nonchoosers
Estimated decision times Result patterns paralleling those for measured decision times
Positive correlation with measured decision times
Confidence Positive correlation with identification accuracy for choosers but not nonchoosers
Better calibration for choosers than nonchoosers
Remember-Know-Familiar judgments Rival hypotheses: Rotello et al. (2005): higher accuracy for Remember than Know
answers; Dunning and Stern (1994): higher accuracy for automatic (Know) than
deliberate (Remember) answers
Combination of postdictors Higher correct classification rates for the combination of all three postdictors than for
each postdictor by itself
Nonchoosers' decision processes Accuracy, confidence, and decision times (reversed) in descending order: "absent" group,
"no memory" group, "low confidence" group
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Method
Participants
Nine-hundred-and-forty-four persons (479 female, 465 male) were approached in the
pedestrian zone in a small university town in Germany. Of these, 720 (360 male, 360 female;
age 15 to 84, Mdn = 33.5 years) agreed to take part in our study. Most participants were
students with various majors (27.2%). Note that this is representative for this city, with
75,000 inhabitants and 23,000 students. Other participants worked in academic (16.5%) or
other occupations (36.2%), were high school pupils (8.5%), retired (6.8%), housewives/-
husbands (4.2%) or unemployed (0.6%).
Manipulated Variables
In a 10 x 2 design, target person (targets 1 through 10) and target presence (present vs.
absent) were independent variables, with an equal number of cases in each cell. Identification
accuracy was the dependent variable, with pre- and post-decision confidence, decision time,
and estimated decision time as postdictor variables. In addition, a judgment of recollective ex-
perience for choosers, and a judgment of decision process for nonchoosers was collected. For
choosers, it was randomly manipulated whether there were Remember and Know options or
Remember, Know, and Familiar options for the judgment of recollective experience.
Photo Lineup
Each lineup consisted of six frontal 9 x 13 cm photographs mounted on a 30 x 33.5 cm
display board depicting six individuals that were arranged in two rows of three pictures each
and numbered 1 to 6. Each lineup member wore different long sleeve clothing. Jewelry, eye-
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glasses and hair accessories were taken off and hair was worn loose. During their encounter
with the participant, target persons wore different clothing from what they were wearing on
their lineup picture. All lineup pictures were taken outdoors in front of the same wall.
Target persons were eight female and two male psychology major students (age 20 to
37, Mdn = 20 years) who received course credit for data collection.
For half of the participants, the target photograph was present (TP) in the lineup, for
the other half it was substituted by a replacement (TA). For practical reasons, in this field
study, the target as well as the replacement always appeared on position 3. All foils, includ-
ing the replacement, fit the general descriptions of each of the target persons as determined by
a pilot study with N = 55 mock witnesses (effective sizes, determined as Tredoux’s Es were
between 5.14 and 6.76; Tredoux, 1998, 1999).
Procedure
Ten persons were involved in the present study both as stimulus persons (targets)
and as interviewers, alternating their roles. Data collection took place in a town different from
their home university. Data were collected in pairs of two persons, one serving as target, one
as the interviewer. After data of eight participants were collected, the roles were changed.
Every interviewer collected data of 8 participants with each of the other targets. Interviewers
underwent three training sessions in which the interaction with the participants as both target
and interviewer, time taking as well as controlling interaction time was practiced.
Specifically, the target asked a passer-by for directions to a certain location in the pe-
destrian zone of a university town. The conversation was scheduled to last between 15 s and
60 s. Hereafter, the target walked into the shown direction. To ensure that the target was no
longer seen by the passer-by after the interaction, targets only approached people whose
walking direction was opposite of the location asked for.
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The other person, the interviewer, watched the situation from a distance and recorded
the interaction time with a stopwatch. Thirty seconds after the interaction between target and
participant was terminated the interviewer approached the participant and explained that the
true nature of the preceding interaction was a study on face recognition. If consent to partici-
pate was given, passers-by were handed a questionnaire. After indicating their pre-decision
confidence on an 11-point scale ranging from 0% to 100% (with intervals marked in 10%
steps: 0%, 10%, ..., 100%), participants were handed the display board with the lineup. To
ensure the blindness of the interviewer, target-present and -absent lineups were placed into
differently colored envelopes, with interviewers being unaware of their contents. The experi-
mental design sheet informed interviewers which envelope to use for which participant. Thus,
the interviewer pulled the display board out of the envelope and handed it to the participant
without looking at it. This procedure ensured that the interviewers could only see the display
board from the back, but not the pictures, that is, whether the target was present or not.
On the answer sheet, participants were advised that they would be asked to identify
the person who had asked them for directions. The instructions clearly stated that the person
might or might not be present in the lineup. Identification decision time was measured unob-
trusively via stopwatches which the interviewers held in their hands but were covered by a
shopping bag.
After the identification task, choosers were asked to make a RK or RKF judgment.
The RKF judgment instructions followed those provided by Conway et al. (1997) but were
adapted for the identification procedure:
During the identification
A ... I had the person, his/her manner of speaking, the situation, or what I was
thinking when he/she asked me for directions before my mental eye.
B ... I just knew that it was the face of the person, who asked me for directions.
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C ... the face just felt somewhat familiar, so that I chose it.
In the RK condition, the third response was omitted. Hereafter, choosers indicated
their post-decision confidence on an 11-point scale ranging from 0% to 100%.
The following procedure was adopted for nonchoosers: Immediately after the identifi-
cation, nonchoosers were first asked for their post-decision confidence rating (0%-100%) and
then made a judgment about their decision process. To gain further insight into the decision
processes of nonchoosers they were given the following question:
You did not make a choice. Which of the following statements applies best to you?
A The person was not among them.
B I think the person was among them, but I was not confident enough to choose
him/her.
C I did not know whether the person was among them or not.
Finally, participants were asked, how long they thought they had seen the target per-
son, and how long they estimated it had taken them to make a decision. Estimations were
made in s with no intervals allowed.
After participants had completed all items, they were thanked and handed a card with
the researchers’ web address where the results of the study would be available after approxi-
mately three months.
Results
An alpha level of alpha = .05 was used for all inferential analyses. Cohen’s (1988) d
and f, are reported as measures of effect size for ANOVAs, and Cramer’s V and phi are re-
ported for nonparametric analyses of 3 x 2 and 2 x 2 contingency tables, respectively.
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Identification accuracy varied across targets from 41.7% to 70.8% (M = 56.9%, SD =
49.5). Of the 720 participants 410 (56.9%) made a correct identification decision. Nonchoos-
ers (n = 284) were more accurate in their decisions (70.1%) than choosers (n =436; 48.4%),
chi2(1, N = 720) = 32.96, p < .001, phi = 0.21. Accuracy did not differ for TA (55.3%) and
TP (58.6%) lineups, chi2(1, N = 720) = .816, p = .408, phi = .031.
In the following, we first look at the relationships between identification accuracy and
the each postdictor individually. For each postdictor, a 2 x 2 x 10 ANOVA with choice
(choosers vs. nonchoosers), decision outcome (correct vs. incorrect), and target (target 1 vs. ...
vs. target 10) as independent variables was computed and the results are reported in the fol-
lowing section. Subsequently, the postdictors are combined. Descriptive statistics of decision
time measures and decision confidence measures as well as their intercorrelations can be found
in Table 2.
Postdicting Identification Accuracy from Assessment Variables
Pre-Decision Confidence
For pre-decision confidence there only was a main effect of decision outcome,
F(1, 680) = 16.91, p < .001, d = 0.32. Participants making a correct identification decision
showed higher pre-decision confidence ratings (M = 64.4%, 95% CI = 62.2 – 66.6%) than
participants making an incorrect identification decision (M = 56.9%, 95%
CI = 54.3 – 59.5%).
                     
1Results for the individual targets regarding identification accuracy and choosing rates,
as well as diagnosticity can be obtained from the Appendix.
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Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Identification Accuracy, Postdictors of Identification Accuracy, Estimated
Viewtime, and Estimated Decision Time for Choosers (n = 436)
M SD 95% CI Pre-
decision
confidence
Post-
decision
confidence
Decision
time
Viewing
time
Estimated
viewing
time
Estimated
decision
time
Identification accuracy 48.4% 50.0 43.7-53.1% .16** .39** -.30** .08 .10* -.21**
Pre-decision confidence 60.6% 23.6 58.4-62.8% .46** -.13** -.01 -.04 -.16**
Post-decision confidence 60.6% 27.1 58.1-63.1% -.33** -.01 .05 -.31**
Decision time1 9.4 s 2.5 8.6-10.2 s -.04 -.04 .49**
Viewing time 28.5 s 10.8 27.5-29.5 s .27** .05
Estimated viewing time1 19.4 s 2.3 17.9-21.0 s .35**
Estimated decision time1 9.3 s 3.0 8.4-10.3 s
*p ≤ .05, two-tailed. **p ≤ .01, two-tailed.
1The mean and standard deviations were backtransformed from the logarithmic values used for the inferential analyses.
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Decision Time
Due to significant positive skewness and kurtosis in the response latency distribution,
one extreme value was winsorized (Winer, 1971) and inferential analyses were conducted on
log-transformed data (i.e., log base 10).
There were significant main effects of decision outcome, F(1, 680) = 21.37, p < .001,
d = -0.35, and choice, F(1, 680) = 8.88, p = .003, d = -0.23. Specifically, accurate participants
decided faster (M = 8.6 s, 95% CI = 7.9 - 9.5 s) than inaccurate ones (M = 12.1 s, 95%
CI = 11.1 - 13.3 s), and choosers decided faster (M = 9.4 s, 95% CI = 8.6 - 10.2 s) than non-
choosers (M = 11.0 s, 95% CI = 10.0 - 12.2 s). The main effects were modified by the ex-
pected interaction between Decision Outcome and Choice, F(1, 680) = 6.26, p = .013, f = .10.
There was a simple main effect of decision outcome within choosers, F(1, 680) = 43.90,
p < .001, d = -0.49, but not within nonchoosers, F(1, 680) = 0.53, p = .465, d = -0.06.
Within choosers, accurate decisions were made faster (M = 7.3 s, 95% CI = 6.3 - 7.9 s) than
inaccurate ones (M = 12.4 s, 95% CI = 10.9 - 13.8 s). Within nonchoosers, there was no dif-
ference between accurate (M = 11.0 s, 95% CI = 9.5 - 12.1 s) and inaccurate (M = 12.8 s,
95% CI = 9.7 - 14.1 s) decisions with regard to decision time.
Furthermore, the interaction between Decision Outcome and Target was significant,
F(9, 680) = 2.30, p = .015, f = .17. Note, however, that the predicted Choice by Accuracy
interaction was not qualified by an interaction with Target, F(9, 680) = 0.49, p = .884,
f = .08.
Post-Decision Confidence
There was a significant main effect for decision outcome, F(1, 680) = 37.50, p < .001,
d = 0.47. Accurate participants were more confident (M = 67.8%, 95% CI = 65.3% - 70.3%)
than inaccurate ones (M = 52.7%, 95% CI = 49.8% - 55.5%). The main effect was modified
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by the expected interaction between Decision Outcome and Choice, F(1, 680) = 11.83,
p = .001, f = .15. There was a significant simple main effect of accuracy within choosers,
F(1,  680) = 66.70, p < .001, d = 0.63, but not within nonchoosers, F(1, 680) = 2.74,
p = .098, d = .13. Specifically, within choosers, accurate identifiers were more confident
(M = 70.7%, 95% CI = 67.1 – 74.3%) than inaccurate ones (M = 50.1%, 95% CI = 46.7 -
 53.5%). Within nonchoosers, accurate (M = 63.7%, 95% CI = 60.2 - 67.3%) and inaccurate
identifiers (M = 58.0%, 95% CI = 52.1 – 63.8%) did not differ significantly with regard to
post-decision confidence.
Estimated Decision Time
Due to significant positive skewness and kurtosis in the estimated decision time dis-
tribution, three extreme values on both sides of the distribution were winsorized (Winer,
1971) and inferential analyses were conducted on log-transformed data.
Estimated decision time and the measured times were positively associated for choos-
ers, r(434) = .49, p < .001, and nonchoosers, r(282) = .46, p < .001. The estimated and meas-
ured means did not differ significantly from one another for choosers (Ms = 9.3 s and 9.4 s),
t(435) = -.164, p = .870, d = -0.02, or nonchoosers (Ms = 10.3 s and 11.0 s), t(283) = -1.16,
p = .246, d = -0.11. Figure 1 displays the means of correct and incorrect choosers and non-
choosers with regard to actual and estimated decision time.
There was a significant main effect of decision outcome, F(1, 680) = 5.50, p = .019,
d = -0.18. Correct decisions were estimated to have been made faster (M = 9.0 s, 95%
CI = 7.8 – 9.7 s) than incorrect ones (M = 11.1 s, 95% CI = 10.0 – 12.6 s). This main effect
was modified by an interaction between Decision Outcome and Choice, F(1, 680) = 5.42,
p = .020, f = .09. There was a significant simple main effect of accuracy within choosers. Cor-
rect choosers estimated their decision time as shorter (M = 7.7 s, 95% CI = 6.6 – 8.9 s) than
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did incorrect choosers (M = 11.7 s, 95% CI = 10.1 – 13.5 s), F(1, 680) = 15.94, p < .001,
d = -0.31. No such difference was found between correct (M = 10.6 s, 95% CI = 9.1 – 12.3 s)
and incorrect nonchoosers (M = 10.6 s, 95% CI = 8.3 – 13.5 s), F(1, 680) = 0.00, p = .992,
d = 0.00.
Figure 1. Means (and CIs) of actual vs. estimated decision time as a function of choice
and decision outcome.
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Calibration of Confidence Measures
For confidence measures, in addition to ANOVAs, calibrational analyses were carried
out in order to establish the postdictive value of these measures.
Pre-Decision Confidence
The pre-decision confidence-accuracy correlation did not differ between choosers,
r(434) = .16, p = .001, and nonchoosers, r(282) = .16, p = .006, z = 0.11. Therefore, calibra-
tion analyses with regard to pre-decision confidence were carried out for the whole group of
participants. Following Brewer and Wells (2006) the 11 confidence categories were collapsed
into five categories (i.e., 100% and 90%, 80% and 70%, 60% and 50%, 40% and 30%, 20%,
10% and 0%) to provide more stable estimates of proportion correct for each confidence cate-
gory. To create the CA calibration curve, the proportion correct for each of the collapsed
categories was plotted against the weighted mean confidence for that category. Figure 2 dis-
plays the CA calibration curve, which shows only very little slope, indicating poor calibra-
tion. The overall calibration was C = .024. The curve displays strong underconfidence in the
first two categories (0 - 20% and 30 - 40%), good calibration in the third category (50 - 60%),
and strong overconfidence in the last two categories (70 - 80% and 90 - 100%), leading to an
overall O/U of .042. The resolution statistic showed only little capability to discriminate be-
tween correct and incorrect identification decisions (NRI = .041). The NRI statistic is directly
comparable to eta2 (see Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; Yaniv, Yates, & J. E. K. Smith, 1991). As
eta2 is directly related to Cohen's f, cutoffs for small, moderate, and large NRI values can be
derived from the .10, .25, and .40 cutoffs for f, specifically, the values are .010, .059, and .138
(see Brewer & Wells, 2006).
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Figure 2. Pre-decision confidence-identification accuracy calibration curves for choos-
ers and nonchoosers combined.
Post-Decision Confidence
As expected, the CA correlation was highly significant for choosers, r(434) = .39,
p < .001, but non-significant for nonchoosers, r(282) = .09, p = .137.
Figure 3 displays the CA calibration curve for choosers and nonchoosers. The calibra-
tion curve for choosers generally follows the slope of the identity line. Choosers showed an
overall calibration of C = .026. The curve displays some underconfidence in the first category
(0 - 20%), fairly good calibration in the second category (30 - 40%), and strong overconfi-
dence in the last three categories at the higher end of the scale (50 - 100% confident), leading
to an overall O/U of .122. The resolution statistic showed high capability to discriminate be-
tween correct and incorrect identification decisions for choosers, NRI = 0.174.
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Figure 3. Chooser’s (top panel) and nonchooser’s (lower panel) post-decision confi-
dence-identification accuracy calibration curves.
For nonchoosers, the calibration line almost parallels the x axis, C = .059. Nonchoos-
ers were highly underconfident in the first three categories, fairly well calibrated in the fourth
category and overconfident in the fifth confidence category, leading to an overall O/U of -.077.
The resolution index indicates low capability to discriminate between correct and incorrect
nonchoosers, NRI = .030.
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RKF Judgment
The usefulness of the RK(F) judgment for postdicting identification accuracy was
tested via two separate three-way frequency analyses for the RK and the RKF condition to
develop a hierarchical log-linear model of RK(F) judgment, decision outcome, and target. For
the RKF condition, stepwise selection by simple deletion of effects produced a model that
included the two-way association between RKF judgment and Decision Outcome as well as
the two-way association between Decision Outcome and Target, chi2(36, N = 204) = 37.52,
p = .399. Post-hoc chi2-analyses revealed that identification accuracy for Remember
(M = 47.1%, 95% CI = 35.2 - 59.1%) and Know answers (M = 59.5%, 95% CI = 48.4 -
 70.6%) did not differ significantly, chi2(1, N = 149) = 2.28, p = .089, phi = -.12, whereas
there was a significant difference in accuracy of Know and Familiar answers (M = 34.5%,
95% CI = 21.6 - 47.5%), chi2(1, N = 134) = 8.08, p = .004, phi = .26.
For the RK condition, stepwise selection by simple deletion of effects produced a
model that included the two-way association between RK judgment and Target, chi2(20,
N = 232) = 21.74, p = .356, indicating that the distribution of Remember and Know judg-
ments differed as a function of target (but not accuracy: R: 42.4% accurate; K: 54.4%).
Combination of Postdictors
The previous analyses showed that there were associations between decision times
and confidence measures with identification accuracy for choosers. However, in a given case,
it is not clear how fast, or how confident is “enough” in order to evaluate the identification
evidence as accurate. Therefore, decision time boundaries (Dunning & Perretta, 2002) were
computed based on the 2 (accuracy: correct vs. incorrect) x 2 (time boundary: faster or equal
vs. slower) contingency tables with the time boundary set at each integer value (i.e., 1 s, 2 s,
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etc.). The decision time that produced the greatest chi2 value was identified as the time
boundary that optimally discriminated between correct and incorrect choosers. An analogous
analysis was carried out for post-decision confidence based on the 2 (accuracy: correct vs.
incorrect) x 2 (post-decision confidence boundary: more or equal vs. less confident) contin-
gency tables. Based on the results of the boundary analysis, accuracy within and outside the
optimum boundary were computed for each target. We then computed the mean accuracy
rates across targets. In a second step, we determined how many choosers made accurate deci-
sions, provided they responded within both optimum boundaries, only in one or the other, or
outside both optimum boundaries.
Boundary Analyses
Decision Time. As expected, the decision time-accuracy (LA) relation was significant
for choosers, r(434) = -.30, p < .001, but not for nonchoosers, r(282) = -.05, p = .451. Thus,
time boundary analyses were performed only on choosers' data. The plot of chi2 values by
time boundaries is presented in Figure 4. The optimum time boundary here was at 6 s, chi2(1,
N = 436) = 50.19, p < .001, phi = -.34. The mean proportion of correct decisions made before
the optimum time boundary was 68.8% and 36.4% after the optimum time boundary.
Post-Decision Confidence. The plot of chi2 values by post-decision confidence
boundaries is presented in Figure 5. The mean proportion of correct decisions made within
the optimum post-decision confidence boundary was 77.5% and 38.3% outside the optimum
post-decision boundary.
Estimated Decision Time. The estimated decision time-accuracy relationship was sig-
nificant for choosers, r(434) = -.21, p < .001, but not for nonchoosers, r(282) = .01, p = .931.
The plot of chi2 value by estimated time boundaries is presented in Figure 6. The optimum
estimated time boundary here was at 3 s, chi2(1, N = 436) = 17.52, p < .001, phi = -.20. The
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mean proportion of correct decisions made before the optimum estimated time boundary was
66.1% and 43.7% after the optimum estimated time boundary.
Figure 4. Plot of chi2 values (and 95% CI) by decision time boundary.
Figure 5. Plot of chi2 values (and 95% CI) by post-decision confidence boundary.
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Figure 6. Plot of chi2 values (and 95% CI) by estimated decision time boundary.
Combining Postdictors According to Boundary Results
In the next step, postdictors were combined according to the boundary analyses re-
sults. For the RKF condition, R and K vs. F judgments were also included. Remember and
Know judgments were combined as there was no significant difference in identification accu-
racy for these two groups. Table 3 shows identification accuracy for postdictor combinations.
The columns labeled % correct contain what proportion of participants was correct in this
condition. For example, of the non-confident fast choosers, 56.8% of the 88 participants
made a correct decision. The columns labeled M contain the unweighted mean for this cell
across all 10 targets. This was slightly less (55.4%) for the example.  
Choosers who decided within the first 6 s and gave a post-decision confidence rating
of 90% or 100% were on average (computed across targets) correct in 97.2% of the cases. For
choosers who were less than 90% confident and slower than 6 s, accuracy was 31.8% on av-
erage.
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Table 3
Identification Accuracy of Choosers for Combinations of Postdictors as a Function of RK(F) Condition
Decision time
Condition Fast (≤ 6 s) Slow (> 6 s)
Total
RK and RKF conditions
together
n % correct M* n % correct M* n % correct M*
Post-decision confidence
0- 80% 88 56.8 55.4 245 31.8 31.8 333 38.4 38.3
95% CI 46.4-67.2 26.0-37.6 33.2-43.6
90-100% 57 96.5 97.2 46 60.9 60.4 103 80.6 77.5
95% CI 91.4-100 46.7-75.1 72.9-88.3
Total 145 72.4 68.8 291 36.4 36.4 436 48.4 57.0
95% CI 65.1-79.7 30.9-41.9 43.7-53.1
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Table 3 (continued)
Decision time
Fast (≤ 6 s) Slow (> 6 s)
Total
RKF condition only n % correct M* n % correct M* n % correct M*
Low post-decision confidence (0-80%)
Remember/Know 25 48.0 52.5 70 32.9 32.2 95 36.8 35.6
95% CI 28.0–68.0 21.8-44.0 27.1-46.5
Familiar 9 44.4 47.6 44 31.8 27.5 53 34.0 35.7
95% CI 10.0-78.8 17.9-45.7 21.1-46.9
Total 34 47.1 47.4 114 32.5 31.6 148 35.8 36.2
95% CI 29.4-64.7 23.7-41.1 28.0-43.6
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Decision time
Fast (≤ 6 s) Slow (> 6 s)
Total
RKF condition only n % correct M* n % correct M* n % correct M*
High post-decision confidence (90-100%)
Remember/Know 31 96.8 97.8 23 65.2 67.5 54 83.3 78.1
95% CI 90.5-100 45.3-85.1 73.3-93.3
Familiar 1   100 100 1  0.0  0 2 50.0 50.0
95% CI 100-100      0-0 0-100
Total 32 96.9 97.8 24 62.5 65.8 56 82.1 77.3
95% CI 90.5-100 41.6-83.3 71.8-92.5
High and low confidence 66 71.2 71.8 138 37.7 37.5 204 48.5 48.1
95% CI 60.2-82.2 29.6-45.8 41.6-55.4
* Mean accuracy calculated separately as the unweighted mean for this cell across all 10 targets (see text).
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Replacing decision time with estimated decision time, that is, looking at those partici-
pants who estimated their decision as 3 s or faster and who were also 90% or 100% confi-
dent, produced an accuracy rate of 96.7%. For choosers who were less than 90% confident
and estimated their decision time as slower than 3 s, accuracy was 37.6% on average.
Including the RKF judgment in the RKF condition (N = 204) led to the following re-
sults: Those participants who made a Remember or Know judgment were on average accurate
in 52.7% of the identifications. Looking only at decision time in this group (within the first 6
s) led to 71.8% correct identifications, and using only post-decision confidence as a postdic-
tor (90 or 100%) to 77.3%. Combining the three postdictors resulted in 97.8% correct identi-
fications. However, combining only decision time and post-decision confidence also resulted
in 97.8% correct decisions; thus RKF judgments did not improve postdictions. For the other
two combinations (post-decision confidence and RKF judgments; decision time and RKF
judgments) accuracy rates were at 78.1% and 74.7%, respectively.
Combining estimated decision times with post-decision confidence and RKF judgment
produced an accuracy rate of 96.9% for those participants who estimated their decision time
as 3 s or faster, were 90% or 100% confident and gave a Remember or Know judgment.
For the former analyses it might be objected, that post-hoc criterion setting does not
help to postdict the results in future samples. Therefore, we split our sample into two ran-
dom subsamples wherby 50% of the choosers of each target were randomly assigned to one
of two groups. We performed all analyses again for one subsample and then postdicted identi-
fication accuracy for the second subsample. The optimum time boundary for the subsample
was at 6 s, chi2(1, N = 218) = 25.68, p < .001, phi = -.34. The proportion of correct deci-
sions made before the optimum time boundary was 71.6% and 35.4% after the optimum time
boundary. The optimum post-decision confidence boundary for the subsample was at 70%,
chi2(1, N = 218) = 27.67, p < .001, phi = .36. The proportion of correct decisions made
within the optimum post-decision confidence boundary was 68.9% and 28.7% outside the
optimum post-decision confidence boundary. The optimum estimated time boundary was at
4 s, chi2(1, N = 218) = 9.06, p = .003, phi = -.20. The proportion of correct decisions made
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before the optimum estimated time boundary was 67.4% and 42.4% after the optimum esti-
mated time boundary.
Hierarchical log-linear model of RK(F) judgment, decision outcome, and target pro-
duced a model that only included decision outcome for the RK, chi2(38, N = 118) = 42.86,
p = .270, and the RKF conditions, chi2(58, N = 100) = 70.42, p = .127. Therefore, RK(F)
judgments were not included for the combination of postdictors.
Choosers who decided within the first 6 s and gave a post-decision confidence rating
between 70 and 100% were on average across targets correct in 82.9% of the cases. Choosers
who were less confident and slower were on average 23.2% accurate. Replacing decision time
with estimated decision time produced an accuracy rate of 81.0%. Choosers who estimated
their decision as slower and who were less confident were on average accurate in 36.2% of the
cases. Thus, with regard to combining (estimated) decision times and post-decision confi-
dence, we found comparable results when the optimum boundaries were estimated for one
subsample and then used to postdict identification accuracy of another subsample. RKF
judgment had no postdictive value.
To summarize, we successfully postdicted identification accuracy of choosers by us-
ing post-decision confidence and decision time as postdictors. The RKF judgment did not im-
prove postdiction beyond decision time and post-decision confidence. Estimated decision
times also served as a useful postdictor. Note, howerver that postdiction was successful only
for a small number of participants in the sample: fast and confident choosers.
Nonchoosers’ Decision Processes
Most of the results reported so far referred to choosers’ decisions only. In the fol-
lowing, we report results with regard to nonchoosers’ decision processes. Descriptive statis-
tics of decision time, decision confidence measures, and decision process measures of non-
choosers as well as their intercorrelations can be found in Table 4. Of the 284 nonchoosers,
204 simply stated “The person was not among them” (absent group), 39 responded “The tar-
get was among them, but I was not confident enough“ ("low confidence" group), and 41 se-
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lected the option “I did not know whether the person was among them or not“ ("no memory"
group). However, the three groups did not differ with regard to decision outcome, chi2(2,
N = 284) = 2.13, p = .345, Cramer's V = .09, although the "absent" group showed a tendency
to greater accuracy (72.5%) than the other two groups (64.1% vs. 63.4%).
Three 3 x 2 ANOVAs with the decision process groups ("absent" vs. "low confi-
dence" vs. "no memory") and decision outcome (correct vs. incorrect) as independent vari-
ables and pre-decision confidence, decision times, and post-decision confidence as dependent
variables were computed. There were main effects of decision process on pre-decision confi-
dence, F(2, 278) = 19.80, p < .001, f = .38, decision times, F(2, 278) = 6.82, p = .001, f = .22,
and post-decision confidence, F(2, 278) = 36.08, p < .001, f = .51. Post hoc t-tests showed
that the "absent" group decided faster (M = 9.7 s), with higher pre-decision decision confi-
dence (M = 66.8%), and higher post-decision confidence (M = 69.9%) than both the "low
confidence" (Ms = 14.0 s, 56.4%, 45.6%) and "no memory" groups (Ms = 16.3 s, 43.4%,
40.7%), all |t|s ≥ 2.56, |d|s ≥ 0.42. The "low confidence" and "no memory" groups only dif-
fered with regard to their pre-decision confidence ratings (M = 56.4% vs. 43.4%, respec-
tively), t(78) = 2.63, p = .010, d = 0.31. The main effect of decision outcome was significant
for pre-decision confidence only, F(1, 278) = 6.02, p = .015, d = .29. Specifically, pre-
decision confidence ratings were higher for accurate (58.5%) than inaccurate (49.9%) non-
choosers. The decision process by decision outcome interaction was non-significant for all
three variables. There were no associations of identification accuracy with post-decision con-
fidence or decision times, all |r|s ≤ .21, ps ≥ .183.
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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Postdictors of Identification Accuracy for Nonchoosers as a Function of Reasons
Given for Not Choosing
M SD 95% CI 2 3 4 5 6 7
“Target was not among them” (n = 204)
1 Accuracy 72.5% 44.7 66.4-78-6% .11 .02 -.05 -.09 .03 .05
2 Pre-decision confidence 66.8% 21.4 63.9-69.7% .38** -.06 .03 .03 -.10
3 Post-decision confidence 69.9% 23.7 66.6-73.2% -.18* -.05 .12 -.08
4 Decision time 9.7 s 2.3 8.7-10.9 s -.02 .21** .45**
5 Viewing time 27.9 s 10.4 26.4-29.3 s .24** .03
6 Estimated viewing time 20.0 s 2.6 17.6-22.7 s .48**
7 Estimated decision time 9.0 s 3.0 7.7-10.5 s
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Table 4 (continued)
M SD 95% CI 2 3 4 5 6 7
“Low confidence” (n = 39)
1 Accuracy 64.1% 48.6 48.8-79.4% .24 .12 -.17 .13 -.00 .05
2 Pre-decision confidence 56.4% 22.9 49.2-63.6% .39* -.09 .06 .04 -.14
3 Post-decision confidence 45.6% 21.7 38.8-52.4% -.22 .13 -.03 -.24
4 Decision time 14.0 s 2.4 10.7-18.4 s .18 .03 .46**
5 Viewing time 27.0 s 9.9 23.8-30.2 s .51** .50**
6 Estimated viewing time 19.5 s 2.4 14.7-25.7 s .52**
7 Estimated decision time 14.2 s 2.6 10.4-19.3 s
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Table 4 (continued)
M SD 95% CI 2 3 4 5 6 7
“No memory” (n = 41)
1 Accuracy 63.4% 48.8 48.5-78.3% .22 .19 .21 .21 -.02 -.15
2 Pre-decision confidence 43.4% 21.3 36.8-49.8% .21 .14 .08 .25 .12
3 Post-decision confidence 40.7% 22.4 33.8-47.6% .17 .32 .30 -.25
4 Decision time 16.3 s 2.1 13.1-20.3 s .33* .15 .36*
5 Viewing time 30.2 s 10.9 26.7-33.6 s .41** -.04
6 Estimated viewing time 20.0 s 2.7 14.7-27.2 s .10
7 Estimated decision time 14.5 s 2.9 10.4-20.3 s
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01.
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Discussion
In the present study three major research questions were addressed: First, we ana-
lyzed the postdictive value of the combination of three assessment variables for choosers.
Second, the usefulness of estimated decision times as a postdictor of identification accuracy
was examined. Third, we tested the utility of self-reported decision process of nonchoosers as
assessment variable. The issues of stimulus sampling, generalizability as well as ecological
validity were addressed by carrying out a large scale field study with 720 participants and ten
targets.
Previous research to test the usefulness of assessment variables has usually looked at
post-decision confidence, decision times or decision processes only in isolation. In contrast,
we sought to test their postdictive value relative to each other as well as in combination. We
emphasize that the postdictive values of these assessment variables is limited to their meas-
urement in the immediate context of the identification (Sporer, 1993), that is, uncontaminated
by postidentification feedback or other factors distorting their postdictive value.
A number of findings from the literature were replicated in the present field experi-
ment: As in other studies, significant positive CA and negative LA associations were found
only for choosers but not for nonchoosers (Dunning & Stern, 1994; Dunning & Perretta,
2002; S. M. Smith et al., 2000; Sporer, 1993, 1994; Sporer et al., 1995; Weber et al., 2004;
Weber & Brewer, 2006), resulting in the expected interaction between Choice and Decision
Outcome (Sporer, 1994). For choosers, the observed point-biserial correlations are considered
large for confidence (r = .39) and medium to large for decision times (r = -.30; Cohen, 1988, p.
81). Calibrational analyses replicated the finding that there is high capability to discriminate
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accurate from incorrect choosers but not nonchoosers via post-decision confidence (Brewer &
Wells, 2006; Brewer, Keast et al., 2002; Weber & Brewer, 2003, 2004, 2006).
We know of no study where pre-decision confidence was calibrated. Here, calibration
measures of pre-decision confidence showed only little capability to discriminate accurate
from inaccurate witnesses. This is consistent with many correlational studies on the pre-
decision confidence accuracy relation (e.g., Cutler & Penrod, 1988; Cutler, Penrod, O’Rourke,
& Martens, 1986; Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Gwyer & Clifford, 1997; Sporer, 1992a).
Nevertheless, despite low calibration we did find a significant positive correlation between
pre-decision confidence and identification accuracy not only for choosers but also for non-
choosers, and hence for the whole sample. This is consistent with the results of Sporer
(1993). Over a wide range of abilities and knowledge, broad agreement between self-assessed
and objective knowledge has been found (Ackerman, Beier, & Bowen, 2002; Perfect, 2004).
However, when confronted with a lineup, witnesses normally have had no experience with
this task and they do not know what the identification task will be like (see Perfect, 2004;
Perfect & Hollins, 1996). This may be one reason for the lack of reliability of the association
between pre-decision confidence and identification accuracy. Specifically, witnesses usually
are not told the number of lineup members, the perspective from which the pictures were
taken (frontal, 3/4 pose or profile), or how similar the foils will be to the suspect (e.g., Cutler
& Penrod, 1988; Cutler Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Cutler, Penrod, O'Rourke, & Martens,
1986; Gwyer & Clifford, 1997; Sporer, 1992a, 1993). Considering these circumstances, it is
not surprising that pre-decision confidence ratings often lack an association with identification
accuracy. In the present study, we informed witnesses that they would be asked to make an
identification from a lineup consisting of six portrait (frontal) pictures. Of course, the number
of lineup members should not be disclosed when the sequential lineup method is used (R. C.
L. Lindsay & Wells, 1985; Sporer, 1993). Nevertheless, information about the angle and qual-
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ity of the pictures could help witnesses to make better calibrated estimates of pre-decision
confidence.
We successfully combined post-decision confidence and decision time via boundary
analyses which resulted in correct classifications of 97.2% of the fast and confident choosers.
To overcome the argument of post-hoc criterion setting, we split our sample of choosers into
two halves and postdicted accuracy of the first subsample by using the boundaries estab-
lished in the second subsample. The obtained results were comparable to those observed for
the whole sample with somewhat lower but yet high correct classification rates. Although
there was an association between RK(F) judgment and identification accuracy in the RKF
condition, the RKF judgment did not further improve classification rates. Furthermore, no
postdictive value of RKF judgments was found when we tried to postdict accuracy from the
results obtained from subsample 1 to subsample 2. Although we obtained a high number of
correctly classified choosers within the established boundaries, it should be clear that our
postdiction rate holds only for a small subgroup of participants, viz. n = 57 fast and confi-
dent choosers, given there were 436 choosers in our total sample of 720. Replacing decision
times with estimated decision times led to comparable results, with a correct classification
rate of 96.7%, which, however, applied to an even smaller number of participants (n = 24).
Admittedly, there was also a number of choosers outside one or both boundaries that were
accurate.
Boundary analyses for decision times and post-decision confidence revealed optimum
boundaries of 6 s and 90%. This is inconsistent to the 10 – 12 s rule established by Dunning
and Perretta (2002). Sauerland and Sporer (in press) found optimum boundaries of 18 s and
50% confidence. One difference between the present and the Sauerland and Sporer (in press)
study was the retention interval between witnessing the event and the identification task.
Sauerland and Sporer used a 1-week retention interval, whereas in the present study it was
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only 30 s. Furthermore, Sauerland and Sporer (in press) used laboratory methodology with a
filmed event. Likewise, Brewer, Caon et al. (2006) found shorter optimum time boundaries
for participants who were tested immediately (13 s) than for those who were tested after 15
min (36 s) or 20 min (35 s). Weber et al. (2004) found optimum time boundaries that varied
widely between 5 s and 28 - 29 s across four laboratory studies with retention intervals of 15
- 20 min between a filmed event and testing. With the growing number of studies on the topic,
a meta-analysis could shed light on those variables that have an impact on the optimum time
and confidence boundaries. As of now, the optimum boundaries seem to vary from study to
study, thus making it difficult to derive recommendations for practice. Furthermore, in real
cases, decision times and confidence may vary numberwise from those that we obtain in labo-
ratory or field studies, for example due to the awareness of the severe consequences of false
identifications and false rejections. It would be interesting to collect decision times and confi-
dence ratings in real cases so they can be compared to the descriptive data obtained in labora-
tory/field studies. Undoubtedly, it would be a great contribution to the field of identification
if data were collected even where DNA samples exist, so that identification accuracy could
actually be assessed in real cases.
There was a tendency of Know judgments to be associated with more accurate identi-
fications than Remember judgments in both the RK and the RKF condition (cf., Davids,
2006), thus supporting the assumptions made by Dunning and Stern (1994). On the contrary,
we found no support for Rotello et al.'s (2004) arguments. However, only in the RKF condi-
tion did a significant association of RKF judgment and identification accuracy emerge: Wit-
nesses who made a Familiar judgment were significantly less often accurate in their identifica-
tion decision than those who made a Know judgment. When looking at the distribution of cor-
rect and incorrect decisions in the RKF and the RK conditions, it seems that many partici-
pants who would have made a Know judgment in the RK condition tended to make a Familiar
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judgment in the RKF condition, resulting in higher accuracy rates of Know judgments than
Familiar judgments in the RKF condition. Remember judgments also tended to be more accu-
rate in the RKF than in the RK condition. According to these results it is not so crucial
whether a witness Remembers or Knows that a person is that target, but whether s/he only
thought the face was familiar. Practitioners should be very cautious with identification evi-
dence given on the grounds that the face simply looked more familiar than the other ones (see
Behrman & Richards, 2005).
In practice, measured decision times may not always be available. Therefore, the sec-
ond aim of the study was to analyze the utility of estimated decision times as a postdictor of
identification accuracy. An estimation of the time taken for the identification may then be an
alternative (albeit crude) way of gaining information about the witness's decision process. The
fact that estimated and measured decision times were highly positively associated for the
whole sample legitimates our procedure. Altogether, the pattern of results for estimated deci-
sion times paralleled the one for measured decision times, even though the effect sizes were
somewhat smaller. Specifically, the association between estimated decision times and identifi-
cation accuracy was significant for choosers but not nonchoosers resulting in the Choice by
Decision Outcome interaction. Although we know of no study that tested the usefulness of
estimated decision times after longer time intervals, we are aware that the association with
identification accuracy may be distorted due to feedback (cf., Semmler, Brewer, & Wells,
2004; Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003). Wells and colleagues (Wells
& Bradfield, 1998, Experiment 1; Wells, Olson et al., 2003) found that participants receiving
confirming feedback estimated their decision time as being significantly longer than those not
receiving feedback. No such effect was found for disconfirming feedback. Thus, decision times
estimated retroactively by a witness at a later interrogation or in the courtroom may not have
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any probative value. The effect of retention interval and feedback on the decision time estima-
tion with and without feedback should be tested more thoroughly in future studies.
The third aim of the present study was to identify a postdictor for nonchoosers. It
was expected that those nonchoosers who indicated that they rejected the lineup because
"The target was absent" would be more accurate than those who simply indicated that “The
target was present, but I was not confident enough“ or who “did not know whether the per-
son was present“. There was only a non-significant trend in this direction (Cramer's V = .09).
However, as expected, the "absent" group made their decisions faster and with higher pre- and
post-decision confidence. The only difference that emerged between the "low confidence" and
the "no memory" group was for pre-decision confidence. Contrary to the hypothesis, the
"low confidence" group showed higher pre-decision confidence than the "no memory" group.
An explanation for the lack of association between the postdictors and identification
accuracy other than the heterogeneity of nonchoosers may be that choosers’ and nonchoos-
ers’ identification decision possesses asymmetric features (Weber & Brewer, 2004). Whereas
choosers’ decisions are likely to be based on a match between their memory for the target and
one of several faces shown in a lineup (Sporer, 1993), nonchoosers’ decisions are based on a
failure to match their memory to any of the faces in the lineup. Weber and Brewer (2006) ar-
gued that confidence ratings of nonchoosers are not based on confidence for the most likely
match (face), because then one would expect the CA relationship of nonchoosers to be similar
to the one observed for choosers, which is not the case. Instead, the authors suggested that
confidence of nonchoosers reflected the average match between all lineup faces and the target.
This hypothesis could be tested by either asking nonchoosers about their confidence with re-
gard to each lineup member (as done by Sporer, 1993, with sequential lineups), or by using
one-person lineups (i.e., showups). Following Weber and Brewer's (2006) reasoning, the as-
sociations between postdictors and identification accuracy should be observed when confi-
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dence and decision time measures apply to only one lineup member. Unfortunately, many
studies with showups either do not report the CA correlation at all, or if they do, they do not
differentiate between choosers and nonchoosers (e.g., Beal, Schmitt, & Dekle, 1995; Gon-
zales, Ellsworth, & Pembroke, 1993; R. C. L. Lindsay, Pozzulo, Craig, Lee, & Corbers, 1997;
Yarmey, Yarmey, & Yarmey, 1996). Dysart, R. C. L. Lindsay, and Dupuis (2006) found a
significant CA correlation for both choosers (r = .32) and nonchoosers (r = .19), supporting
Weber and Brewer's (2006) hypothesis. Dysart, R. C. L. Lindsay, MacDonald, and Wicke
(2002) reported neither a significant CA association for choosers nor for nonchoosers when
asking bar patrons (many of which were intoxicated with alcohol) to make an identification
from a showup.
Some caveats need to be discussed. First, although ecological validity was enhanced by
using a natural setting, there was no crime scenario in the present study. Thus, it is unlikely
that participants experienced the same arousal level as witnesses of a real crime would. How-
ever, it is equally unlikely that participants in studies with filmed crimes do. The well known
inverted-U relationship between arousal and memory suggests that identification accuracy
should be higher for events that have a medium arousal level, but should be lower in extremely
arousing situations, as witnessing serious crimes may be. Quite on the contrary, recent re-
search demonstrated that arousal with regard to life events has an impact on a feeling of re-
membering, the vividness of the memory (Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 2004), and perceived
accuracy (Talarico & Rubin, 2003) whereas was actual accuracy unaffected. Yet again, others
(Kensinger & Schacter, 2006) found that negative arousal affected not only vividness, but also
accuracy. The data base on the issue seems to be inconclusive at this time and further studies
are needed to find out about the effect that arousal has on identification accuracy, as well as
on confidence and RKF judgments.
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A second caveat in the present study is the short (30 s) interval between the event and
the identification task. In real cases, there are normally days, if not months between witness-
ing the event and the identification (Behrman & Richards, 2005). It is likely, that the memory
for the target would have decreased after a longer retention interval. However, leaving a longer
interval would have made it extremely difficult to track the participants and would most
likely have led to a large number of drop outs. Nonetheless, the main body of laboratory
studies in the identification field uses time intervals of 30 min or less. We believe that there
should be at least an interval of one day between event and identification when there are no
severe practical reasons that speak against this.
To summarize, we successfully combined decision times and post-decision confidence
and found that fast and confident choosers are highly accurate. Additionally, estimated deci-
sion times also qualified as postdictor of identification accuracy. The issue of how to proceed
with slower and less confident choosers, however, remains unsolved. For future studies, we
emphasized the contributive value that real cases could have. Our attempt to identify a post-
dictor of nonchoosers' performance failed. Studies that look at nonchoosers' showup decisions
could help us find out more about nonchoosers' decision processes. In conclusion, we are op-
timistic that further research on system and assessment variables along the lines presented
here should increase the probative value of eyewitness identification evidence, and reduce
miscarriages of justice.
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Appendix
Table A1
Identification Accuracy (in %) and Choosing Rates (in %)  as a Function of the Target Person and Target Presence
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Target 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Identification accuracy (%)
TA and TP 43.1 70.8 65.3 45.8 62.5 58.3 41.7 50.0 61.1 70.8 56.9
(31) (51) (47) (33) (45) (42) (30) (36) (44) (51) (410)
TP only  41.7 80.6 75.0 38.9 63.9 72.2 33.3 41.7 66.7 72.2 58.6
(15) (29) (27) (14) (23) (26) (12) (15) (24) (36) (211)
TA only 44.4 61.1 55.6 52.8 61.1 44.4 50.0 58.3 55.6 69.4 55.3
(16) (22) (20) (19) (22) (16) (18) (21) (20) (25) (199)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table A1 (continued)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Target 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Choosing rate (%)
TA and TP 62.5 61.1 63.9 61.1 58.3 69.4 52.8 52.8 63.9 59.7 60.6
(45) (44) (46) (44) (42) (50) (38) (38) (46) (43) (436)
TP only 69.4 83.3 83.3 75.0 77.8 83.3 55.6 63.9 83.3 88.9 76.4
(25) (30) (30) (27) (28) (30) (20) (23) (30) (32) (275)
TA only 55.6 38.9 44.4 47.2 38.9 55.6 50.0 41.7 44.4 30.6 44.7
(20) (14) (16) (17) (14) (20) (18) (15) (16) (11) (161)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note. Figures enclosed in parentheses represent absolute frequencies. TA = target-absent. TP = target-present.
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Table A2
CA Correlations, Decision Time-Accuracy Correlations, Post-Decision Confidence Boundary (in %), and Time Boundary (in s) as a
Function of the Target Person (Choosers only)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Target 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mean post-decision 57.1 63.4 60.9 54.8 62.6 64.4 56.8 52.1 63.0 68.8 60.6
confidence (%)
Mean decision time (s)1 10.1 9.1 8.6 13.7 9.2 7.9 9.0 11.1 10.2 6.8 9.4
CA relation (r) .43** .57** .38** .29° .39* .19 .47** .02 .56** .43** .39**
LA relation (r) -.25 -.40** -.27 -.14 -.40** -.13 -.25 .01 -.45** -.43** -.30**
Post-decision 80 60 70 100 90 20 90 ns2 70 90 90
confidence boundary (%)
Time boundary (in s) 4 6 5 ns2 6 5 - 6 5 ns2 14 - 16 10 - 12 6
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1The means of decision times were backtransformed from the logarithmic values used for the inferential analyses. 2When there was no
significant association between the postdictor and identification accuracy, no boundary was computed.
*p ≤ .05, two-tailed. **p ≤ .01, two-tailed.
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EXPERIMENT 4
The Application of Multiple Lineups in a Field Study
When attempting to establish if a suspect actually is the culprit, investigators can
frequently rely on DNA analysis. However, DNA samples often do not exist, and then
eyewitness identification testimony may be the only evidence available. For the past 30
years, research in this field has dealt with numerous factors that can have either a positive or
negative impact on identification performance (see Wells & Olson, 2003). Estimator variables
are those that cannot be controlled by the criminal justice system (e.g., lighting conditions;
Wells, 1978). The focus of the present study are system or control variables (Wells, 1978),
over which the criminal justice system normally has control (e.g., instructions to witnesses
and lineup composition). Specifically, we tested the usefulness of multiple lineups in order to
determine whether a particular identification decision is correct or incorrect. Note, that here,
multiple lineup presentation does not indicate the repeated presentation of one lineup to a
witness but the presentation of several lineups depicting different aspects of a person (face,
body, clothing) to one witness.
Furthermore, the present study addresses one shortcoming that affects most
identification studies. Although the need for a sufficient participant sample sizes seems
obvious to most, the need to sample stimuli appears to be far less straightforward (Wells &
Windschitl, 1999). Whereas some studies have reported results for two targets (Brewer,
Caon, Todd, & Weber, 2006, Experiment 2; Brewer & Wells, 2006; D. S. Lindsay, Read, &
Sharma, 1998), very few studies have used more (Brigham, 1990). Studies that did use two
targets have reported different results for different targets (Brewer et al., 2006, Experiment 2;
Brewer & Wells, 2006; D. S. Lindsay et al., 1998). This shows, that general conclusions based
on one target could be misleading. Therefore, we included nine targets in the present study.
Even though a wealth of research on identification accuracy exists using laboratory
staged events or filmed scenarios, only a small number of field experiments have been
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conducted to date (e.g., Brigham, Van Verst, & Bothwell, 1986; Krafka & Penrod, 1985;
Yarmey, 2004). Nevertheless, field experiments have some potential to provide a more
differentiated understanding of processes underlying eyewitness identification (Cutler &
Penrod, 1995), compared to laboratory research. In order to enhance the ecological validity
and generalizability of postdiction research, data were collected in a natural setting, in the
pedestrian zone of a small university town.
MULTIPLE LINEUPS
In an identification procedure, the witness is commonly asked to identify the face of
the target, as this seems to be the most prominent part of a person to be recognized.
However, other aspects of a person such as the body, voice, gait or posture may also be
subject to recognition. This could be particularly true in cases where the target’s face could
not be seen clearly or only for a short period of time. Drawing from the principle of encoding
specifity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973), several studies have attempted to improve
identification accuracy by providing different aspects of a person in one lineup (e.g., Cutler &
Penrod, 1988; Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Cutler & Fisher, 1990; Egan, Pittner, &
Goldstein, 1977; Melara, Dewitt-Rickards, & O’Brien, 1989). Although some studies
reported positive effects, the meta-analysis by Cutler, Berman, Penrod, and Fisher (1994)
reported only small effect sizes, concluding that, averaged across studies, the presentation of
different aspects of a person produced only trivial effects on identification accuracy.
Pryke, Lindsay, Dysart, and Dupuis (2004) argued that one reason for the lack of
improvement in identification performance when presenting different aspects of a person in
one lineup (cf., Cutler et al., 1994) may be that the face overwhelmed the other aspects of the
person. Specifically, witnesses may make a choice on the basis of the face, while discounting
inconsistencies of body or voice. Therefore, the authors argued that different aspects of a
person should be presented independently, so that one aspect could not be overwhelmed by
another. A clear advantage of such a procedure is that independent evidence can be obtained
from one witness. For example, the probability that a witness identifies a suspect by chance
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out of a six person lineup is 1/6. When there are two witnesses, the probability that both
identify the same person merely by chance is 1/36, and 1/216 with three witnesses. In many
cases, there is only one witness which brings us back to a guessing probability of 1/6.
However, the probability that this witness identifies the suspect by chance can be reduced to
1/36 by presenting a second, say body lineup, and to 1/216 when a third lineup (e.g., voice) is
added.
Lindsay, Wallbridge, and Drennan (1987) presented witnesses with two independent
lineups, one in which the face of the target was to be identified, and a second one in which a
piece of clothing that the target wore during the crime was to be identified. Note, that the
clothing worn in the facial lineup was non-identical to the clothing worn during the crime. In
order to establish the probative value of these identifications, the authors computed the
diagnosticity ratio (Wells & Lindsay, 1980; Wells & Turtle, 1986). The diagnosticity ratio
(DR) is defined as the ratio of correct to incorrect decisions. For target/suspect choices this
refers to the ratio of hits (target choices) in target-present (TP) lineups and false alarms
(suspect choices) in target-absent (TA) lineups. When the term equals 1, the lineup is neither
diagnostic of the guilt nor of the innocence of the suspect. For nonchoosers the DR is the
ratio of correct rejections in TA lineups and false rejections in TP lineups. DRs for foil
choices can be established by dividing the proportion of foil identifications in TA lineups by
the proportion of foil identifications in TP lineups (Wells, personal communication, March
2006). Another way to present the results is to look at the proportion of suspects that would
be guilty if the procedure (i.e., multiple lineups) was applied to a large number of cases. To
estimate this value, assumptions about the base rate of TA and TP lineups have to be made
(Wells & Lindsay, 1980). According to Wells (as cited by Pryke et al., 2004), a prior
probability near 50% is not unreasonable in real world cases. Thus, we set equal base rates
(50%) of innocent versus guilty suspects in the lineup, so that the percentage guilty value is
determined by the ratio of correct identifications to all attempted identifications. For lineup
rejections, the percentage guilty value is determined by the ratio of false rejections to all
rejections, and for foil choices by the ratio of foil identifications in TP to all foil
identifications. Whereas the percentage guilty value should ideally approach 100 for
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target/suspect choices, the value for lineup rejections and foil choices should ideally approach
0.
Designation of an Innocent Suspect
One issue in analyzing eyewitness identification data is the designation of an innocent
suspect. At least five methods of doing so can be found in the literature: First, the foil who
resembles the target most according to a pilot study is selected to be the innocent suspect
(e.g., Kneller, Memon, & Stevenage, 2001; Sporer, 1992, 1993, 2007). Second, one of several
foils which are rated as similar to the target is randomly selected (e.g., Brewer et al., 2006;
Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004; Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Krafka & Penrod, 1985).
Third, experienced policemen create the photo-spreads and select the innocent suspect (e.g.,
Brigham et al., 1986; Fleet, Brigham, & Bothwell, 1987; Olsson & Juslin, 1999). Fourth, the
foil chosen most often is the innocent suspect (Pryke et al., 2004). Finally, Wells (personal
communication, March 2006) argued that all foils could potentially be the innocent suspect
and therefore recommended to compute the average across all foils. Indeed, choosing rates for
a single foil can vary widely and therefore may have a great impact on the results. Therefore,
the decision was made to analyze the data according to the averaging approach. In order to
carry out the analyses, it was necessary that the foils in all TA lineups were the same. To
make our results comparable to those of Pryke et al. (2004), results for the foil chosen most
often in the portrait lineup will also be reported. By definition, the procedure applied by
Pryke et al. (2004) results in smaller or equal DRs for portrait face lineups than the averaging
method. However, for the remaining lineups one method or the other may lead to higher DR
estimates.
Previous Research on Multiple Lineups
Lindsay et al. (1987) reported that the DR for face and clothing lineups was 13.60
whereas it was 1.91 for face lineups only. Thus, when a witness chose a face and then chose
the matching clothing originally worn by that person in a second independent lineup, it was
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13.6 times more likely that the identified person actually was the target than that it was an
innocent suspect. However, was a witness presented with a facial lineup only, it was only 1.9
times more likely that the identified person actually was the target than that it was an
innocent suspect.
To study the usefulness of multiple lineups more extensively, Pryke et al. (2004)
presented witnesses with three or four independent lineups in two experiments. In
Experiment 1, witnesses made independent decisions for simultaneous face and body lineups.
A voice lineup was presented sequentially. The DR was computed separately for each of the
lineups and for all combinations. The DR of target choices from the face lineup was notable
(3.63) but rather low for the voice lineup (1.12) and the body lineup (0.65). The DR for
choosing the face, body, and voice of the same person was 11.00. In other words, it was 11
times more likely that a chosen lineup member actually was the target when the witness
picked the same person out of all three lineups than it was that the chosen person was the
innocent suspect. The DR for the combination of the face and voice lineups was considerably
smaller (3.52) when compared to that of all three lineups but also when compared to the DR
of 13.60 obtained for face and clothing lineups by Lindsay et al. (1987). Pryke et al. (2004)
discussed the possibility that clothing lineups were generally more diagnostic than voice
lineups. Therefore, in Experiment 2, a clothing lineup was added and all lineups were
presented sequentially in order to test the usefulness of multiple lineups in this presentation
mode. Again, the DR of choices from the face lineup was considerable (4.67), but low for the
voice lineup (0.38). The DR of the body lineup was 2.01 and 5.00 for the clothing lineup,
replicating the notion that clothing lineups are more diagnostic than voice lineups. For some
lineup combinations (face, body, and clothes; face, voice, and clothes; face, body, voice, and
clothes) multiple identifications of the same person only occurred for TP but not TA lineups,
causing undefined DRs due to division by zero. In these cases, estimation of guilt was 100%.
Clearly, Experiment 2 replicated the success of multiple lineup administrations.
So far, the effect has been demonstrated for only three different targets (R. C. L.
Lindsay et al., 1987; Pryke et al., 2004), and hence its generalizability remains unclear. In the
present field study, witnesses responded to body, accessory (shopping bag) and two facial
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lineups. In addition to a portrait face lineup, witnesses were presented with a profile (90°
angle) face lineup.
A profile face lineup was presented in addition to the portrait face lineup for the
following reasons. Early face recognition studies suggested that recognition was easier from
3/4 view than from frontal or profile view (e.g., Patterson & Baddeley, 1977; Woodhead,
Baddeley, & Simmonds, 1979, Experiment 2), while others failed to find such an effect (e.g.,
Davies, Ellis, & Shepherd, 1978, Experiment 2). In a thorough review of the literature Liu and
Chaudhuri (2002) pointed to the impact of the amount of angular rotation between learning
and testing. Specifically, when faces are presented frontally or in profile view in the study
phase, the 3/4 pose represents the least amount of angular rotation at test, unless study and
test stimuli are presented in the same pose. When the amount of angular rotation was
separated from the effects of learning or test views, there was only little evidence for a 3/4
view advantage per se (Liu & Chaudhuri, 2002).
In eyewitness identification studies, participants are presented with moving persons
during the learning phase, and the face of the target may be viewed in different poses. Our
targets were instructed to show their faces both frontally and from the side while interacting
with the participants. However, we expected that participants would not look at the target’s
face for the whole duration of the interaction. Thus, some participants may have seen the
target primarily from the front, others more from the side. We expected that identification for
participants would be easier from frontal or profile view, depending on the view that had
dominated during the interaction. Therefore, we included both frontal and profile face view
lineups in our study.
In addition, we included an accessory (bag) lineup, rather than a clothing lineup,
because we thought it more likely that a culprit leaves an accessory like a bag than a piece of
clothing at the scene of crime. Therefore a bag may be more likely to be available for
constructing a lineup.
If multiple lineups really are independent sources of evidence, we would not expect to
find a significant correlation between the performance in the individual lineups. This is
contrary to the finding that performance in blank lineups (lineups that are known to be TA),
Multiple Lineup Decisions 152
are predictive of subsequent performance in TA and TP lineups (Wells, 1984). Generally, this
notion presupposes that there is a positive correlation of identification accuracy decisions
across lineup tasks. To our knowledge, the only study to have investigated this issue was
Wells' (1984) study, however only for the sequence of TA (blank) facial lineups followed by
TA or TP facial lineups. In order to test the usefulness of blank lineups for different types of
lineups (i.e., portrait, body, bag, profile), witnesses were presented with two TA and two TP
lineups, which were counterbalanced across participants. When the portrait face lineup was
shown in TP mode, the body lineup was also shown as TP, the other two as TA, and vice
versa. Of course, such a procedure is only meaningful if participants are explicitly instructed
for each lineup the stimulus to be recognized may or may not be present. Please note, that the
presentation of TA and TP lineups to the same person is accompanied by the fact that the
DR can only be computed for those lineups that were shown in the same target presence
mode.
If blank lineups are predictive of performance in other types of lineups, participants
who correctly rejected the TA (blank) lineups should show higher performance in the TP
lineups compared to those who falsely chose someone from TA lineups. If, however,
performance in different lineup types is independent, there should be no predictive value of
blank lineups. Furthermore, we expected two lineups (portrait face and body/profile face and
accessory) to be more diagnostic than just the portrait or profile facial lineups by themselves.
METHOD
Participants
Six-hundred-forty-eight participants (324 male, 324 female; age 15 to 84, Mdn = 33
years) agreed to take part in this study when they were approached in the pedestrian zone in
a small university town in Germany. Participants were representative of the general
population of this university town which has 75,000 inhabitants and 23,000 students. They
Multiple Lineup Decisions 153
worked in numerous professions (36.3%), were students (27.5%), academics (15.9%), high
school pupils (8.5%), retired (6.8%), housewives/-husbands (4.5%), or unemployed (0.6%).
Photo Lineups
Target persons were seven female1 and two male psychology major students (age 20
to 37, Mdn = 20 years) from a university in a different town who received course credit for
data collection.
Materials consisted of photos of faces (neck up), bodies (shoulders down), and bags.
Lineups were mounted on a 30 x 33.5 cm display board and consisted of six pictures that
were numbered 1 to 6 and arranged in two rows of three pictures each.
For facial photographs, jewelry, eyeglasses and hair accessories were taken off and
hair was worn loose. On the body photographs, each lineup member wore different long
sleeve clothing. The head was blotched out with an opaque oval covering the head and neck.
The target shopping bag was a white cotton bag (55 x 56 cm), depicting a hand-drawn cow on
a colorful background. The foil bags were similarly white and also had a colorful picture
and/or writing on them. Portrait face and shopping bag lineup pictures were 9 x 13 cm
photographs, body lineups 8.5 x 15 cm and profile pictures 9 x 9.5 cm in size.
For practical reasons, the target as well as the replacement photos always appeared at
the same position, that is, position 3 for the portrait face lineups, position 4 for body
lineups, position 2 for bag lineups, and position 5 for profile face lineups.
                     
1Actually, 10 targets were involved. However, after the data collection, a mistake in
the TA body lineup of one female target was detected, so that the data collected for this target
was dismissed. Participants for whom this target was the interviewer, not the target, remained
in the analysis.
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Lineup Construction
Potential lineup members were recruited from a university town different from the
investigation site based on their physical appearance resembling the respective targets. Each
potential lineup member was photographed outside in front of the same wall of a dining hall.
For the portrait face lineup, all foils, including the replacement, fit the general description of
the target persons (Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 1993) as determined by a pilot study with N =
55 mock witnesses (effective sizes, determined as Tredoux’s Es were between 5.14 and 6.76;
Tredoux, 1998, 1999). Following Pryke et al.’s (2004) procedure, little effort was made to
select foils on the basis of similarity to features other than facial as witnesses usually do not
provide detailed descriptions about the target’s body (Sporer, 1996). Also, from a practical
perspective, it is unlikely that the police engage in the time consuming procedure of matching
foils to the suspect with regard to more than general similarity unless there are some unusual
features, which was not the case for our targets (see Pryke et al., 2004).
In order to select foil bags and a replacement, participants of the pilot study ranked 11
cotton bags according to their likeness to the target bag. The bag with the highest ranking was
chosen as replacement, the succeeding five as foils. Following Pryke et al.’s (2004) procedure
for the clothing lineup, the six bags in the TA lineup were randomly assigned to lineup
members. Random assignment of bags was performed for each individual target.
Procedure
Nine stimulus persons were involved in the present study. Data collection took place
in a town different from their home university. Data were collected by pairs of two persons,
one serving as target, one as interviewer. After data of eight participants were collected, the
roles were changed. Thus, every interviewer collected data of 8 participants with each of the
other persons.
The stimulus persons underwent three training sessions in which the interaction with
the participants as both target and interviewer, time taking as well as controlling interaction
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time was practiced. During data collection, target persons wore different clothing from what
they wore on their body lineup picture.
Specifically, the target asked a passer-by for directions to a certain location in the
pedestrian zone of a university town. The conversation was scheduled to last between 15 s
and 60 s. To ensure that the target was no longer seen by the passer-by after the interaction,
targets only approached people whose walking direction was opposite of the location asked
for.
The other person, the interviewer, watched the situation from a distance and recorded
the interaction time with a stopwatch. Thirty seconds after the interaction between target and
participant had terminated the interviewer approached the participant and explained that the
true nature of the preceding interaction was a study on face recognition. If consent to
participate was given, passers-by were handed a questionnaire. First, participants indicated
their pre-decision confidence with regard to identifying the previously seen person from a 6-
person portrait face lineup on an 11-point scale ranging from 0% to 100% (with intervals
marked in 10% steps: 0%, 10%, ..., 100%). Then, participants were handed the display board
with the portrait face lineup. To ensure the blindness of the interviewer, TP and TA lineups
were placed into differently colored envelopes. The experimental design told interviewers
which envelope to use for which participant. Thus, the interviewer pulled the display board
out of the envelope and gave it to the participant so that he/she could only see the display
board from the back, but not the pictures, that is, whether the target was present or not.
On the answer sheet, participants were advised that they would be asked to identify
the person who had asked them for directions and that the person might or might not be
present in the lineup. The instructions clearly stated that the person might or might not be
present in the lineup. After the identification decision was made, participants indicated their
post-decision confidence, again on an 11-point scale ranging from 0% to 100%.
Participants were not informed about the subsequent lineups until the post-decision
confidence rating for the portrait face lineup was completed. After the portrait face lineup,
the body, bag, and profile face lineups followed, always in this sequence. Participants were
warned that the target may or may not be present for every lineup. After each lineup,
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participants were again asked to indicate their post-decision confidence. Pre-decision
confidence was not collected in order to keep the amount of time needed to fill in the
questionnaire within limits. For half of the participants, the portrait face and body lineups
were TP, and the bag and profile face lineups TA, and vice versa.
After participants had completed all items, they were thanked and handed a card with
the researchers’ web address where some results of the study would be available after
approximately three months.
RESULTS
First, descriptive statistics for the four lineup types and the correlations of
identification performance and choosing rates between the lineups are reported. Second, we
present DRs for the four lineup types individually (ignoring other decisions) followed by
those for multiple lineup decisions2.
Identification Accuracy and Choosing
An alpha level of .05 was used for all inferential analyses. Cramer’s V and phi are
reported as effect sizes for nonparametric analyses of 3 x 2 and 2 x 2 contingency tables,
respectively. Hits and false alarms across targets can be obtained from Table 1. Table 2 shows
the means and correlations of identification performance and choice across the four different
lineup types. Identification accuracy for portrait face lineups was 57.7% (TA: 54.9%; TP:
60.5%), for body lineups 22.5% (TA: 26.2%; TP: 18.8%), for bag lineups 35.2% (TA:
59.0%; TP: 11.4%), and for profile face lineups 30.2% (TA: 32.8%; TP: 28.7%). Performance
in TA and TP lineups differed significantly for body, chi2(1, N = 648) = 5.09, p = .015,
phi = -0.09, and bag lineups, chi2(1, N = 648) = 160.48, p < .001, phi = -0.50, but not for the
two facial lineups, chi2s(1, N = 648) ≤ 2.05, ps ≥ .088, phis ≤ |0.06|.
                     
2Results for the individual targets can be obtained from the Appendix.
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Table 1
Hits and False Alarms (%) Across Targets (N = 648)
Frontal face Body Bag Profile
Hits 60.5 18.8 11.4 28.7
False alarms (average)a 7.5 12.3 6.8 11.4
Frontal
face
False alarms (designated suspect)b 19.7 4.3 7.1 7.1
aInnocent suspect identifications were computed as the mean of all positive identifications in TA lineups. bFoil chosen most often in
the TA portrait face lineup was designated to be the innocent suspect.
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Table 2
Means and Correlations of Identification Performance and Choosing Across Four Different
Lineup Types (N = 648)
Lineup type Body Bag Profile
M (%) SD Identification accuracy
Frontal face 57.7 49.4 .10** .02 .03
Body 22.5 41.8 -.06 -.06
Bag 35.2 47.8 .04
Profile 30.2 46.0
M (%) SD Choosing
Frontal face 61.4 48.7 .15** .07 .22**
Body 75.5 43.1 .24** .09*
Bag 39.5 48.9 .05
Profile 74.1 43.9
*p ≤ .05, two-tailed. **p ≤ .01, two-tailed.
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For all four lineup types, identification accuracy of choosers was significantly lower
than identification accuracy of nonchoosers, all chi2s(1, N = 648) ≥ 30.33, ps < .001, phis ≤ -
0.22 (see Table 2). Specifically, in the portrait face lineup choosers’ accuracy was 49.2%,
nonchoosers’ accuracy was 71.2%. In the body lineup, choosers made a correct decision in
12.5% of the cases, nonchoosers in 53.5% of the cases. In the bag lineup, choosers were
accurate in 14.5% of the cases, nonchoosers in 48.7% of the cases. For the profile face lineup
the numbers were 19.4% and 61.3%, respectively.
For identification accuracy, there was only one significant, albeit low correlation,
which was the one between performance in portrait face and body lineups, r(646) = .10,
p = 009. For choice, there were significant positive correlations of the body lineup with all
other lineups (portrait: r(646) = .15, p < .001, bag: r(646) = .24, p < .001; profile:
r(646) = .09, p = .025). There also was a significant correlation between the two facial
lineups, r(646) = .22, p < .001.
Predicting Lineup Performance from Blank Lineups
Performance in blank (TA) lineups did not correlate with performance in TP lineups,
r(646) = .00, p = .975. It made no difference, whether the portrait face and body lineups were
blank, r(322) = -.07, p = .219, or the bag and the profile face lineups did not contain the
suspect, r(322) = .02, p = .731.
Looking only at the two facial lineups neither lead to significant correlations, r(646)
 = -.05, p = .185, and it made no difference whether the portrait face lineup was blank,
r(322) = .01, p = .823, or the profile face lineup, r(322) = .04, p = .513.
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Table 3
Diagnosticity Ratios and % Guilty for Individual and Multiple Lineups Aross Nine Targets
(N = 648)
Target/suspect choice Lineup rejection Foil choice
DR
(average)a
% guilty DR  (designated
suspect)b
DR % guilty DR % guilty
Specific lineup modes
Portrait 8.12 89 3.06 2.47 29 2.61 28
Body 1.53 60 4.35 1.15 47 1.26 44
Bag 1.67 62 1.54 0.95 51 1.55 39
Profile 2.52 72 4.65 1.58 39 1.33 43
Multiple lineups
Portrait 7.61 88 3.12 2.45 29 2.86 26
Body 0.58 37
-.-
c 0.53 65 1.23 45
Portrait and body 10.43 91 2.86 2.52 28 1.77 36
Bag 1.49 60 1.26 0.79 56 1.58 39
Profile 2.49 71 4.47 1.61 38 1.33 43
Bag and profile 3.00 75 8.00 1.57 39 1.33 43
aInnocent suspect identifications were computed as the mean of all positive identifications in
TA lineups. bFoil chosen most often in the TA portrait face lineup was designated to be the
innocent suspect. cNo DR because, by defintion, there are no accurate body identifications
other than those that are also accurate portrait face identifications as the designated suspect is
the person who was most frequently chosen from the portrait face lineup.
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Diagnosticity of Lineups
Another way to look at these dependencies is to calculate the conditional probabilities
that the body, bag, and profile lineup decisions are accurate, given that the first decision
regarding the frontal face lineup was accurate or inaccurate, and given that the first decision
was a choice or nonchoice. Diagnosticity was estimated for target/suspect choices, lineup
rejections, and foil choices. Additionally, the percentage of suspects that would be guilty if
the procedure (i.e., multiple lineups) was applied to a large number of cases was estimated as
explained above.
DRs and % guilty for individual and multiple lineups for the total sample can be found
in Table 3. The columns labeled DR (average) contain the DR as obtained when suspect
identifications were computed as the mean of all positive identifications in TA lineups. The
% guilty columns show estimates of the percentage of suspects that would be guilty if
multiple lineups were applied to a large number of cases. For target/suspect choices the
column labeled DR (designated suspect) contain DR estimates when the foil chosen most
often in the TA portrait face lineup was designated to be the innocent suspect. By definition,
the latter procedure results in smaller or equal DRs for portrait face lineups than the averaging
method. However, for the remaining lineup types one method or the other may lead to higher
DR estimates.
Diagnosticity as a Function of Specific Lineup Mode
In the top part of Table 3, results for target/suspect choices, lineup rejections and foil
choices for decisions in each of the four lineup modes are reported. Note that for these
results, the decisions made in the other lineup modes were not considered.
Overall, the DRs for target/suspect choices were higher than those for lineup
rejections and foil choices. For all lineup decisions (rejections, target/suspect choices, foil
choices), the portrait face lineup was most diagnostic.
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Target/suspect choices. For target/suspect choices, performance in profile face lineups
was larger than 2 (DR = 2.52, 72% guilty), even though much lower than for the portrait face
lineup (DR = 8.12, 89% guilty). Body (DR = 1.53, 60% guilty) and bag lineups (DR = 1.67,
62% guilty) showed only weak diagnosticity. When designating the foil chosen most often in
the TA portrait lineup to be the innocent suspect, estimates of DR were reduced
substantially for the portrait face lineup (as expected by definition; DR = 3.06) but enhanced
for the body (DR = 4.35) and profile face lineup (DR = 4.65).
Lineup rejections and foil choices. For lineup rejections and foil choices, the % guilty
value should be low if the DR is high, indicating a high probability that the suspect is
innocent.
For lineup rejections (DR = 2.47, 29% guilty), the portrait face lineup was the only
one that was diagnostic, while performance for body (DR = 1.15), bag (DR = 0.95) and
profile face (DR = 1.58) was only weakly or non-diagnostic of innocence. Similarly, for foil
choices (DR = 2.61, 28% guilty), the portrait face lineup was the only one that was
diagnostic, while performance for body (DR = 1.26), bag (DR = 1.55) and profile face
(DR = 1.33) was only weakly or non-diagnostic of innocence.
Multiple Lineup Decisions
In the bottom part of Table 3, results for multiple lineup decisions are reported. For
each participant, two lineups were TA and two TP, so that combined DRs could be
computed only for combinations of the respective two lineups. The lines in the multiple
lineups section of Table 3 that indicate DRs for only one lineup mode, for example, portrait
face, were computed by eliminating those cases in which the same lineup member had
additionally been chosen in the lineup that was presented in the same target presence mode
(in this case the body lineup). Therefore, the values may differ from those presented in the
specific lineup mode section of the table.
There are no direct tests to compare DRs against chance level. We can, however, test
whether the result pattern obtained statistically significantly deviates from the null
hypothesis that the proportions in each cell are the same. Our hypothesis was that suspect
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identifications/lineup rejections in addition to the facial identifications/rejections would be
highly diagnostic of guilt. Thus, for target/suspect choices we computed chi2-values of the
proportion of witnesses who did not identify the (innocent) suspect’s face, identified just the
(innocent) suspect’s face, or the (innocent) suspect’s face and an additional aspect in TA and
TP lineups. For lineup rejections, we computed chi2 of the proportion of witnesses who did
not reject the (innocent) suspect’s face, rejected just the (innocent) suspect’s face, or the
(innocent) suspect’s face and an additional aspect in TA and TP lineups. The results of these
analyses will be reported after the DRs in the corresponding results section.
Target/suspect choices. Overall, portrait face lineups as well as the combination of the
portrait face lineup with the body lineup were highly diagnostic of guilt. As expected, the
combinations of portrait face and body lineups (DR = 10.43, 91% guilty) as well as bag and
profile face lineups (DR = 3.00, 75% guilty) were more diagnostic than each lineup by itself.
The portrait face lineup (DR = 7.61, 88% guilty) and the profile face lineup (DR = 2.49, 71%
guilty) themselves were also diagnostic. Performance in body and bag lineups was poor
(DRs ≤ 1.49). Designating the foil chosen most often in the TA portrait face lineup to be the
innocent suspect reduced diagnosticity for the combination of the portrait face and body
lineups to DR = 2.86, but increased diagnosticity for the combination of the bag and profile
lineups to DR = 8.00.
Table 4 presents the proportion of witnesses who did not identify the suspect’s face,
identified just the suspect’s face (portrait or profile), or the suspect’s face and the second
aspect of the person (body or bag, respectively) in TA and TP lineups. The results are
displayed for the two methods of establishing the number of false alarms (average vs.
designating the foil chosen most often in the TA portrait face lineup to be the innocent
suspect). Non-identifications in portrait face and body lineups were diagnostic of innocence
for the averaging (DR = 2.34, 30% guilty) and designated suspect method (DR = 2.03, 33%
guilty). Identification of the portrait only was more diagnostic for the averaging (DR = 7.43,
88% guilty) than the designated suspect method (DR = 3.12, 76% guilty). Identification of
the portrait and the body was more diagnostic for the averaging method (DR = 10.43, 91%
guilty) than just the identification of the portrait, but not for the designated suspect method
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Table 4
Suspect Choices for Portrait Face plus Body Lineups and Profile Face plus Bag Lineups as a Function of Target Presence (N = 648)
Frequencies Proportions-diagnosticity
Condition None 1 2 None 1 2
Portrait face and body lineups
TP 128 156 40 .40 .48 .12
TA (average)a 299.2 21.0 3.8 .92 .06 .01
DR 2.34c 7.43 10.43
% Guilty 30 88 91
TP 128 156 40 .40 .48 .12
TA (designated suspect)b 260 50 14 .80 .15 .04
DR 2.03c 3.12 2.86
% Guilty 33 76 74
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Table 4  (continued)
Frequencies Proportions-diagnosticity
Condition None 1 2 None 1 2
Profile face and bag lineups
TP 231 85 8 .71 .26 .02
TA (average)a 287.2 34.2 2.7 .89 .11 .01
DR 1.24c 2.49 3.00
% Guilty 45 71 75
TP 231 85 8 .71 .26 .02
TA (designated suspect)b 304 19 1 .94 .06 .00
DR 1.32c 4.47 8.00
% Guilty 43 82 89
aInnocent suspect identifications were computed as the mean of all positive identifications in TA lineups. bFoil chosen most often in
the TA portrait face lineup was designated to be the innocent suspect. cDiagnosticity of non-identifications is the ratio of lineup
rejections in TA lineups to lineup rejections in the TP condition.
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(DR = 2.86, 74% guilty). The pattern of frequencies generating these DRs differed from
chance expectations for the averaging method, chi2(2, N = 648) = 200.90, p < .001, Cramer’s
V = 0.56, and the designated suspect method, chi2(2, N = 648) = 111.97, p < .001, Cramer’s
V = 0.42. However, when excluding nonchoosers, the effect became non-significant for the
averaging, chi2(1, N = 648) = 0.27, p = .603, phi = -0.02, and designated suspect method,
chi2(1, N = 648) = 0.06, p = .806, phi = -0.01.
Non-identifications in profile face and bag lineups were weakly diagnostic of
innocence for the averaging (DR = 1.24, 45% guilty) and designated suspect method
(DR = 1.32, 43% guilty). Identification of the profile only was diagnostic for the averaging
(DR = 2.49, 71% guilty) and designated suspect method (DR = 4.47, 82% guilty).
Identification of the profile and the bag was more diagnostic for the averaging method
(DR = 3.00, 75% guilty) and the designated suspect method (DR = 8.00, 89% guilty) than
just the identification of the profile. The pattern of frequencies generating these DRs differed
from chance expectations for the averaging method, chi2(2, N = 648) = 30.18, p < .001,
Cramer’s V = 0.22, and the designated suspect method, chi2(2, N = 648) = 57.29, p < .001,
Cramer’s V = 0.30. Again, when excluding nonchoosers, the effect became non-significant for
the averaging, chi2(1, N = 648) = 0.01, p = .920, phi = 0.00, and designated of suspect
method, chi2(1, N = 648) = 0.29, p = .590, phi = 0.02.
Lineup rejections. Overall, portrait face lineups as well as their combination with
body lineups were somewhat diagnostic of innocence. Contrary to expectations, the
combination (DR = 2.52, 28% guilty) did not exceed the value of the portrait face lineups
alone (DR = 2.45, 29% guilty). Performance for body, bag, and profile lineups as well as the
combination of the latter two was poor (DRs ≤ 1.61).
Table 5 presents the proportion of witnesses who did not reject the suspect’s face,
rejected just the suspect’s face (portrait or profile), or the suspect’s face and the second
aspect of the person (body or bag, respectively) in TA and TP lineups. Identifications in
portrait face and body lineups were not diagnostic of innocence (DR = 0.58, 63% guilty).
Rejections of the portrait only were diagnostic (DR = 2.45, 29% guilty). Rejections of the
portrait and the body were not more diagnostic (DR = 2.52, 28% guilty) than just the
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Table 5
Lineup Rejections for Portait Face plus Body Lineups and Profile Face plus Bag Lineups as a Function of Target Presence (N = 648)
Frequencies Proportions-diagnosticity
Condition None 1 2 None 1 2
Portrait face and body lineups
TP 252 49 23 .78 .15 .07
TA 146 120 58 .45 .37 .18
DR 0.58 2.45 2.52
% Guilty 63 29 28
Profile face and bag lineups
TP 259 23 42 .80 .07 .13
TA 221 37 66 .68 .11 .20
DR 0.85 1.61 1.57
% Guilty 54 38 39
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rejection of the portrait. The pattern of frequencies generating these DRs differed from chance
expectations, chi2(2, N = 648) = 73.18, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.34. However, when
excluding choosers, the effect became non-significant, chi2(1, N = 648) = 0.01, p = .920,
phi = 0.00.
Identifications in profile face and bag lineups were not diagnostic of innocence
(DR = 0.85, 54% guilty). Rejections of the profile (DR = 1.61, 38% guilty) as well as
rejections of the profile and the bag (DR = 1.57, 39% guilty) were weakly diagnostic.
Nevertheless, the pattern of frequencies generating these DRs differed from chance
expectations, chi2(2, N = 648) = 11.61, p = .003, Cramer’s V = -0.13. Again, when excluding
choosers, the effect became non-significant, chi2(1, N = 648) = 0.01, p = .920, phi = 0.00.
Foil choices. The only lineup that seemed to be somewhat diagnostic for foil choices
was the portrait face lineup (DR = 2.86). Performance in all other lineups was poor
(DRs ≤ 1.77).
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present field experiment was to test the usefulness of multiple lineups
with a very large sample of participants in a natural setting. Stimulus sampling was
emphasized by using nine different targets. Besides reporting DRs for target/suspect choices
we also analyzed DRs for lineup rejections and foil choices. This allows for a more complete
view on the utility of multiple lineups, also in cases where no choice or foil choices are made.
In previous studies, no (Lindsay et al., 1987) or limited information were reported for lineup
rejections and foil choices (Pryke et al., 2004).
Compared to foil choices and lineup rejections, target/suspect choices were most
diagnostic of guilt. The portrait face lineup alone and its combination with the body lineup
were most diagnostic for target/suspect choices.
Lineup rejections showed some capability of establishing innocence, but the DRs
obtained here were much lower than those obtained for target/suspect choices. Again, the
portrait face lineup and its combination with the body lineup were most diagnostic of
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innocence. However, the combination of the two lineups did not increase diagnosticity. The
diagnosticity of multiple foil choices was acceptable for portrait face lineups but limited for
all other lineups or combinations with DRs ≤ 1.77.
Taken together, our results on target/suspect choices support the results of former
studies with multiple lineups (Lindsay et al., 1987; Pryke et al., 2004). These studies
reported higher diagnosticity of target/suspect choices for multiple lineups when compared to
single lineup decisions, but only for a total of three targets.
We included a second face lineup, a profile lineup, because during the interaction
witnesses may have seen the target primarily from the side, so that an identification from a
profile face picture may be easier. This reasoning is supported by research that reported
improved recognition when there was no or little angular rotation between encoding and
recognition (Liu & Chaudhuri, 2002). Generally, performance in the profile face lineup was
low (30.5%) and much lower than in the portrait face lineup (57.7%). Yet, 12.2% of the
participants made an incorrect identification decision in the portrait face, but a correct
decision in the profile face lineup. Furthermore, depending on the method of establishing the
innocent suspect, the profile lineup by itself as well as its combination with the bag lineup
showed high diagnosticity for target/suspect choices, sometimes exceeding those values
obtained for the portrait face and its combination with the body lineup.
Particularly the use of a clothing lineup had proved useful in previous studies, not by
itself but when combined with other lineups (Lindsay et al., 1987; Pryke et al., 2004,
Experiment 2). In the present study, we used a shopping bag as clothing in a broader sense,
presuming that such an item would be more likely to be left behind by a culprit than a piece
of garment and would therefore be available for lineup construction. Similar to previous
results on clothing lineups, the utility of the bag lineup was limited by itself, but its
combination with the profile face lineup boosted diagnosticity for target/suspect choices.
However, for lineup rejections and foil choices the combination of the profile face lineup with
the bag lineup did not increase diagnosticity. One possible explanation for this finding is, that
after the testing, quite a few participants spontaneously mentioned to the interviewer that
they had not noticed the target carry a bag and therefore had rejected the lineup. Apparently,
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these participants had no memory for the bag. Research on the weapon focus (Steblay, 1992)
has demonstrated that witnesses do pay a lot of attention to some objects (weapons) that a
target carries, however, at the cost of lower face identification performance. This does not
seem to be the case for less salient objects, such as a bag (cf. Pickel, 1998, 1999). This is also
compatible to the social norm of keeping eye contact while talking to another person.
Providing an “I don’t know” option may be a way of eliminating witnesses who have no
memory for an item and thus may reduce deflation of lineup rejection DRs as observed here
(all bag DRs for lineup rejections here were smaller than 1).
The present results direct our attention to an important methodological issue in
eyewitness identification research: the designation of the innocent suspect in TA lineups. As
observed, the results can differ widely depending on the method that is selected to establish
innocent foil choices. While the averaging method resulted in larger DRs in most cases, this
was not always the case. For example, for multiple lineups, DRs for the profile face lineup
and its combination with the bag lineup were larger for the designated suspect method than
for the averaging method. We believe that both methods and their reasoning have their
legitimization. Researchers must be cautious when deciding for one or the other method and
we believe it most appropriate to report more than one measure (for methods of establishing
innocent suspect choices other than the ones used here, see e.g., Brewer et al., 2006; Clare &
Lewandowsky, 2004; Fleet et al., 1987; Olsson & Juslin, 1999; Sporer, 1993, 2007).
Performance in the four different lineup types was not associated with each other.
This result supports the idea that multiple lineups can serve as independent sources of
evidence. In accordance with this result, performance in blank lineups was not associated with
performance in TP lineups, as would have been expected from Wells’ study (1984). However,
there were a number of methodological differences between the present and Wells’ study
(1984). While Wells (1984) used blank portrait face lineups to predict TP or TA portrait face
lineups, our blank lineups were different lineup types compared to those that were predicted.
Specifically, we used portrait face and body lineups to predict the outcome of bag and profile
face lineups and vice versa. Possibly, the usefulness of blank lineups is limited to portrait face
lineups or at least to the same lineup mode and viewing angle. For example, blank profile face
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lineups may only be predictive of profile face lineups but not of body lineups. Also,
correlations may be higher if two lineup modes are either TA or TP, respectively. This could
be tested in future studies.
Furthermore, in order to compute DRs, we used identical distractors in the blank and
TP lineups, although they were presented on different lineup positions. This is different from
Wells’ (1984) study and may have mislead witnesses in a way that resulted in an impact on
their choosing behavior: In lineups 2, 3, and 4, witnesses may have recognized some
distractors presented before and thus may have assumed that all lineup members were
identical, resulting in the same choosing behavior as in lineup 1. Supporting this notion, our
data on choosing in the body and profile face lineups suggest that witnesses were not so much
influenced by the presence of the target when they made a choice but by the fact of whether
or not they had made a choice before.
Despite the strengths of the present study, namely the large sample, multiple targets
and the natural setting, there are some caveats that need to be discussed. First, although
ecological validity was enhanced by using a natural setting, there was no crime scenario in the
present study. Thus, it is unlikely that participants experienced the same arousal level as
witnesses of a real crime would. However, it is equally unlikely that participants in studies
with filmed crimes do. Yet, even if the accuracy of identification decisions was influenced by
the arousal level, this does not necessarily need to have an impact on DRs. However, future
studies should investigate this issue.
A second caveat here is the short (30 s) interval between the event and the
identification task. In real cases, there are normally days, if not months between witnessing
the event and the identification (Behrman & Richards, 2005). It is likely, that the memory for
the target would have decreased after a longer retention interval. Yet again, this need not
influence the obtained DRs. This is another issue that could be investigated in future studies.
Altogether, as there is only a very limited number of studies on multiple lineup
decisions, only little is known about conditions that have a positive or a negative impact on
the DRs. Future research may dig deeper into this topic. It should also be explored further
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how many and which specific lineup types should be used. Asking witnesses from which
perspective they saw the target could aid on deciding for a portrait or profile face lineup.
To conclude, what can be said about the application of this novel control variable,
multiple lineups, in real cases? The data speak for the application of multiple lineups with
regard to suspect/target choices as a procedure to avoid false identifications, whereas the
benefit of multiple lineups for lineup rejections and foil choices seems rather limited. Yet,
although the combination of lineups for target/suspect choices shows higher diagnosticity
than looking at just a single lineup, there are also cases where participants correctly identify
the target from a facial lineup but not from another lineup. Thus, multiple identifications
should be viewed as stronger evidence than a single identification (cf. Pryke et al., 2004).
However, single lineup evidence must not be discarded per sé.
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Appendix
Table A1
Hits and False Alarms (%) for Nine Targets (ns = 72)
Target
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Hits 41.7 80.6 75.0 38.9 63.9 72.2 33.3 66.7 72.2
False alarms (average)a 9.3 6.5 7.4 7.9 6.5 9.3 8.3 7.4 5.1
Frontal
face
False alarms (designated suspect)b 38.9 11.1 19.4 25.0 16.7 22.2 19.4 16.7 8.3
Hits 5.6 13.9 11.1 41.7 13.9 22.2 2.8 19.4 38.9
False alarms (average)a 11.6 10.6 13.0 12.5 10.2 14.8 13.4 12.5 12.0
Body
False alarms (designated suspect)b 0.0 2.8 5.6 11.1 5.6 2.8 0.0 8.3 2.8
Hits 11.1 2.8 8.3 2.8 5.6 22.2 13.9 19.4 16.7
False alarms (average)a 3.7 4.6 6.5 9.3 8.8 5.6 8.3 7.9 6.9
Bag
False alarms (designated suspect)b 2.8 8.3 5.6 19.4 8.3 2.8 5.6 8.3 2.8
Hits 2.8 27.8 16.7 19.4 47.2 58.3 16.7 36.1 33.3Profile
False alarms (average)a 12.0 10.6 11.1 12.5 11.6 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1
False alarms (designated suspect)b 2.8 8.3 5.6 19.4 8.3 2.8 5.6 8.3 2.8
aInnocent suspect identifications were computed as the mean of all positive identifications in TA lineups. bFoil chosen most often in
the TA portrait face lineup was designated to be the innocent suspect.
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Table A2
Diagnosticity Ratios (DRs) and Guilt Estimates for Lineup Rejections, Target/Suspect Choices and Foil Choices for Individual Lineup
Decisions
Target
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Target/suspect choice
DR (average)a 4.50 12.44 10.13 4.94 9.86 7.80 4.00 9.00 14.18Portrait face
% guilty 82 93 91 83 91 89 80 90 93
DR (designated suspect)b 1.07 7.25 3.86 1.56 3.83 3.25 1.71 4.00 8.67
Body DR (average)a 0.48 1.31 0.86 3.34 1.36 1.50 0.21 1.55 3.23
% guilty 33 57 46 77 58 60 17 61 76
DR (designated suspect)b - 5.00 2.00 3.75 2.50 7.99 - 2.33 14.00
Bag DR (average)a 3.00 0.60 1.28 0.30 0.64 4.00 1.67 2.46 2.40
% guilty 75 38 56 23 39 80 63 71 71
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Table A2 (continued)
Target
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Target/suspect choice
DR (designated suspect)b 4.00 0.34 1.49 0.14 0.67 7.99 2.50 2.33 6.01
Profile DR (average)a 0.23 2.61 1.50 1.55 4.08 5.25 1.50 3.25 3.00
% guilty 19 72 60 61 80 84 60 76 75
DR (designated suspect)b 0.25 3.34 - 2.33 16.99 20.99 6.01 - 2.00
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Table A2 (continued)
Target
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Lineup rejection
DR 1.45 3.96 3.33 2.11 2.75 2.66 1.13 3.33 6.25Portrait face
% guilty 41 20 23 32 27 27 47 23 14
Body DR 1.00 1.44 0.67 2.25 2.33 0.36 1.16 2.25 0.91
% guilty 50 41 60 31 30 73 46 31 52
Bag DR 0.97 1.04 0.96 0.76 0.85 1.09 1.00 0.91 0.95
% guilty 51 49 51 57 54 48 50 52 51
Profile DR 1.43 2.16 1.09 1.00 1.58 4.01 1.99 1.99 1.20
% guilty 41 32 48 50 39 20 33 33 45
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Table A2 (continued)
Target
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Foil choice
DR 2.00 14.00 5.33 1.31 2.80 5.00 2.25 2.67 1.83Portrait face
% guilty 33 7 16 43 26 17 31 27 35
Body DR 1.09 1.05 1.40 1.59 0.88 1.88 1.00 1.08 2.36
% guilty 48 49 42 39 53 35 50 48 30
Bag DR 2.67 1.00 1.40 1.43 1.36 2.00 1.38 2.13 1.88
% guilty 27 50 42 41 42 33 42 32 35
Profile DR 0.93 1.15 1.26 1.35 2.08 2.00 1.00 1.41 1.71
% guilty 52 47 44 43 32 33 50 41 37
Note. Dashes indicate undefined values because the frequency in the TA condition only was zero for target/suspect choices. aInnocent
suspect identifications were computed as the mean of all positive identifications in TA lineups. bFoil chosen most often in the TA
portrait face lineup was designated to be the innocent suspect.
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Table A3
Diagnosticity Ratios (DRs) of Lineup Selections in Combinations for Lineup Rejections, Target/Suspect Choices and Foil Choices
Target
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Target/suspect choice
DR (average)a 4.75 12.00 12.00 5.45 10.91 6.00 4.24  8.31  9.33
% guilty 83 92 92 85 92 86 81 89 90
Portrait face
DR (designated suspect)b 1.07 8.00 4.80 2.00 5.00 2.71 1.71 6.00 7.00
Bodyc DR (average)a 0.50 0 0.25 3.14 0.63 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.50
% guilty 33 0 20 76 39 16 18 20 33
DR (average)a 0.00 15.00 4.50 4.00  6.00 42.00  0.00 12.00 36.00Portrait face and
body % guilty 0 94 82 80 86 98 0 92 97
DR (designated suspect)b 5.04 1.44 0.99 1.44 6.84 2.04 11.88
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Table A3 (continued)
Target
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Target/suspect choice
Bag DR (average)a 3.43 0.60 1.09 0.33 0.38 3.00 1.41 2.40 2.31
% guilty 77 38 52 25 27 75 59 71 70
DR (designated suspect)b 4.10 0.46 1.21 0.17 0.64 11.99 2.39 3.13 7.49
Profile DR (average)a 0.24 2.61 1.43 1.68 4.36 4.91 1.30 3.27 3.00
% guilty 19 72 59 63 81 83 57 77 75
DR (designated suspect)b 0.28 3.43 - 2.40 16.96 23.15 5.80 - 2.20
DR (average)a 0 2.00 0.00 2.00 9.00 6.00 3.00 3.00
% guilty 0 67 0 67 90 86 75 75
Bag and Profile
DR (designated suspect)b - 1.01 - - - -
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Table A3 (continued)
Target
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Lineup rejection
DR 1.38 3.67 6.50 1.75 2.40 3.25 1.00 2.80 17.00Portrait face
% guilty 42 21 13 36 29 24 50 26 6
Body DR 0.75 0.33 0.13 1.33 1.33 0.33 0.44 1.00 0.25
% guilty 57 75 89 43 43 75 69 50 80
DR 1.67 3.67 1.75 5.00 3.33 1.50 1.00 6.00 2.67Portrait face and
body % guilty 38 21 36 17 23 40 50 14 27
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Table A3 (continued)
Target
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Lineup rejection
Bag DR 0.91 0.80 0.73 0.69 0.69 0.80 0.87 0.71 0.82
% guilty 52 56 58 59 59 56 54 59 55
Profile DR 3.00 3.00 0.33 1.00 1.67 4.00 2.33 2.50 1.00
% guilty 25 25 75 50 38 20 30 29 50
DR 1.17 2.00 1.38 1.00 1.50 4.00 1.67 1.75 1.40Bag and Profile
% guilty 46 33 42 50 40 20 38 36 42
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Table A3 (continued)
Target
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Foil choice
DR 2.11 - 6.00 1.10 2.20 4.75 2.83 13.00 1.50Portrait face
% guilty 32 0 14 48 31 17 26 7 40
Body DR 1.09 1.00 1.26 1.50 0.76 1.82 1.04 1.20 2.18
% guilty 48 50 44 40 57 35 49 45 31
DR 1.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 - - 0.50 0.60 -Portrait face and body
% guilty 50 33 20 33 0 0 67 63 0
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Table A3 (continued)
Target
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Foil choice
Bag DR 2.33 1.00 1.38 2.00 1.14 2.00 1.55 2.50 1.63
% guilty 30 50 42 33 47 33 39 29 38
Profile DR 0.89 1.15 1.24 1.67 1.83 2.00 1.05 1.47 1.57
% guilty 53 47 45 38 35 33 49 41 39
DR - 1.50 0.40 - 2.00 0.50 1.00 -Bag and Profile
% guilty 0 40 71 0 33 67 50 0
Note. Dashes indicate undefined values because the frequency in the TA condition only was zero for target/suspect choices or because
the TP condition only was zero for lineup rejections or filler choices. Blank cells indicate that thte frequency in both the present and
absent conditions was zero. aInnocent suspect identifications were computed as the mean of all positive identifications in TA lineups.
bFoil chosen most often in the TA portrait face lineup was designated to be the innocent suspect. cNo DR (designated suspect)
because, by defintion, there are no accurate body identifications other than those that are also accurate portrait face identifications as
the designated suspect is the person who was most frequently chosen from the portrait face lineup.
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DISCUSSION
This dissertation reported 4 experiments that are concerned with the evaluation of
eyewitness identification testimony. In order to increase ecological validity even in a labora-
tory setting, a 1-week interval was inserted between witnessing the crime and identification in
Experiments 1 and 2. Experiments 3 and 4, which report different data of a large scale field
study, emphasized stimulus sampling by including 10 targets (9 in Experiment 4). Experiment
1 challenged previous research findings regarding the relationship between identification per-
formance and target description by not only testing describers and non-describers, but also a
group of rereaders who reread their target description before the identification task. Experi-
ments 2 and 3 suggested that investigators combine postdictors rather than looking at each of
them individually when assessing identification decisions. Experiment 4 showed that multiple
lineups can be beneficial as a procedure to avoid false identifications with regard to sus-
pect/target choices, whereas the benefit of multiple lineups for lineup rejections and foil
choices seems rather limited. In the following, the main results of each experiment will be dis-
cussed. For a more comprehensive discussion, see the discussion sections of each Experiment.
Verbal Overshadowing
Experiment 1 assessed three target description groups in order to test different theo-
retical accounts regarding the relationship between identification performance and target de-
scription: non-describers, describers, and rereaders (describers with rereading of the descrip-
tion before the identification task). No verbal overshadowing effect (VOE) as postulated by a
change in processing style (TIPS, Schooler, Fiore, & Brandimonte, 1997; Schooler, 2002) or
by an alteration of the original memory trace (RBI; Meissner, Brigham, and Kelley, 2001) was
found. Also, our results yielded no support for a memory facilitation effect through context
reinstatement by rereading of one's target description (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987;
Cutler, Penrod, O'Rourke, & Martens, 1986). Instead, consistent with our hypothesis, our
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results support the recognition criterion shift approach as suggested by Clare and Lewan-
dowsky (2004).
With regard to the duration of the criterion shift, the present results support the as-
sumption that the recognition criterion shift only occurs if (a) the identification task immedi-
ately follows the description task, as assessed in the study by Clare and Lewandowsky
(2004), or (b) the description is reactivated before the identification task, for example by re-
reading it, as it was the case in the present study.
Looking at retention intervals between description and identification, we found that
there is only one study (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990, Experiment 5) who used a reten-
tion interval of 48 hours and found a VOE. Yet, most studies examining the VOE used only
short post-description delays of less than 24 hours (cf., Meissner & Brigham, 2001). There-
fore, there is a clear need of studies with longer post-description delays in order to address
the questions of the durability and permanence that target descriptions can have on identifica-
tion performance. After all, the probability that a lineup is carried out immediately after the
description is very low as documented in archival analyses of real criminal cases (Behrman &
Richards, 2005; Sporer, 1992a; Valentine, Pickering, & Darling, 2003; van Koppen & Lochun,
1997). Hence, the ecological validity of previously reported findings is arguable.
Postdicting Choosers' Identification Performance
In Experiments 2 and 3, post-decision confidence and decision times were shown to be
useful postdictors of choosers' identification accuracy. This is in line with previous findings
(e.g., Dunning & Perretta, 2002; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995; Sporer, 1992b, 1993,
1994; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004). A decision rule including highly con-
fident and fast participants led to more correct classifications than either variable alone in
both studies, suggesting that investigators should look at decision times and confidence in
combination and not individually. Although we obtained a high number of correctly classified
choosers within the established boundaries, it should be clear that our postdiction rate holds
Discussion 191
only for a small subgroup of participants, fast and confident choosers. The issue of how to
proceed with slower and less confident choosers, however, remains unsolved.
Additional postdictors, such as self-reported decision processes (Experiment 2) and
Remember-Know-Familiar (RKF) judgments (Experiment 3) did not lead to higher correct
classification rates. Significant associations between postdictors (Experiment 2) highlight the
need to consider the different processes jointly as, in combination, they may be more useful
in assessing identification decisions.
Postdicting Nonchoosers' Identification Performance
Experiments 2 and 3 also dealt with nonchoosers' decision processes. Using a different
procedure in both experiments, nonchoosers made statements about their decision processes.
In either case, no associations between self-reported decision processes and identification ac-
curacy were found. Thus, it seems that self-reported decision processes, like post-decision
confidence and decision time, are not a valid postdictor of nonchoosers' identification per-
formance.
An explanation for the lack of association between the postdictors and identification
accuracy of nonchoosers may be that choosers' and nonchoosers' identification decisions pos-
sess asymmetric features (Weber & Brewer, 2004). Whereas choosers' decisions are likely to
be based on a match between their memory for the target and one of several faces shown in a
lineup, nonchoosers' decisions are based on a failure to match their memory to any of the
faces in the lineup. Weber and Brewer (2006) argued that confidence ratings of nonchoosers
are not based on confidence for the most likely match (face), because in this case, one would
expect the CA relationship of nonchoosers to be similar to the one observed for choosers,
which is not the case. Instead, the authors suggested that confidence of nonchoosers reflected
the average match between all lineup faces and the target. This hypothesis could be tested by
either asking nonchoosers about their confidence with regard to each lineup member (as done
by Sporer, 1993, with sequential lineups) or by using one-person lineups (i.e., showups).
Following Weber and Brewer's (2006) reasoning, the associations between postdictors and
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identification accuracy should be observed when confidence and decision time measures apply
to only one lineup member. Unfortunately, many studies with showups either did not report
the CA correlation at all, or, if they did, they did not differentiate between choosers and non-
choosers (e.g., Beal, Schmitt, & Dekle, 1995; Gonzales, Ellsworth, & Pembroke, 1993; Lind-
say, Pozzulo, Craig, Lee, & Corbers, 1997; Yarmey, Yarmey, & Yarmey, 1996). Dysart,
Lindsay, and Dupuis (2006) found a significant CA correlation for both choosers (r = .32) and
nonchoosers (r = .19), supporting Weber and Brewer's (2006) hypothesis.
Assessing Identification Testimony via Multiple Lineup
Decisions
Finally, Experiment 4 tested the usefulness of multiple lineup decisions with regard to
different lineup types (portrait, body, bag, profile) for the assessment of identification testi-
mony regarding nine different targets.
Utility of Blank Lineups to Predict Performance in Other Lineup Types
Performance in the four different lineup types was not associated with each other,
supporting the idea that multiple lineups can serve as independent sources of evidence. Ac-
cordingly, performance in blank lineups was not associated with performance in TP lineups,
as would have been expected from Wells’ study (1984). However, there were a number of
methodological differences between the present and Wells’ study (1984). While Wells (1984)
used blank portrait face lineups to predict TP or TA portrait face lineups, our blank lineups
were different lineup types compared to those that were predicted. Specifically, we used por-
trait face and body lineups to predict the outcome of bag and profile face lineups and vice
versa. Possibly, the usefulness of blank lineups is limited to portrait face lineups or at least to
the same lineup mode and viewing angle. For example, blank profile face lineups may only be
predictive of profile face lineups but not of body lineups. Also, correlations may be higher if
two lineup modes are either TA or TP, respectively. This could be tested in future studies.
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Furthermore, in order to compute DRs, we used identical distractors in the blank and
TP lineups, although they were presented on different lineup positions. This is different from
Wells’ (1984) study and may have mislead witnesses in a way that resulted in an impact on
their choosing behavior: In lineups 2, 3, and 4, witnesses may have recognized some distrac-
tors presented before and thus may have assumed that all lineup members were identical, re-
sulting in the same choosing behavior as in the first lineup, the portrait lineup. Supporting
this notion, our data on choosing in the body and profile face lineups suggest that witnesses
were not so much influenced by the presence of the target when they made a choice but by
the fact of whether or not they had made a choice before.
Diagnosticity of Multiple Lineups
For target/suspect choices, the portrait face lineup alone and its combination with the
body lineup were most diagnostic. Lineup rejections showed some capability of establishing
innocence, but the DRs obtained here were much lower than those obtained for target/suspect
choices. Again, the portrait face lineup and its combination with the body lineup were most
diagnostic of innocence, but the combination of the two lineups failed to increase diagnostic-
ity. The diagnosticity of multiple foil choices was acceptable for portrait face lineups but
limited for all other lineups or combinations. Taken together, our results on target/suspect
choices support the results of former studies with multiple lineups (Lindsay, Wallbridge, &
Drennan, 1987; Pryke, Lindsay, Dysart, & Dupuis, 2004).
The results indicate that multiple lineups can be applied as a procedure to avoid false
identifications with regard to suspect/target choices, whereas the benefit of multiple lineups
for lineup rejections and foil choices seems rather limited. Yet, although the combination of
lineups for target/suspect choices shows higher diagnosticity than looking at just a single
lineup, there are also cases where participants correctly identify the target from a facial lineup
but not from another lineup. Thus, multiple identifications should be viewed as stronger evi-
dence than a single identification (cf. Pryke et al., 2004). However, single lineup evidence
must not be discarded per se.
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To conclude, the present studies suggest that both decision times and post-decision
confidence should be collected at the time of identification and be combined in order to assess
identification accuracy. Investigators need to be aware though, that there is no postdictive
value of nonchooser's estimates. Furthermore, these data ought to be collected at the time of
identification in order to prevent distortion by feedback or media (see Semmler, Brewer, &
Wells, 2004; Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003). The finding that con-
fidence ratings that are made in the court room should not serve as evidence entails the need
for some changes in police work and the judiciary. From the results of empirical research we
can derive, that questions about confidence regarding the identification decision should not be
admitted at court. Instead, a video of the identification or at least a written protocol which
includes the decision time and post-decision confidence of the witness should be provided.
There seem to be no negative effects of target descriptions on identification accuracy when
there is a sufficient interval between description and identification, as there is in real cases.
Finally, the data speak for the application of multiple lineups with regard to suspect/target
choices as a procedure to avoid false identifications. Before multiple lineups are applied in
real cases, however, further studies are necessary, in order to specify how many and which
particular lineup types should be used.
In real cases, the results for the assessment variables (decision times, confidence, deci-
sion processes) and control variables (target description, multiple lineups) examined in the
present dissertation may vary from those that we obtain in laboratory or field studies. Rea-
sons could be, for example, awareness of the severe consequences of false identifications and
false rejections or the stress level at encoding or recognition. It would be interesting to collect
data on these issues in real cases so they can be compared to the data obtained in labora-
tory/field studies. Undoubtedly, it would be a great contribution to the field of identification
if data were collected even where DNA samples exist, so that identification accuracy could
actually be assessed in real cases.
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DEUTSCHE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die Bedeutung von Personenidentifizierungen durch Augenzeugen für die
Ermittlungsarbeit und die strafrechtliche Verfolgung von Straftaten ist nach wie vor
unbestritten, auch wenn inzwischen häufig auf DNA-Analysen zurückgegriffen werden kann.
Die Forschung auf diesem Gebiet beschäftigt sich seit über 30 Jahren mit Faktoren, die einen
positiven oder negativen Einfluss auf die Identifizierungsleistung haben können. Diese werden
Schätz- und Systemvariablen genannt (Wells, 1978). Schätzvariablen können unterteilt werden
in Situationsvariablen, die nur post hoc untersucht werden können (z.B. Lichtverhältnisse),
und Beurteilungsvariablen (Sporer, 1993), die angewendet werden, um den
Entscheidungsprozess von Zeugen zu evaluieren. System- oder Kontrollvariablen hingegen
sind solche Variablen, die vom Rechtssystem normalerweise kontrolliert werden können. Sie
beinhalten Testfaktoren, wie z.B. die Instruktionen für den Zeugen und die Zusammensetzung
der Gegenüberstellung. Eine vielfach untersuchte Systemvariable ist die Beschreibung der
Zielperson durch einen Augenzeugen. In der vorliegenden Dissertation wurden einerseits
System-/Kontrollvariablen (Experimente 1 und 4) sowie Beurteilungsvariablen untersucht
(Experimente 2 und 3).
Experiment 1: Personenbeschreibungen und
Personenidentifizierung: Verbale Überlagerung oder
Verschiebung des Wiedererkennenskriteriums?
Jeder Identifizierungsaufgabe geht normalerweise eine Personenbeschreibung durch
einen Augenzeugen voraus. Obwohl dieses Vorgehen offenkundig zu sein scheint, gibt es
einige Untersuchungen, die dieses Vorgehen in Frage stellen. So wurde gezeigt, dass der
Personenbeschreibungsprozess negative Auswirkungen in Form eines verbalen
Überlagerungseffekts auf die Identifizierungsleistung haben kann (Meissner & Brigham,
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2001), d.h. dass Probanden, die die Zielperson beschrieben, schlechtere
Identifizierungsleistungen erbrachten als solche, die dies nicht taten.
Es gibt drei theoretische Ansätze, um dieses Phänomen zu erklären: Der Ansatz des
transfer-inappropriate processing shift (TIPS; Schooler, 2002) geht davon aus, dass die
verbalen Prozesse, die während einer Personenbeschreibung ablaufen, die darauf folgenden
non-verbalen Prozesse, die für das Wiedererkennen eines Gesichtes notwendig sind, hemmen.
Es wird aber keine Veränderung der ursprünglichen Gedächtnisspur angenommen. Der Ansatz
der retrieval-based interference (RBI; Meissner, Brigham, & Kelley, 2001) postuliert im
Gegensatz dazu, dass der verbale Überlagerungseffekt aus einer Veränderung der
Gedächtnisspur resultiert. Der Ansatz von Clare und Lewandowsky (2004) hingegen
konzentrierte sich auf mentale Prozesse. Demnach überwachen Zeugen ihre Fähigkeit, eine
Person zu beschreiben, genauso, wie sie dies bei anderen Gedächtnisaufgaben tun (Brigham &
Pressley, 1988; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Schraw, 1998). Aufgrund der relativen
Unerfahrenheit hinsichtlich des Beschreibens von Personen ist es wahrscheinlich, dass diese
Aufgabe als schwierig empfunden wird, und dass es keine Vorerfahrungen gibt, mit denen die
Zeugen ihre eigene Beschreibung vergleichen können (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004).
Aufgrunddessen nehmen Clare und Lewandowsky (2004) an, dass sich Zeugen hinsichtlich
der Qualität ihrer Beschreibung unsicher sind, was dazu führen kann, dass sie die
Lichtbildvorlage eher zurückweisen, also Nichtwähler werden. Es wird also eine Verschiebung
des Entscheidungskriteriums in die konservative Richtung erwartet.
Anders als von den Ansätzen zur verbalen Überlagerung angenommen, ist es aber auch
denkbar, dass Verbalisierung durch Wiederherstellung des Wahrnehmungskontextes positive
Effekte auf das Wiedererkennen hat (z.B. Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Cutler, Penrod,
O'Rourke, & Martens, 1986; Davids, 2006; Sporer, 2007). Die Forschungsergebnisse hierzu
sind jedoch uneinheitlich. Möglicherweise beeinträchtigen andere Effekte, wie der verbale
Überlagerungseffekt und die Verschiebung des Entscheidungskriteriums, die positiven Effekte
der Wiederherstellung des Wahrnehmungskontextes.
Experiment 1 zielte darauf ab, die verschiedenen Erklärungsansätze gegeneinander zu
testen. Es wurden drei Gruppen getestet: keine Personenbeschreibung (Kontrollgruppe), nur
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Personenbeschreibung und Personenbeschreibung mit nochmaligem Lesen der eigenen
Beschreibung (Wiederlesen). Das Lesen der eigenen Beschreibung unmittelbar vor der
Identifizierungsaufgabe sollte dazu dienen, die Probanden wieder in den verbalen Modus zu
versetzen. Wenn dies zu ungeeigneter Verarbeitung führt, sollte der verbale
Überlagerungseffekt in dieser Gruppe besonders deutlich zu Tage treten. Um die ökologische
Validität der Untersuchung zu erhöhen, lag zwischen der Beschreibung und der Identifizierung
ein Intervall von einer Woche (s. Behrman & Richards, 2005; Valentine, Pickering, & Darling,
2003). Um die Hypothese der Kriteriumsverschiebung (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004)
untersuchen zu können, erhielten 50% der Probanden eine Lichtbildvorlage mit (target-
present; TP), 50% eine Lichtbildvorlage ohne Zielperson (target-absent; TA). Da
Standardinstruktionen verwendet wurden (vgl. Meissner & Brigham, 2001), wurde kein
verbaler Überlagerungseffekt, verursacht durch ungeeignete Verarbeitung (TIPS) oder eine
Veränderung der Gedächtnisspur, (RBI) erwartet. Stattdessen wurde eine
Kriteriumsverschiebung (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004) postuliert. Konkret wurde für die
Beschreibungsgruppen eine konservative Kriteriumsverschiebung angenommen, die im
Vergleich zur Kontrollgruppe zu einer höheren Zurückweisungsrate führen sollte. Da es bisher
keine Befunde hinsichtlich der Dauer dieser Kriteriumsverschiebung gibt, waren zwei
Resultate denkbar: (1) Wenn die Kriteriumsverschiebung dauerhaft ist, sollten alle Beschreiber
die Lichtbildvorlage gleichhäufig zurückweisen; (2) wenn die Kriteriumsverschiebung aber
vorübergehend ist, dann sollte die Gruppe, die nur beschreibt (ohne Wiederlesen), ein
ähnliches Wahlverhalten zeigen wie die Kontrollgruppe. Wiederleser sollten hingegen die
Lichtbildvorlage häufiger zurückweisen als die anderen beiden Gruppen. Dies würde für TA
Lichtbildvorlagen zu einer höheren Rate korrekter Entscheidungen (richtige Zurückweisung),
für TP Lichtbildvorlagen zu einer geringeren Rate korrekter Entscheidungen (Treffer) führen.
Ausgehend vom Prinzip der Wiederherstellung des Wahrnehmungskontextes wurde
erwartet, dass Wiederleser eine bessere Identifizierungsleistung aufweisen als die anderen
beiden Gruppen.
Die Ergebnisse zeigten keinen Einfluss der Beschreibung oder des Wiederlesens auf die
Identifizierungsleistung, wohl aber auf das Wahlverhalten: Wiederleser wiesen die
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Gegenüberstellung signifikant häufiger zurück als die Kontrollgruppe und Beschreiber ohne
Wiederlesen. Diese Ergebnisse sprechen für eine Kriteriumsverschiebung bei den Wiederlesern
(Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004). Hinsichtlich der Dauer der Kriteriumsverschiebung ist
aufgrund der vorliegenden Ergebnisse anzunehmen, dass diese entweder nur dann auftritt,
wenn (1) die Identifizierungsaufgabe unmittelbar auf die Beschreibungsaufgabe folgt (vgl.
Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004), oder (2) die Beschreibung vor der Identifizierungsaufgabe
reaktiviert wird, beispielsweise durch Wiederlesen.
Das Ausbleiben eines verbalen Überlagerungseffektes wurde bereits in anderen
Untersuchungen, bei denen zwischen Beschreibung und Identifizierung ein Zeitintervall von
mehr als 24 Stunden lag, berichtet (z.B. Clifford, 2003; Memon & Rose, 2002; Yu &
Geiselman, 1993). Dies deutet darauf hin, dass es einen Bedarf an Untersuchungen mit
längeren (ökologisch valideren) post-Beschreibungsintervallen gibt, um den Fragen nach der
Dauer und Umkehrbarkeit der Auswirkungen von Personenbeschreibungen auf die
Identifizierungsleistung weiter nachzugehen.
Experiment 2: Subjektive Sicherheit, Entscheidungszeit und
selbstberichtete Entscheidungsprozesse als
Beurteilungsvariablen für die Richtigkeit von
Identifizierungsaussagen
Beurteilungsvariablen sind Variablen, die dazu dienen, eine Identifizierungsaussage
nachträglich hinsichtlich ihrer Richtigkeit zu bewerten. Die am häufigsten verwendeten
Beurteilungsvariablen sind subjektive Sicherheit nach der Identifizierung und
Entscheidungszeit. Bei der Untersuchung dieser Variablen ist die Unterscheidung zwischen
Personen, die die Lichtbildvorlage zurückweisen (Nichtwähler) und solchen, die eine Person
aus der Lichtbildvorlage auswählen (Wähler) von großer Bedeutung. In der Literatur zeigte
sich für Wähler ein recht robuster positiver Zusammenhang zwischen subjektiver Sicherheit
und Identifizierungsleistung (z.B., Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995) sowie ein negativer
Zusammenhang zwischen Entscheidungszeit und Identifizierungsleistung (z.B., Sporer,
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1992a, 1993, 1994; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004). Keine solchen
Zusammenhänge wurden für Nichtwähler gefunden. Die Ergebnisse zur Entscheidungszeit
werden nun vermehrt im Zusammenhang mit Befunden zum Entscheidungsprozess von
Augenzeugen betrachtet: Wähler, die von automatischem Wiedererkennen sprachen, trafen
deutlich häufiger eine korrekte (und schnelle) Entscheidung als solche, die von eliminativen
Prozessen während des Wiedererkennens berichteten (Caputo & Dunning, 2005; Dunning &
Stern, 1994; Kneller, Memon, & Stevenage, 2001).
Obwohl Entscheidungszeit und subjektive Sicherheit nach der Identifizierung in der
Vergangenheit bereits erfolgreich kombiniert wurden (Sporer, 1992a; Weber et al., 2004),
befasst sich der überwiegende Anteil der Forschung mit nur einer Beurteilungsvariablen. Ziel
von Experiment 2 war es zu überprüfen, ob die Kombination von drei Beurteilungsvariablen
dazu führt, dass mehr Identifizierungsentscheidungen korrekt klassifiziert werden, als wenn
nur eine Beurteilungsvariable herangezogen wird. Bei den untersuchten Beurteilungsvariablen
handelte es sich um die subjektive Sicherheit, Entscheidungszeit und selbstberichtete
Entscheidungsprozesse.
Weiterhin befasste sich Experiment 2, das als Laboruntersuchung durchgeführt wurde,
mit Entscheidungsprozessen von Nichtwählern. Vorangehende Untersuchungen zeigten relativ
einheitlich, dass Zusammenhänge der Identifizierungsleistung mit der subjektiven Sicherheit
nach der Identifizierung (z.B. Sporer et al., 1995; Weber & Brewer, 2003) und der
Entscheidungszeit (z.B. Dunning & Stern, 1994; Sporer, 1992a, 1993; Weber et al., 2004,
Weber & Brewer, 2006) für negative Identifizierungsentscheidungen (Nichtwähler) nicht
gelten. Bisher wurde keine Beurteilungsvariable gefunden, die ein valides Urteil hinsichtlich
der Richtigkeit von Identifizierungsentscheidungen von Nichtwählern erlaubt. Gleichwohl ist
die Beurteilung der von Nichtwählern gemachten Identifizierungsaussagen zur Entlastung
unschuldiger Verdächtiger von erheblicher Bedeutung. Daher wurden in der vorliegenden
Untersuchung speziell für Nichtwähler Fragen zum Entscheidungsprozess konzipiert, um
deren Brauchbarkeit als Beurteilungsvariable zu überprüfen.
Wie erwartet konnten durch die Kombination von subjektiver Sicherheit und
Entscheidungszeit mehr Wähler korrekt klassifiziert werden als bei Berücksichtigung von nur
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einer Beurteilungsvariablen. Hinsichtlich der selbstberichteten Entscheidungsprozesse ergaben
sich weder für Wähler noch für Nichtwähler Zusammenhänge mit der Identifizierungsleistung.
Weiterhin wurde das Ergebnis repliziert, dass es für Nichtwähler keine Zusammenhänge
zwischen subjektiver Sicherheit, Entscheidungszeit und Identifizierungsleistung gibt.
Die Entscheidungsprozesse von Wählern und Nichtwählern wurden in Experiment 3
weiter untersucht.
Experiment 3: Schnell und sicher: Die Nachhersage von
Identifizierungsaussagen in einer Felduntersuchung
Experiment 3 hatte, wie Experiment 2, die Zielsetzung, Beurteilungsvariablen zur
Evaluation von Identifizierungsentscheidungen zu kombinieren. Weiterhin wurden die
Entscheidungsprozesse von Wählern und Nichtwählern weiter untersucht. Im Vergleich zu
Experiment 2 wurden die folgenden Änderungen vorgenommen. (1) Zur Erhöhung der
ökologischen Validität wurde Experiment 3 als Feldexperiment durchgeführt. (2) Im Sinne der
internen Replikation der Ergebnisse wurde mit 10 anstatt mit nur einer Zielperson gearbeitet
(s. Wells & Windschitl, 1999). (3) Ursprünglich sollte in Experiment 2 noch eine weitere
Beurteilungsvariable, ein Urteil hinsichtlich des Bewusstseinszustandes und der Existenz einer
Erinnerungserfahrung (Erinnern-Wissen-Vertraut sein Urteil), einbezogen werden. Die
Operationalisierung schlug jedoch fehl und wurde daher für Experiment 3 geändert. (4)
Selbstberichtete Erinnerungsprozesse wurden nicht erhoben.
Hinsichtlich des Erinnern-Wissen-Vertraut sein Urteils argumentierten Rotello,
Macmillan, und Reeder (2004), dass Personen, die ein Erinnern-Urteil fällen (Erinnerung an
bestimmte Merkmale der Person), über eine größere spezifische Gedächtnisstärke verfügen.
Im Vergleich dazu gehen Wissen-Urteile eher mit einer globalen (unspezifischen)
Gedächtnisstärke einher. Ausgehend von diesen Annahmen würde erwartet, dass Wähler, die
ein Erinnern-Urteil abgeben, häufiger eine richtige Entscheidung treffen als solche, die ein
Wissen-Urteil abgeben.
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Ein anderer Ansatz zur Betrachtung von Entscheidungsprozessen wird von Dunning
und Stern (1994) vertreten. Sie unterscheiden zwischen automatischen und deliberaten
Entscheidungsprozessen. Dunning und Stern (1994) postulieren, dass Zeugen, die von
automatischen Entscheidungsprozessen berichten, häufiger korrekte
Identifizierungsentscheidungen treffen als Zeugen, die eher deliberate Entscheidungen treffen.
Setzt man diesen Ansatz mit dem Erinnern-Wissen Paradigma in Bezug, dann würden wir
erwarten, dass Wissen Antworten mit automatischen Entscheidungsprozessen und höherer
Richtigkeit in Zusammenhang stehen als die deliberaten Erinnern Antworten. Dunning und
Sterns (1994) Ansatz fand einige Unterstützung (Caputo & Dunning, 2005; Dunning & Stern,
1994; Kneller et al., 2001). In einer anderen Untersuchung gelang es jedoch nicht, anhand von
selbstberichteten Entscheidungsprozessen richtige von falschen Entscheidungen zu
unterscheiden (Brewer, Gordon, & Bond, 2000).
Es gibt also rivalisierende Hypothesen bezüglich der Überlegenheit von Erinnern- und
Wissens-Urteilen in Bezug auf die Klassifikation von Identifizierungsaussagen und die
Datenlage ist uneinheitlich. Bislang gibt es nur wenige Untersuchungen zu diesem Thema.
Experiment 3 sollte unter anderem dazu dienen, zusätzliche Daten diesbezüglich zu liefern. Es
wurde erwartet, dass sowohl Personen, die Erinnern, als auch solche, die Wissen angeben, im
Durchschnitt bessere Identifizierungsleistungen erbringen würden als Personen, die Vertraut
sein angeben.
Weiterhin beschäftigte sich Experiment 3 mit der Beurteilung von
Identifizierungsaussagen, die von Nichtwählern gemacht wurden, bediente sich aber einer
anderen Vorgehensweise als Experiment 2. Sporer et al. (1995) argumentierten, dass die
Gruppe der Nichtwähler möglicherweise eine große Heterogenität aufweist. Daher wurden in
der vorliegenden Untersuchung die Nichtwähler anhand der von ihnen gemachten Aussagen in
drei Gruppen aufgeteilt: (1) Nichtwähler, die davon überzeugt waren, dass die Zielperson in
der Lichtbildvorlage nicht anwesend war ("abwesend"), (2) Nichtwähler, die sich zu unsicher
waren, um eine Wahl zu treffen und ("unsicher"), und (3) Nichtwähler, die keine Erinnerung
hatten und daher keine (positive) Entscheidung treffen wollten ("keine Erinnerung"). Es wurde
erwartet, dass in der abwesend Gruppe mehr korrekte Entscheidungen getroffen werden als in
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den beiden anderen Gruppen. Weiterhin wurde erwartet, dass die abwesend Gruppe ihre
Entscheidungen schneller, sowie mit höherer subjektiver Sicherheit vor und nach der
Identifizierungsentscheidung trifft. Für die unsichere und die keine Erinnerung Gruppe wurde
erwartet, dass erstere die geringste Identifizierungsleistung erbringt, längere
Entscheidungszeiten braucht und niedrigere subjektive Sicherheiten angibt.
Wie in Experiment 2 wurden subjektive Sicherheit und Entscheidungszeit für Wähler
erfolgreich miteinander kombiniert. Hierdurch wurde eine sehr hohe Anzahl der
Entscheidungen korrekt klassifiziert. Zwar zeigte sich ein Zusammenhang zwischen dem
Erinnern-Wissen-Vertraut sein Urteil und der Identifizierungsleistung, jedoch trug dies nicht
zu einer höheren Anzahl korrekter Klassifizierungen bei, als es bereits durch die beiden
anderen Beurteilungsvariablen der Fall war.
Es wurde erwartet, dass Nichtwähler der abwesend Gruppe in ihrer
Identifizierungsentscheidung häufiger richtig lagen als Nichtwähler der anderen beiden
Gruppen. Es zeigte sich ein nicht-signifikanter Trend in diese Richtung. Die abwesend
Gruppe war aber wie erwartet hinsichtlich ihrer Entscheidungen schneller und sicherer.
Zwischen den anderen beiden Gruppen ergab sich nur hinsichtlich der subjektiven Sicherheit
vor der Identifizierung ein signifikanter Unterschied. Allerdings war die unsichere Gruppe
entgegen den Erwartungen vor der Identifizierung signifikant sicherer als die keine Erinnerung
Gruppe.
Neben mangelnder Homogenität innerhalb der Gruppe der Nichtwähler gibt es noch
eine weitere mögliche Erklärung für die nichtgefundenen Zusammenhänge zwischen
Identifizierungsleistung und Beurteilungsvariablen bei Nichtwählern. So verlaufen die
Entscheidungsprozesse von Wählern und Nichtwählern vermutlich asymmetrisch (Weber &
Brewer, 2004). Während die Entscheidungen von Wählern auf einer Passung zwischen dem
Gedächtnis für die Zielperson und einem Gesicht in der Lichtbildvorlage basiert, basiert die
Entscheidung von Nichtwählern darauf, dass eben solch eine Passung nicht festgestellt werden
kann. Weber und Brewer (2006) argumentierten, dass die Angaben zur subjektiven Sicherheit
von Nichtwählern wohl nicht auf der subjektiven Sicherheit hinsichtlich des Gesichtes mit der
besten Passung basieren. In diesem Fall würde man nämlich, ähnlich wie bei Wählern, einen
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Zusammenhang zwischen subjektiver Sicherheit und Identifizierungsleistung erwarten. Dies
ist aber nicht der Fall. Weber und Brewer (2006) schlossen daher, dass die Angaben zur
subjektiven Sicherheit von Nichtwählern die durchschnittliche Passung für alle Personen in der
Lichtbildvorlage widerspiegelt. Diese Hypothese könnte entweder durch Abfragen der
subjektiven Sicherheit für jedes einzelne Gesicht in einer Lichtbildvorlage überprüft werden
(Sporer, 1993) oder durch den Gebrauch von Lichtbildvorlagen mit nur einer Person
(showups). Folgt man Weber und Brewers (2006) Argumentation, dann sollten sich dann
Zusammenhänge zwischen Beurteilungsvariablen und Identifizierungsleistung ergeben.
Experiment 4: Die Anwendung multipler
Gegenüberstellungen in einer Felduntersuchung
Nach wie vor bleibt die Frage, wie man mit Nichtwählern und weniger sicheren oder
langsameren Wählern umgehen soll, unbeantwortet. Eine neue Methode zur Beurteilung von
Identifizierungsaussagen wurde von Lindsay, Wallbridge und Drennan (1987) eingeführt und
von Pryke, Lindsay, Dysart und Dupuis (2004) weiterentwickelt. In diesen Untersuchungen
nahmen die Versuchspersonen nicht nur eine Identifizierung aus einer Portraitvorlage vor,
sondern unabhängig davon auch aus einer Bekleidungsvorlage (Lindsay et al., 1987) oder
Körper- und Stimmvorlage (Pryke et al., 2004). Auf diese Art und Weise konnten von einem
Zeugen/einer Zeugin mehrere voneinander unabhängige Aussagen gewonnen werden und die
Ratewahrscheinlichkeit deutlich verringert werden. Die bisherigen Ergebnisse (Lindsay et al.,
1987; Pryke et al., 2004) sprechen dafür, dass die wiederholte Identifizierung einer Person aus
verschiedenen Lichtbildvorlagen wahrscheinlicher ist, wenn es sich hierbei tatsächlich um die
Zielperson handelt und nicht um einen unschuldigen Verdächtigen. Mit solchen multiplen
Lichtbildvorlagen beschäftigte sich Experiment 4.
Der beschriebene Effekt wurde bisher nur für drei Zielpersonen gezeigt (Lindsay et al.,
1987; Pryke et al., 2004). Um eine bessere Generalisierbarkeit der Ergebnisse zu
gewährleisten, wurden in der vorliegenden Untersuchung neun Zielpersonen einbezogen. Den
Probanden wurden Portrait-, Körper-, Accessoire- (Einkaufstasche) und Profilvorlagen
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vorgelegt. Wenn multiple Lichtbildvorlagen tatsächlich unabhängig voneinander sind, so
würden wir keine signifikante Korrelation hinsichtlich der Leistung in den verschiedenen
Lichtbildvorlagen erwarten. Dies steht jedoch im Gegensatz zu dem Befund, dass leere
Lichtbildvorlagen (blank lineups; Lichtbildvorlagen die bekanntermaßen TA sind) einen
Vorhersagewert für die Leistung in folgenden Gegenüberstellungen haben (Wells, 1984). Dies
setzt nämlich eben eine solche Korrelation zwischen den Leistungen in den einzelnen
Lichtbildvorlagen voraus. Meines Wissens ist Wells' (1984) Studie die einzige, die sich bisher
mit diesem Thema auseinandergesetzt hat, allerdings nur für die Sequenz von TA
Portraitvorlagen, gefolgt von TA oder TP Portraitvorlagen. Um die Nützlichkeit leerer
Lichtbildvorlagen für unterschiedliche Arten von Gegenüberstellungen (Portrait, Körper,
Tasche, Profil) zu überprüfen, wurden jeder Versuchsperson je zwei TA (Portrait und Körper
oder Profil und Tasche) und TP Vorlagen vorgelegt.
Wenn leere Lichtbildvorlagen einen Vorhersagewert hinsichtlich der Leistung in
anderen Arten von Gegenüberstellungen haben, dann sollten Versuchspersonen, die die leeren
(TA) Gegenüberstellungen korrekt zurückweisen, in TP Gegenüberstellungen bessere
Leistungen erbringen als solche, die hierzu nicht in der Lage sind. Wenn die Leistung in den
unterschiedlichen Gegenüberstellungsarten jedoch unabhängig voneinander ist, dann sollten die
leeren Gegenüberstellungen keinen prädiktiven Wert hinsichtlich der Leistung in TP
Lichtbildvorlagen haben. Weiterhin wurde erwartet, dass zwei Identifizierungsentscheidungen
(Portrait und Körper/Profil und Tasche) über eine höhere Diagnostizität verfügen als nur die
Identifizierungsentscheidung hinsichtlich des Gesichts (Portrait oder Profil).
Es zeigte sich, dass die Wahl der Zielperson bzw. deren Austauschperson (in der
Praxis ein unschuldig Verdächtigter) im Vergleich zu Zurückweisungen und zur Wahl eines
Distraktors (bekanntermaßen unschuldig) die höchste Diagnostizität erreichte. Die
Portraitvorlage und deren Kombination mit der Körpervorlage erreichten die höchste
Diagnostizität für die Wahl der Zielperson/Austauschperson. Zurückweisungen sprachen zu
einem gewissen Maße für Unschuld, allerdings waren die ermittelten Diagnostizitäten weitaus
geringer als die für die Wahl der Zielperson/deren Austauschperson. Auch hier erreichten die
Portraitvorlage und deren Kombination mit der Körpervorlage die höchste Diagnostizität,
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jedoch führte die Kombination nicht zu einer Erhöhung derselben. Die Wahl eines Distraktors
war akzeptabel für Portraitvorlagen, aber sehr begrenzt für alle anderen Vorlagen oder deren
Kombinationen. Insgesamt unterstützen die vorliegenden Ergebnisse die Befunde
vorangehender Untersuchungen (Lindsay et al., 1987; Pryke et al., 2004).
Die Identifizierungsleistungen in den vier unterschiedlichen Lichtbildvorlagen standen nicht
miteinander in Zusammenhang. Dies spricht dafür, dass multiple Lichtbildvorlagen als
voneinander unabhängige Beweisstücke verwendet werden können. Demgemäß wurden in der
vorliegenden Untersuchung im Gegensatz zu Wells (1984) keine Anhaltspunkte für die
Nützlichkeit von leeren Lichtbildvorlagen gefunden. Möglicherweise ist die Nützlichkeit leerer
Lichtbildvorlagen auf Portraits oder Lichtbildvorlagen desselben Körperteils beschränkt. So
könnten leere Profilvorlagen prädiktiven Wert für Profilvorlagen haben, nicht jedoch für
Körpervorlagen.
Zusammenfassend kann aufgrund der vorliegenden Daten geschlossen werden, dass
sowohl Entscheidungszeit als auch subjektive Sicherheit bei der Identifizierung erhoben und
zur Beurteilung der Identifizierungsaussage miteinander kombiniert werden sollten.
Ermittlungsbeamte sollten sich allerdings dessen bewusst sein, dass für Nichtwähler keine
Aussage aufgrund dieser Variablen getroffen werden kann. Zudem sollten diese Daten
unmittelbar während/nach der Identifizierung erhoben werden, um eine Beeinflussung durch
Feedback oder Medien zu verhindern (s. Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004; Wells & Bradfield,
1998; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003). Die Erkenntnis, dass die Beurteilung der subjektiven
Sicherheit im Gerichtssaal aus psychologischer Sicht keinerlei Beweiswert hat, bringt die
Notwendigkeit von Veränderungen der Poliziearbeit und des Rechtswesens mit sich. Aus den
Ergebnissen der empirischen Forschung lässt sich ableiten, dass vor Gericht keine Fragen zur
subjektiven Sicherheit zugelassen werden sollten. Stattdessen sollte möglichst ein Video von
der Identifizierung gemacht werden, mindestens jedoch ein Protokoll erstellt werden, das die
subjektive Sicherheit und Entscheidungszeit des Zeugen zum Zeitpunkt der Identifizierung
festhält. Einen negativen Effekt von Personenbeschreibungen auf die Identifizierungsleistung
scheint es nicht zu geben, wenn zwischen Beschreibung und Identifizierung ausreichend Zeit
liegt. Dies ist in der Realität der Fall. Die Daten sprechen weiterhin für die Anwendung
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multipler Lichtbildvorlagen bezüglich Wahlen der Zielperson/des Verdächtigen, um falsche
Identifizierungen zu vermeiden. Hinsichtlich Distraktor-Wahlen und Zurückweisungen
hingegen sind multiple Lichtbildvorlagen nach derzeitigen Erkenntnissen weniger brauchbar.
Bevor die Anwendung multipler Lichtbildvorlagen jedoch in die Praxis umgesetzt wird, sind
weitere Studien erforderlich, die untersuchen, wie viele und welche spezifischen
Lichtbildvorlagen zu verwenden sind.
In realen Fällen könnten die Ergebnisse bezüglich der hier untersuchten
Beurteilungsvariablen (subjektive Sicherheit, Entscheidungszeit, Entscheidungsprozesse) und
Kontrollvariablen (Personenbeschreibung, multiple Lichtbildvorlagen) von jenen, die wir in
Labor- oder Feldstudien erhalten, abweichen. Gründe hierfür könnten beispielsweise die
Konsequenzen der Entscheidung oder Stress bei der Enkodierung/dem Wiedererkennen sein.
Es wäre interessant, Daten in realen Fällen zu erheben, so dass diese mit Feld-
/Laboruntersuchungen verglichen werden könnten. Zweifelsohne wäre es ein großer Beitrag
zur Identifizierungsforschung, wenn Daten auch dann erhoben werden würden, wenn DNA
Spuren vorliegen, so dass die Identifizierungsleistung in realen Fällen überprüft werden
könnte.
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 211
References
Behrman, B. W. & Richards, R. E. (2005). Suspect/foil identification in actual crimes and in
the laboratory: A reality monitoring analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 29, 279-301.
Brewer, N., Gordon, M., & Bond, N. (2000). Effect of photoarray exposure duration on
eyewitness identification accuracy and processing strategy. Psychology, Crime and
Law, 6, 21-32.
Brigham, J. C., & Pressley, M. (1988). Cognitive monitoring and strategy choice in younger
and older adults. Psychology and Aging, 3, 249-257.
Caputo, D. D., & Dunning, D. (2005). Eyewitness accuracy and decision processes using se-
quential lineups. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Clare, J., & Lewandowsky, S. (2004). Verbalizing facial memory: Criterion effects in verbal
overshadowing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
30, 739-755.
Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Martens, T. K. (1987). Improving the reliability of eyewitness
identification: Putting context into context. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72, 629-
637.
Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., O´Rourke, T. E., & Martens, T. K. (1986). Unconfounding the
effects of contextual cues on eyewitness identification accuracy. Social Behaviour, 1,
113-134.
Davids, M. S. C. (2006). Knowing what you know: Meta-memory and the effects of verbal
overshadowing on eyewitness identification testimony. Unpublished master’s thesis,
University of Giessen, Germany.
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 212
Dunning, D. &. Stern, L. B. (1994). Distinguishing accurate from inaccurate eyewitness iden-
tification via inquiries about decision processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 67, 818-835.
Kneller, W., Memon, A., & Stevenage, S. (2001). Simultaneous and sequential lineups: Deci-
sion processes of accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses. Applied Cognitive Psychology,
15, 659-671.
Koriat, A., & Goldsmith, M. (1996). Monitoring and control processes in the strategic regula-
tion of memory accuracy. Psychological Review, 103, 490-517.
Lindsay, R. C. L., Wallbridge, H., & Drennan, D. (1987). Do the clothes make the man? An
exploration of the effect of lineup attire on eyewitness identification accuracy. Canadian
Journal of Behavioural Science, 19, 464-478.
Meissner, C. A., & Brigham, J. C. (2001). A meta-analysis of the verbal overshadowing effect
in face identification. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15, 603-616.
Meissner, C. A., Brigham, J. C., & Kelley, C. M. (2001). The influence of retrieval processes
in verbal overshadowing. Memory and Cognition, 29, 176-186.
Pryke, S., Lindsay, R. C. L., Dysart, J. E., & Dupuis, P. (2004). Multiple independent identi-
fication decisions: A method of calibrating eyewitness identifications. Journal of Ap-
plied Psychology, 89, 73-84.
Rotello, C. M., Macmillan, N. A., & Reeder, J. A. (2004). Sum-difference theory of remem-
bering and knowing: A two-dimensional signal-detection model. Psychological Review,
111, 588-616.
Schooler, J. W. (2002). Verbalization produces a transfer inappropriate processing shift. Ap-
plied Cognitive Psychology, 16, 989-997.
Schraw, G. (1998). Promoting general metacognitive awareness. Instructional Science, 26,
113-125.
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 213
Semmler, C., Brewer, N., & Wells, G. L. (2004). Effects of postidentification feedback on
eyewitness identification and nonidentification confidence. Journal of Applied Psychol-
ogy, 89, 1-13.
Sporer, S. L. (1992a). Post-dicting eyewitness accuracy: Confidence, decision-times and per-
son descriptions of choosers and non-choosers. European Journal of Social Psychology,
22, 157-180.
Sporer, S. L. (1993). Eyewitness identification accuracy, confidence and decision times in si-
multaneous and sequential lineups. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 22-33.
Sporer, S. L. (1994). Decision–times and eyewitness identification accuracy in simultaneous
and sequential lineups. In D. F. Ross, J. D. Read, & M. P. Toglia (Eds.), Adult eyewit-
ness testimony: Current trends and developments (pp. 300-327). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Sporer, S. L. (2007). Person descriptions as retrieval cues: Do they really help? Psychology,
Crime, & Law.
Sporer, S. L., Penrod, S. D., Read, J. D., & Cutler, B. L. (1995). Choosing, confidence, and
accuracy: A meta–analysis of the confidence-accuracy relation in eyewitness identifica-
tion studies. Psychological Bulletin, 118, 315-327.
Valentine, T., Pickering, A., & Darling, S. (2003). Characteristics of eyewitness identification
that predict the outcome of real lineups. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 969-993.
Weber, N., & Brewer, N. (2003). The effect of judgment type and confidence scale on confi-
dence-accuracy calibration in face recognition. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 490-
499.
Weber, N., & Brewer, N. (2004). Confidence-accuracy calibration in absolute and relative face
recognition judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 10, 156-172.
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 214
Weber, N., & Brewer, N. (2006). Positive versus negative face recognition decisions: Confi-
dence, accuracy, and response latency. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 17-31.
Weber, N., Brewer, N., Wells, G. L., Semmler, C., & Keast, A. (2004). Eyewitness identifica-
tion accuracy and response latency: The unruly 10-12 second rule. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Applied, 10, 139-147.
Wells, G. L. (1978). Applied eyewitness testimony research: System variables and estimator
variables. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1546-1557.
Wells, G. L. (1984). The psychology of lineup identifications. Journal of Applied Social Psy-
chology, 14, 89-103.
Wells, G. L., & Bradfield, A. L. (1998). "Good, you identified the suspect": Feedback to
eyewitnesses distorts their reports of the witnessing experience. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 83, 360-376.
Wells, G. L., Olson, E. A., & Charman, S. D. (2003). Distorted retrospective eyewitness re-
ports as functions of feedback and delay. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied,
9, 42-52.
Wells, G. L., & Windschitl, P. D. (1999). Stimulus sampling and social psychology experi-
mentation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1115-1125.
ERKLÄRUNG
Ich erkläre: Ich habe die vorgelegte Dissertation selbständig und nur mit den Hilfen angefertigt,
die ich in der Dissertation angegeben habe. Alle Textstellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus
veröffentlichten oder nicht veröffentlichten Schriften entnommen sind, und alle Angaben, die auf
mündlichen Auskünften beruhen, sind als solche kenntlich gemacht.
Gießen, im März 2007
________________________________
Melanie Sauerland
